--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 1539300 (Tulalip C.A.)
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Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals.

The Tulalip Tribes Plaintiff,
v.
Jesus Rivera Defendant.

NO. TUL-CR-VW-2025-0103
|
January 14, 2026

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Judge Mark Poulet

This matter came before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Jurisdiction. The Court having reviewed the record of the file herein and having listened to the arguments of the parties and having been otherwise fully informed issued an oral ruling on December 19, 2025, DENYING the motion. This written order outlines the Court’s reasoning.

The Court concludes that it has criminal jurisdiction over Defendant under 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(5)(E) because Attempting to Elude a Police Vehicle, as charged here, constitutes “obstruction of justice” within the meaning of that provision. On a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Court assumes the facts alleged by the prosecution are true.

FACTS

On December 4, 2024, Defendant was driving within the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation. Tulalip Police (TPD) attempted to stop him because the truck he was driving had a smashed-up windshield. Defendant did not pull over in response to emergency lights and sirens. Instead, he proceeded at a high rate of speed (more than 60-mph in a 30-mph zone) creating a substantial and immediate risk to public safety on Tribal roads. Additional police vehicles joined the pursuit that ultimately ended when Defendant entered southbound Interstate 5 and TPD called off the pursuit.

After investigation, Defendant was charged with one count “Attempting to Elude a Police Vehicle” pursuant to TTC 3.60.130(8). Defendant is not Native American,1 so he was charged under Special Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction pursuant to TTC 2.25.010(1)(c) and 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(5)(E), 1304(a)(9), 1304(b)(1) and 1304(c).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country has long been shaped by overlapping and often inconsistent federal, state, and tribal rules. In 2013, the Indian Law & Order Commission identified this jurisdictional complexity as a contributing factor to persistent public safety challenges in tribal communities.2 Although Congress has not fully restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over all offenders, it has taken incremental steps through amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), including the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) and Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), to recognize and reaffirm greater tribal authority over law enforcement and criminal justice. These enactments provide the statutory framework within which this Court evaluates the scope of the Tulalip Tribes’ criminal jurisdiction in this case.

1. Tulalip criminal jurisdiction is broad but has been restricted by federal law.

Analysis of Tribal Court jurisdiction begins with the Tribal Code and Constitution. The Tulalip Constitution is silent as to the establishment or jurisdiction of the Tulalip Tribal Court. Tulalip Tribal Code (TTC) 2.05.010 establishes the Court and TTC 2.05.020 declares, “The jurisdiction of the Tulalip Tribal Courts shall extend, except as limited by Federal statutory or Tulalip Tribal law, to (a) all persons natural and legal of any kind and to (b) all subject matters which, now and in the future, are permitted to be within the jurisdiction of any Tribal Court of a sovereign Indian tribe or nation recognized by the United States of America....” (emphasis added). While the Court operates under statutory authority, the statute grants broad general jurisdiction. TTC 2.05.030(1)(e) directs the Court to construe tribal law “to enhance public safety on the Tulalip Reservation.” TTC 2.05.030(7)(b) and (d) require the Court to give statutory words their plain meaning and construe all provisions as a whole to give effect to all parts. This is consistent with accepted rules of statutory interpretation in that the Court inquiry begins, and often ends, with the plain language of the text. Where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the language as written, and the judicial inquiry is complete.

It is accepted that federal case law currently restricts Native Tribes’ otherwise broad inherent criminal jurisdiction such that the Tulalip Tribes may not generally exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Native offenders. Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court tightened this restriction to exclude jurisdiction over nonmember Natives. In response to the Duro decision Congress amended ICRA to recognize Tribes’ inherent power to exercise jurisdiction over all Natives, including nonmembers. Reviewing this language in U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), the Supreme Court held the authority to prosecute nonmember Indians provided in the ICRA amendment was not a “grant” of jurisdiction or “delegation” of federal jurisdiction. Instead, the statute restored the sovereign authority of the Tribes that was previously restricted by Federal case law. The discussion and holding in Lara is instructive in the analysis of jurisdictional statements in the ICRA amendments of 2013 and 2022.

2. Congress conditionally restored Tribes’ inherent authority to prosecute non-Indians.

Congress amended ICRA in 2013 to expand the scope of special tribal criminal jurisdiction by recognizing and affirming the inherent power of Tribes to exercise special criminal jurisdiction over all persons for a narrow set of covered crimes. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (b)(1) & (c). In 2022 ICRA was amended further to restore Tribal authority to prosecute non-Native people for nine covered crimes as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (a)(5), and to remove other restrictions. Together these amendments expanded the scope of Tribal authority to protect broader segments of their communities. Consistent with US v. Lara, this Court treats § 1304 not as a delegation of federal power but as Congressional recognition of inherent tribal authority previously constrained by federal common law.

The Court interprets the scope of the Tulalip Tribes’ jurisdiction considering both statutory text and the Tribe’s express exercise of authority under its Code and will only find a lack of jurisdiction under compelling circumstances. Cf, In Re Marriage of Major, 71 Wn. App. 531 (1993). The Tulalip Tribal Code demands this approach. In relation to criminal jurisdiction over non-Native defendants TTC 2.25.010(1)(c) states, “The Tulalip Tribes hereby exercises criminal jurisdiction as a participating tribe to the fullest extent possible as defined within 25 U.S.C. 1304 as presently constituted or hereafter amended.” (emphasis supplied). Considering this directive, the Court broadly applies rules of statutory construction and jurisdictional boundaries to affirm jurisdiction if reasonable.

3. Tribes have authority to prosecute a broad category of conduct that constitutes “obstruction of justice.”

Defendant argues that the charged crime of “Attempting to Elude a Police Vehicle” pursuant to TTC 3.60.130(8) is not a “covered crime” under ICRA so the Tribes lack jurisdiction to prosecute him. The Tribes argue that jurisdiction is proper under § 1304(b)(1) & (c) because Attempting to Elude Police is a form of “Obstruction of Justice” which is a covered crime. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(5)(E) defines “Obstruction of Justice” as:

...any violation of the criminal law of the Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian country where the violation occurs that involves interfering with the administration or due process of the laws of the Indian tribe, including any Tribal criminal proceeding or investigation of a crime, (emphasis added)

Under the plain language of § 1304(a)(5)(E), attempting to elude a police vehicle “interferes” with the administration of the laws of the Tribe. Defendant’s contrary interpretation is inconsistent with settled rules of statutory construction and with persuasive authority addressing the same statutory language. The Court addresses Defendant’s arguments in three parts: A. whether obstruction is limited to codified offenses; B. whether obstruction must relate to another covered crime; and C. whether interference with civil enforcement may constitute obstruction.

A. Other definitions of “obstruction of justice” are not instructive in interpreting the ICRA amendments.

The Tulalip Code includes a specific crime of “Obstructing Justice” in TTC 3.35.170(2)(a) - (f). Federal law also criminalizes a set of acts as “Obstruction of Justice” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521. Defendant argues that only conduct that falls under these specific definitions can be considered “obstruction” under § 1304(a)(5)(E) and neither statute includes the act of eluding police to prevent a traffic stop. The plain language of § 1304(a) does not support this argument.

When Congress intended to utilize definitions found in other federal codes it specifically incorporated those definitions. For instance § 1304(a)(4) defines the terms “coercion” and “commercial sex act” by incorporating the definitions from section 1591(e) of title 18; § 1304(a)(8) incorporates the definition of “Indian country” from section 1151 of title 18; § 1304(a)(12) incorporates the definition of “sex trafficking” from section 1501(a) of title 18; and § 1304(a)(15) incorporates the definition of “spouse or intimate partner” fi*om section 2266 of title 18. Similarly, Congress specifically referenced tribal law regarding the age of consent in § 1304(a)(2)(B). If Congress intended to limit § 1304(a)(5)(E) to “obstruction of justice” as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 or a specific tribal law, it could have included necessary restrictive language, as it did in other portions of the same statute.

While other sections of § 1304 incorporate specific federal definitions, Congress did not to do so for obstruction, granting Tribes broader interpretative latitude. Congress used functional language (“interfering with the administration...”) rather than offense-label language, signaling the intent to capture conduct by effect rather than by title. Congress’ definition of “obstruction of justice” in the ICRA describes a broad category of conduct, not a specifically defined act.

B. The Tribes’ jurisdiction is not limited to interference with the investigation or prosecution of a “covered crime.”

Defendant argues prosecution under § 1304(a)(5)(E) may only occur if the alleged obstruction interferes with the investigation and proceedings of another “covered crime.” Defendant contends because the amendments were motivated to address domestic violence and similar offenses, traffic enforcement and general law enforcement are not included. Fundamental rules of statutory construction do not support this restrictive reading. For instance, § 1304(a)(1) identifies “assault of Tribal justice personnel” as a covered crime and defines it as “any violation of the criminal law of the Indian tribe” only when the justice personnel are acting in relation to a “covered crime.” See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1)(A)-(D). When Congress intended to limit the scope to other covered crimes, it did so expressly.

Defendant’s argument is also inconsistent with the structure of Congress’s subsequent amendments. The 2013 version of tribal special criminal jurisdiction was narrowly tailored to crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protection orders. Unlike those crimes, which require a specific “spouse or intimate partner” or “dating partner” relationship, in 2022 Congress categorized “Obstruction of Justice” and “Assault of Tribal Justice Personnel” as offenses that protect the integrity of the Tribal sovereign itself. By choosing functional language—“interfering with the administration or due process of the laws”—rather than a restrictive list of predicate offenses, Congress signaled that the kind of harm being addressed is the defiance of tribal authority within Indian country. Consequently, attempting to elude a tribal officer is of the same kind of interference with the administration of law as any other act that prevents the Tribe from executing its regulatory and safety mandates.

The structure and history of the amendments confirm that Congress broadened the scope of Tribal criminal jurisdiction. Where that was the clear intent of Congress, this Court will not read in additional restrictions that Congress seems to have intentionally excluded, and which would go against the Tribes’ own goals of enhancing public safety and tribal jurisdiction.

C. Attempting to elude police interferes with the administration of Tribal law regardless of whether the underlying enforcement is civil or criminal or involves a 3rd party investigation.

Defendant argues that his conduct cannot constitute “obstruction of justice” under 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(5)(E) because the initial attempted stop arose from civil traffic enforcement rather than the investigation of a criminal offense. He further argues “obstruction of justice” requires interference with separate criminal proceedings. The Court rejects these arguments for the same reason; Congress did not include these restrictions in the statutory language.

While § 1304(a)(5)(E) offers “interference with criminal proceedings” as an example of obstruction, this phrase may not be read to limit the scope of conduct that may be considered. In fact, rules of construction hold that the term “includes” enlarges the scope and suggests there are other forms of conduct that may be considered obstruction. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v Johnson, 18 Am. Tribal Law 62 (2024). Reading “includes” as exhaustive in this case would violate rules of construction by rendering the preceding clause meaningless.

Section 1304(a)(5)(E) encompasses not only adjudicatory proceedings but also the Tribe’s ability to carry out lawful enforcement of its regulatory and public safety authority. It is undisputed that the Tulalip Tribes possess authority to regulate and enforce traffic laws within the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation as to all persons. See United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1641-44 (2021). The Tribes’ ability to regulate its own roads is an essential exercise of self-governance. If the Tribes has the authority to stop non-Native drivers, then the Defendant’s refusal to stop is, by definition, an “interference” with that recognized authority. If the Defendant could elude a lawful stop for a civil infraction with jurisdictional impunity, the Tribes’ power to “administer” its civil regulatory scheme is rendered illusory. “Attempting to elude” is a unique form of obstruction because it transforms a routine, safe administrative stop into a “high-risk” public safety threat. Defendant’s flight did not merely delay enforcement; it forced tribal officers to terminate a lawful stop, diverted law enforcement resources, and prevented completion of an authorized regulatory action within Indian country.

Similarly, while most of the covered crimes require a specific victim-offender relationship, “obstruction of justice” and “assault of Tribal justice personnel” are unique because they protect the Tribal Sovereign and its officers, not just individuals. Defendant’s alleged conduct—fleeing from lawfully authorized tribal police officers and engaging in a high-speed pursuit across the Reservation—directly interfered with the ability of Tulalip law enforcement to administer and enforce the Tribe’s traffic and public safety laws. Whether Defendant was the subject of the enforcement action, and whether the initial stop was civil or criminal in nature, is immaterial. The relevant inquiry is whether the conduct interfered with the administration of tribal law. Here, the alleged conduct meets that standard.

The ICRA amendments went into effect in late 2022 and only a small number of Tribes are exercising their restored authority. There is limited case law discussing Congress’ intent and the scope of that authority. One of these Tribes conducted a thorough evaluation of this issue in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v Johnson, 18 Am. Tribal Law 62 (2024). In that case the Court reviewed the prosecution of a non-Native person for providing or possessing contraband in a Tribal jail. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the decision in Johnson applied a broad definition of “obstruction of justice” holding that possession of contraband in the Tribal jail fell within that definition.

Although not binding, Johnson is persuasive because it applies the same statutory language to similar facts. There is a parallel between possessing contraband in jail and attempting to elude police. Both acts involve a non-Native person defying a tribal officer’s lawful authority within a secure or regulated environment (the jail vs. reservation roads), and both acts fundamentally “interfere” with the Tribes’ ability to maintain order. Additionally, neither involve any form of domestic violence or a specific victim. The Tulalip Tribes has the authority to prosecute the Defendant for interfering with the administration of justice by eluding multiple TPD officer’s attempts to enforce traffic safety laws within Tribal boundaries.

CONCLUSION

The plain language of the statute, statutory construction, legislative history and tribal policy all support the finding that the Tribes has jurisdiction to prosecute this case.

The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.

So Ordered on this the 14 day of January 2026

All Citations
--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 1539300

Footnotes
1	The Court uses the terms “Native”, “Native American” and “Indian” interchangeably.
2	A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer; Report to the President and Congress of the United States, Indian Law & Order Commission (2013).