--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 2140262 (Ho-Chunk)
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court.
In the Interest of Minor Child: [Redacted], DOB [Redacted]
Case No.: SU 26-02
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July 20, 2026
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July 21, 2026
Tr. Ct. Case No.: JV 20-07
ORDER (Reversal)
On March 11, 2026, the trial court issued a final judgment in conjunction with a guardianship designation. Order (Denial of Mot. for Termination), JV 20-07 (HCN Tr. Ct., Mar. 11, 2026) [hereinafter Judgment Regarding Motion]. The appellant subsequently filed a timely appeal. Notice of Appeal, SU 26-02 (May 6, 2026); see also HCN R. App. P. 7(b), 11(a), available at https:// ho-chunknation.com/government/judicial-branch.judicial-rules/ (affording sixty days to appeal a final decision). Within this filing, the appellant contends that the trial court committed several errors of law, Notice of Appeal at 3, thereby rendering the final judgment subject to de novo review. Appellant’s Br., SU 26-02, at 1 (June 5, 2026).1 The Court shall employ this level of appellate scrutiny while remaining mindful that the trial court generally possesses authority “to issue all Orders necessary to ensure the safety of children within the Hocąk community.” Hocąk Nation Children & Family Act, 4 HCC § 3.7a(l) [hereinafter Children’s Act], available at https://ho-chunknation.com/government/legislative-branch/ho-chunk-nation-laws/.
On October 6, 2020, the trial court conferred legal custody of the minor child to the appellant, Children and Family Services (“CFS”).2 Prelim. Legal Custody J.; see also Children’s Act § 3.27(b) (enabling court to “[p]lace the child in the legal custody of CFS”). The appellant held legal custody over the minor child throughout the pendency of the child protection proceeding. See. e.g., Order (Maternal Child Prot. Review Hr’g), at 3 (HCN Tr. Ct. Oct. 1, 2025) [hereinafter Final Review Hearing Judgment] (“[L]egal custody of the minor child shall remain with CFS.”);3 Order (Maternal Child Prot. Review Hr’g), at 8 (HCN Tr, Ct. Sept. 15, 2021) (same);4 Order (Dispositional Order), at 7 (HCN Tr, Ct. Mar. 1, 2021) (same); Order (Plea Hr’g), at 5 (HCN Tr. Ct. Feb. 4, 2021) (same); Order (Continued Emergency Removal Hr’g), at 7 (HCN Tr. Ct. Nov. 3, 2020) (same); Order (Emergency Removal Hr’g) at 5 (same). Ultimately, on May 1, 2025, CFS confirmed that the non-Indian, non-relative physical custodians had filed for guardianship; no relatives ever sought to obtain physical custody; and “it would be difficult to find alternative care ..., but [the] current placement ha[d] received extensive training and support to meet [the minor’s] needs.” Final Review Hr’g J. at 2-3.
Within the resulting guardianship order, the trial court evaluated the appropriateness of transferring legal custody from CFS to the physical custodians. Order (Initial Guardianship Hr’g), JV 20-07G (HCN Tr. Ct. Feb. 16, 2026). The trial court concluded that the proposed temporary guardianship comported with the best interests of the minor child.5 Id. at 1, 8-10. While the court assessed the minor as having “significant special needs and conditions that require specialized care and monitoring.” id. at 7, it summarily expressed: “The capacity of the co-guardians to address the ongoing needs of this child as [Redacted] matures is exceptional .... ” Id. at 7-8.
Based on the preceding observations, the trial court ordered “that CFS relinquish legal custody ... and that temporary guardianship ... and physical custody of the minor child ... be granted to [the] co-petitioners.” Id. at 10. The trial court then clarified as follows: “[T]his temporary guardianship is a form [of] permanency for the child and is intended to last... until the child turns eighteen (18) years of age.” Id. Regarding either a temporary or permanent guardianship, “the Court may grant legal custody and care of [a] child ... until such child arrives at the age of eighteen (18), marries, is emancipated by the Court under th[e] Act, or until the guardian is legally discharged ....”6 Children’s Act § 3.73.
Despite the permanency of the guardianship decree, the trial court declined to grant the appellant’s contemporaneous request to close the underlying child protection action. J. re Mot. The court apparently perceived the temporary guardianship as non-permanent, contrary to its own interpretation of statute. The trial court conjectured: “[G]iven that the Order is for a Temporary Guardianship ..., the Court feels that it is essential that the underlying JV case, JV 20-07, must remain open in the event that [the minor’s] situation was to change.” Id. at 1. However, a permanent guardianship differs from a temporary guardianship in only one important respect. A permanent guardian can only lose guardianship if he or she later proves unsuitable to maintain legal custody. Children’s Act § 3.70b. Conversely, the trial court may “change custody from [a] temporary guardian to a new guardian or ... return the child to the parent[ ].” Id. § 3.70a. In the latter situation, the parent would need to establish availability and suitability,7 including satisfying an inquiry intended to assess the best interests of the child. Id. § 3.6mm, yy, 70a, 86c.
Significantly, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding theoretically continues until the minor child is emancipated. The trial court must monitor the minor child’s health, education, and welfare and, at a minimum, require the presentation of annual guardianship reports.8 Id § 3.80. In this respect, the court periodically reviews its discretionary decision to convey legal and physical custody to the temporary guardians. So, while the guardianship matter endures,9 the child protection matter concluded when the trial court offered final sanction of the pennanency plan, making a remand, in this instance, unnecessary. HCN R. App. P. 17(a).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court reverses the lower tribunal’s refusal to terminate its jurisdiction over the child protection proceeding, which errantly extended the statutory responsibilities of CFS within that context.
EGI HESKEKJET, Dated this 20th day of July 2026.
Hon. Todd R. Matha, Wanašip, Chief Justice Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court
Hon. Tricia A. Zunker, Hinųk pįį, Associate Justice Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court
Hon. David J.W. Klauser, Manąpe Hųk, Associate Justice Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mary Thunder, Clerk of Court for the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court, do hereby certify that on the date set forth below, I served a true and correct copy of the ORDER (Reversal) in Case No. SU 26-02 in accordance with Administrative Order No. 20 07, upon all persons listed below:
By Electronic Mail:
Attorney Erik Shircel
Email: erik.shircel@ho-chunk.com
dojcourtfilings@ho-chunk.com
Brenda Neff
Guardian ad litem
Email: blneff.gal@gmail.com
[Redacted]
Email: [Redacted]
Dated: July 21, 2026
Mary Thunder, Clerk of Court
Ho Chunk Nation Supreme Court
Cc: File
All Citations
--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 2140262
Footnotes |
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The Court did not receive any responsive briefing prior to the deadline of July 6, 2026, and the appellant did not request oral argument. See Order (Accepting Appeal), SU 26-02, at 2 (HCN S. Ct. May 11, 2026) (establishing appel late schedule). |
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CFS maintains statutory authority to independently remove a minor child from the physical custody of his or her parent(s) under limited circumstances. Children’s Act § 3.15b; see also Emergency Removal Notice, JV 20-07 (Sept. 30, 2020) (indicating that removal occurred at 2:30 p.m. CDT on Wednesday, September 30, 2020). But see Order (Emergency Removal Hr’g), JV 20-07, at 3 (HCN Tr. Ct. Oct. 8, 2020) (identifying placement with physical custodian on October 6, 2020, immediately following minor’s hospital discharge). The Department of Justice must then “file [a petition] with the Court no later than 12:00 p.m. (Noon) of the second Court working day following removal.” Children’s Act § 3.20b; see also Child/Family Prot. Pet., JV 20-07 (Oct. 6, 2020). The Court must subsequently schedule an emergency removal hearing to occur “before the end of the second Court working day following the filing.’’ Children’s Act § 3.30a. In this case, the trial court convened the hearing on October 7, 2020. Order (Granting Emergency Temporary Legal & Physical Custody), JV 20-07, at 4 (HCN Tr. Ct. Oct. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Preliminary Legal Custody Judgment]. |
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During the continuing review cycle, the permanency objective transitioned away from parental reunification to “guardianship with a fit and wilting relative” in November 2023 due to the mother’s lack of dispositional progress and diminished communication with CFS. Order (Maternal Child Prot. Review Hr’g), at 5 (HCN Tr. Ct. Feb. 12, 2024); see also Children’s Act § 3.71 (establishing guardianship preferences). The appointment of a temporary or permanent guardian constitutes “a concurrent permanence goal, which ... shall be the result of a parent[ ] ... failing to fulfill the dispositional conditions required to rectify the cause(s) of [a] child protection action.” Children’s Act § 3.63d; see also id. § 3.67 (“attaining permanence may include temporary/permanent guardianship”). |
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Following disposition, the trial court conducted review hearings at required six-month intervals. Children’s Act § 3.30e. |
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The trial court may deny a guardianship petition if it deems “the guardianship will not be in the child’s best interest ....” Id. § 3.77a(l). |
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“An Order vesting legal custody of a child to an individual shall be for an indeterminate period.” Id. § 3.89b. |
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The trial court could certainly inquire about a parent’s failure to meaningfully satisfy prior dispositional requirements whenever a temporary guardianship derives from a child protection matter. In this case, the parent failed to demonstrate reasonable compliance with the dispositional plan from February 23, 2021 (dispositional hearing), until February 16, 2026 (guardianship hearing), nearly five years. |
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By and through its guardianship order, the trial court attempted to fulfill the Nation’s special obligation to disabled children. Supra p. 3; see also Children’s Act § 3.3c. CFS likewise honored this responsibility when it performed the extended assessment of the physical custodians, including active programmatic assistance and supervision for several years. See J. re Mot. at 2 (identifying “special obligation’’ as a reason to indefinitely extend agency involvement despite transfer of legal custody). |
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The trial court errantly surmised that “CFS clearly ha[s] an ongoing duty to any Ho-Chunk child that comes under [its] jurisdiction, until that child has been reunified with their family.” J. re Mot. at 2 (citing Children’s Act § 3.2). Subsection 2, however, erects a preference, and not a prerequisite, of family reunification. Children’s Act § 3.2 (“secur[ing] for each child ... such care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home ... [and] to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible” (emphases added)). Regrettably, the initial action and subsequent inaction of the parent in this case rendered the statutory preference unsatisfiable. Supra note 7. |
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