|
(Cite
as: 1997 WL 752736)
Superior
Court of Connecticut.
In
re CHLOE G. FN1
FN1.
In
accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124
and Practice Book § 1060.1.
Oct.
30, 1997.
Memorandum
of Decision
QUINN,
Judge.
*1
This case presents a petition for the termination of the
parental rights of Elizabeth G. and David G. to their
four and one half year old daughter, Chloe G. It
recounts the story of a well meaning but very limited
mother and a misguided and antisocial father and their relationship
to this bright, attractive and energetic child. Chloe
was removed from the care of her parents when she
was not yet a year old after charges that the
parents entered into a suicide attempt. This
they allegedly attempted to carry out in their vehicle while
Chloe was in the car in the family's closed garage
with a pipe from the vehicle's exhaust system feeding into
the car. Subsequently,
her father was incarcerated due to charges stemming from this
incident and other criminal matters then pending. Chloe
was committed to the care of the Department of Children
and Families (hereafter the ?Department?)
on March 31, 1994. She
has been in various foster homes since that date. Her
present foster parents are closely bonded to her and she
to them. They
wish to adopt her.
As
a preliminary issue, the biological mother has raised an issue
concerning her Native American heritage, reporting that her grandmother may
have been a member of the Narragansett or Micmac tribes.
The
Petitioner contacted the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and then contacted the two tribes in question. A
negative response was received from the Narragansetts and no response
from the Micmacs. Although
the mother did not make any such claim, the testimony
raises the question of the applicability of the provisions of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 USC
§ 1901
-1963. Because
of the interests of Native American peoples in preserving their
families and their unique heritage, the act provides that a
child's tribe be given notice of an involuntary proceeding and
provided the right to intervene. The
threshold question therefore raised: is
Chloe, by virtue of her ancestry, an ?Indian
child?
as defined in the ICWA? An Indian child is:
any
unmarried person under the age of eighteen and who is
either (1) a member of an Indian Tribe or (2)
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
25
USC § 1903(4).
The
evidence has established that Chloe is not a member of
the Narragansett tribe nor do her parents claim to be
members of an Indian tribe or living in an Indian
community. A
?tribe?
is further defined as ?any
Indian tribe, band, nation or other organized group or community
of Indians recognized as eligible for services provided to Indians
by the Secretary (of the Interior) because of their status
as Indians.?
25
U.S.C. § 1903(8).
The
list of such tribes is published annually in the Federal
Register and the Micmac tribe is not so recognized. FN2
Thus,
the Micmacs' failure to respond or even their response would
not bring this matter within the ambit of the statute.
FN2.
61
Fed.Reg. No. 220 (November 13, 1996).
While
no issues with respect to notice were specifically raised by
the parties, the court notes that the ICWA notice provisions
apply not only when there is an Indian child involved
in a custody proceeding, but also when the court has
?reason
to know that an Indian child is involved.?
25 § U.S.C.
1912(a). As
a consequence, in any case where such information is available
to the Department, notice by registered mail, return receipt requested
of the proceedings as well as the tribe's right to
intervene is required. 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a).
In
re Jessica T.,
1993 Ct. Sup. 10376 (1993) , see also In
re M.C.P.,
572 A.2d 627 (Vt.989). As
some tribes also provide for membership to any descendants of
members regardless of the degree of blood relationship, FN3
the notice provisions should be followed in all cases where
Native American ancestry is raised by any party. To
complicate the picture even further, some tribes do not require
enrollment to consider a child an ?Indian
child.?
FN3.
For
example, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in Eastern Connecticut has recently
changed its membership qualifications to such a definition.
*2
Having reviewed the ICWA provisions, the facts of the child's
heritage, the parent's relationship to any tribe as well as
the response to the notices provided, the court concludes that
the ICWA does not apply to these proceedings.
The
court finds that the mother and father have appeared and
have court-appointed attorneys. The
court has jurisdiction in this matter; there
is no pending action affecting the custody of Chloe in
any other court and reasonable efforts have been made to
reunite Chloe with her mother. No
such efforts were made with respect to her father due
to his incarceration.
At
the conclusion of the trial, the Department proceeded against the
father on the grounds of abandonment, failure to rehabilitate and
on the lack of an ongoing relationship with his daughter.
Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(A),
(B) and (D). it proceeded against the mother on the
grounds of failure to rehabilitate and no on-going parent child
relationship. Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B)
and (D). The
allegations of omission or commission as against both parents as
of the adjudicatory date of August 15, 1996 were specifically
abandoned by the Department.
The
court, having read the verified petitions, the social studies, and
the various documents entered into evidence, and having heard the
testimony of various witnesses and evaluators, makes the following factual
findings:
With
Respect to the Child's Father: (David
G.)
This
child's father is thirty-four years old and has been incarcerated
for most of his daughter's short life. David
G. has had some considerable involvement with the criminal justice
system with nine arrests in twelve years. There
have been convictions for arson in 1984, two counts of
risk of injury to a minor in 1986, as well
as a conviction for assault in the third degree in
1991. He
has spent time incarcerated on four occasions, but until the
most recent offense, he had never been incarcerated for any
substantial period of time. (Petitioner's
Exhibit 11.) In
1994, on March 18, he was arrested and charged with
risk of injury to his daughter. At
that time there was a violation of probation charge pending
for his conviction of assault in the third degree, for
which he had received a suspended sentence, as well as
other criminal charges. While
David G. continues to deny that a suicide pact had
been entered into between his wife, Elizabeth, and himself, it
appears he was then despondent over the possibility of a
term of incarceration. He
did receive a sentence of ten years, execution suspended after
five years and has been incarcerated since early 1994, when
his daughter was not yet a year old.
Prior
to David G's present term of incarceration, he resided on
an isolated farm with his father, where his wife, Elizabeth,
continues to reside. There
are dogs at the home, cats and other animals kept
at the farm. During
his daughter's first year of life, there were reports that
David G. used poor judgment in dealing with Chloe. On
one occasion, he took her for a ride on his
snowmobile after which she was treated for frostbite, the existence
of which he denied. On
another, he was seen to throw her roughly into the
back of his truck while in her infant seat. At
yet an earlier time, he fed her ice cream, apparently
not understanding that this was inappropriate for a very young
infant. He
was distrustful of those in authority and required total loyalty
from his wife. At
that time, the Visiting Nurse Association and other professionals were
involved with assisting with the care of this child. David
G. was against any such involvement in his family life
and resisted these efforts. A
parent aide was indicated for the home and it was
determined not to provide one due to his hostility and
the belief that such a worker would not have been
safe, given his attitude.
*3
Since before Chloe's first birthday in 1994, David G. has
not seen his daughter nor had any contact with her.
He
has sent a number of cards and gifts. While
he continues to have regular weekly telephone contact with Elizabeth,
he has never called the Department to inquire about Chloe's
welfare, nor requested except once an administrative case review concerning
treatment plans for Chloe. He
has declined to take the steps necessary to have visitation
with his daughter. It
also appears that while incarcerated he did not participate in
any counseling or programs which might assist in his rehabilitation.
Initially,
after his refusal to participate in a court ordered evaluation,
his visitation rights were suspended (3/24/95 Dranginis, J.) After
completion of the evaluation, he never petitioned to have his
access rights restored and stated that he did not want
visitation while incarcerated. No
expectations were set as to David as he made it
clear that such efforts were not welcomed by him.
Dr.
Mantel initially evaluated David G. Later, he was also evaluated
by Dr. Sadler. The
father's own expert, Dr. Nelken, also testified as to his
conclusions. The
first evaluation was performed by Dr. Mantell and completed on
July 27, 1994 (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). He
found ?an
emotionally unstable man of below average intellectual functioning ...
He
has a substantial history of both juvenile and young adult
offenses, of school difficulties, problems in the community and legal
difficulties as well.?
At
that time Dr. Mantel recommended that nothing but the most
carefully supervised and brief visitation contact be allowed until a
full assessment had been completed and until ?there
is reason to believe that his psychological status has substantially
stabilized.?
Dr.
Mantel's last contact with the father was on December 4,
1995. At
that time he found that the father's ?presentation
on multiple occasions as well as his history raise strong
questions about the adequacy of his judgment, about impulse control
difficulty and about the likelihood of his ability to discharge
a parenting responsibility?
(Petitioner's Exhibit 3, page 9). He
concluded at the time of trial that David G. was
not able to parent Chloe due to his history of
personality problems, legal difficulties, emotional instability and poor judgment. He
also noted that this parent had not taken any steps
to rehabilitate himself and to achieve any understanding of the
problems which brought him to this point.
Dr.
Sadler, after evaluating David G. on February 21, 1997 found:
an
intellectually limited, smoothly sociopathic, impulsive man with impaired judgment. Mr.
G. has pleasant interpersonal skills, a paranoid view of the
world and no expressed insight into the nature of his
interpersonal interactions, his parenting deficit nor his wife's intellectual and
parenting difficulties. Mr.
G. does not acknowledge the emotional or developmental needs of
his child ...
Mr. G. has a personality disorder that has been present
for many years ...
(Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 5.)
*4
He further stated that he did not treat any information
provided by Mr. G. as reliable and that in his
opinion, Mr. G. ?did
what he wanted to do.?
?He
did not inhibit his desires to provide a safe and
stimulating environment for this child.?
Both
Dr. Sadler and Dr. Mantel found that there was no
longer any relationship between Chloe and her father. The
department workers noted that she has no memories of him.
Even
Dr. Nelkin, father's expert, found him to suffer from antisocial
personality disorder. He
eloquently outlined the significant needs many adopted children experience as
they become adults to know their family of origin. He
stated that the adoption process ?in
a general way raises agonizing questions that continue throughout the
life of an individual ...,
questions about identity and the nature of their very being.?
He
also found that if the child, Chloe, were returned to
her parents, ?her
situation would not be ideal.?
His
recommendation was essentially a ?wait
and see?
attitude for a child who has been without permanency for
some years.
David
G.'s aunt testified to her contact with her nephew and
his wife during the first year of Chloe's life. She
did not note anything other than reasonable parenting efforts by
both David and Elizabeth G.
Incarceration
of a parent presents a major hurdle for any parent
who wishes to maintain contact with a child. Nonetheless,
the court has previously held that ?the
incarceration of a parent does not alone constitute abandonment.?
In
re Juvenile Appeal
(Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 443, 446 A.d. 808
(1982) ; In
re Juvenile Appeal
(84-6) 2 Conn.App. 705, 711, 483 A.D. 1101 (1984) cert.
denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.D. 564 (1985). ?The
restrictions on movement that are inherent to incarceration, however, do
not excuse a failure to make use of available, albeit
limited, resources for communication with one's children.?
In
re Juvenile Appeal
(Docket No. 10155), supra.
In
re Shannon S.,
41 Conn.Supp. 145, 153, 562 A.D. 79 (1989).
However
difficult, some of the obligations of parenthood can be pursued,
even from prison. ?The
commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:
(1)
express love and affection for the child; (2)
express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being
of the child; ...?
In
re Juvenile Appeal (Docket 9489
),
183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.D. 801 (1981) quoting In
re Adoption
of Webb,
14 Wash.App. 651, 657, 544 P.2d 130 (1975). This
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the father
took no concerted action to maintain his early relationship with
Chloe; he
did not communicate with her, he did not provide guidance,
he did not express concern. The
efforts that did occur were ineffectual. David
G. has not gained any insight into the myriad problems
that he and his wife
had while they were together in attempting to parent Chloe.
Chloe
has no relationship with him, nor he with Chloe. The
court holds that David G. has, by his conduct, effectively
abandoned his daughter within the contemplation of Connecticut General Statutes
§ 17a-112(c)(3)(A).
As
a further consequence of his actions, there is no ongoing
parent-child relationship, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D).
*5
Further, this child has been adjudicated neglected and the father
has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation
that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time,
considering the age and needs of the child, such parent
could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child. Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B).
Rehabilitation,
as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of
an individual to a constructive and useful role as a
parent. In
re Migdalia M.,
6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 532 (1986). The
ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of
the filing of the termination petition is more able to
resume the responsibilities of parenting than he was at the
time of the commitment. In
re Chloe M.,
29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). The
court must also consider whether the age and needs of
the child support the allowance of additional time for the
parent to rehabilitate. In
re Luis C.,
210 Conn. 157, 167-68, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). In
this case, David G. has made no efforts to rehabilitate
himself as a parent. His
lack of insight into his own past and his wife's
needs and limitations make future rehabilitation unlikely at best. Dr.
Mantel stated the situation succinctly and the court so finds
by clear and convincing evidence. ?This
child has a well defined need for stability in her
life which cannot be reconciled with her parents' need to
forge a family life. She
does not have any more time for her parents to
structure their lives.?
With
Respect to the Mother: (Elizabeth
G.)
Like
her husband, Elizabeth G. suffers from significant intellectual impairment. She
has never held a job and is receiving social security
disability payments. She
is thirty-three years old and has lived on a farm
with her father-in-law for nine years. Her
own childhood was difficult. Her
parents were alcoholic and largely unable to provide care for
her. She
assumed child care and household responsibilities while still a child
herself. She
reported being sexually abused by a relative from the ages
of ten to the age of twenty-six. She
had been in a relationship with her husband, upon whom
she is dependent, for some years prior to Chloe's birth.
After
her birth, she and David married.
During
the first year of Chloe's life, Elizabeth G. required the
services of the VNA and other help to parent this
child. The
unclean and chaotic home circumstances, even after her husband had
been incarcerated and the child removed, made it necessary that
visitation at the home be curtailed. Elizabeth
was unable, despite offers of assistance, to maintain a clean
home in which a small child could play. There
were dirty dishes in the sink, cat hair everywhere including
on the curtains and in the child's diaper when she
was changed there. On
one occasion there were dead mice and dog feces in
the home. The
level of filth and disorganization was unacceptable and not safe
for a small child.
*6
Chloe was first placed with a relative. After
Elizabeth came to remove the child, the Department secured an
order of temporary custody and shortly thereafter on March 21,
1994, Chloe was adjudicated neglected.
Due
to the Department's determination that her home was not proper
for visitation, Elizabeth's visitation was restricted to the Department offices
or other approved locations and has been supervised. Department
workers have noted such visits are controlled by Chloe and
that her mother is unable to structure the visits in
a normal adult-child manner. During
visits, Elizabeth often used food to distract Chloe from actions
she wishes her not to take. She
seems unable to set limits or impose consequences if the
child acts out. On
several occasions the social worker notes that Chloe's style of
play becomes disorganized after the initial period of the visit.
Chloe
then begins to act out aggressively against her mother. Observers
note a relationship that appears to be one of two
peers rather than an adult-child relationship. When
questioned whether this was common in the artificial supervised setting
for visitation that is what the Department is able to
provide, Dr. Mantel reported ?no,
it is rare.?
Dr.
Philips, Elizabeth's own expert, reported that Elizabeth
is
able to function adequately in structured and predictable situations, her
capacity of making sense of novel, complex, or ambiguous experiences
is limited, and she is apt to rely upon over-learned
and familiar paradigms for responding. This
limitation inhibits her ability to learn from frustration or failure
or to be flexible in responding to situations. (Respondent
Mother's exhibit A, Page 3.)
Some
events which occurred during visitation reflect these limitations. During
one visit, Chloe punched a hole in her juice container
with a pencil and continued to drink from it without
her mother's intervention. On
another, Chloe climbed into an open window in a room
two stories from the ground and her mother took no
action to stop her until the department intervened. During
an outing at Mt. Tom, Elizabeth dunked the child's head
under the water and left her unattended later at the
water's edge. She
could not understand why she could not go swimming. When
the problems with this conduct were pointed out to her,
she was unable to understand what was wrong and shortly
afterwards again went in to the water with her child
and pushed her head under water. Elizabeth
also reported that when the child was under a year
old, a hutch fell near her, and she had made
the child go into her room for a one-hour time
out, a discipline not appropriate for the age of this
child. While
she attended six parenting classes, she was unable to translate
the information provided to her into changes in her behavior
toward and dealings with her daughter.
After
her daughter's commitment, consistent with the Department expectations, Elizabeth attended
counseling. Such
counseling was for the purpose of dealing with the issues
leading to the removal of Chloe from her care. Instead,
the sessions were exclusively about her relationship to her husband
and his incarceration. All
observers note that Elizabeth is very committed to her husband,
dependent on him and remains staunchly loyal to him. She
explains all problems away and denies she has any difficulty
in providing care for Chloe. As
observed by Dr. Sadler:
*7
She copes with her stress and her functional limitation by
attempting to deny her impairments. In
my opinion, this is the intersection of the personality characteristics
and intellectual limitations of Mrs. G which allowed her to
fail to respond to her daughters' needs, to fail to
protect her daughter from the disorganization of the household and
fail to provide the direct physical care needed to protect
her daughter. (Petitioner's
Exhibit 6, Page 6.)
When
asked what would be required to permit Elizabeth to parent
her daughter, Dr. Mantell replied that ?she
could do so if she had a supportive person in
the household to provide nurturing guidance and structure as well
as parenting assistance.?
What
kind of a person is this other than a fully
functioning mother, able to parent both Elizabeth and Chloe? Unfortunately,
such assistance is not possible in the world we inhabit
and Elizabeth has been and remains unable to parent this
child. And
therein lies the central tragedy of this family. Elizabeth's
combination of limitations and emotional difficulties are such that she
is neither able to adapt to this bright and energetic
child nor to respond to the ever changing kaleidoscope of
circumstances this child's exploration of her world requires.
With
Respect to the Child: (Chloe
G.)
Chloe
has had some difficult times while in foster care. When
she was initially committed, she was found to have significant
development delays. With
intervention, those lessened and she is now developmentally on target.
(Petitioner's
Exhibit 6, Page 7.) Dr.
Sadler, when questioned about these delays, stated he believes Chloe's
early history of poor caretaking contributed to these delays. His
belief is based on the fact that Chloe made such
rapid progress when removed from her parents and that there
were no physical reasons for those delays. All
those who evaluated her found her to be a bright,
pretty, and energetic young child who was able to cooperate
at appropriate age levels with her evaluators. At
present, Chloe is doing well. The
child responds to her foster mother and is clearly bonded
to her. Her
foster mother is able to provide structure, set boundaries and
to nurture her. Chloe
also has a special connection to her foster father who
spends much time with her and to whom she is
also bonded. The
love and affection her foster mother has for Chloe shone
through her every word and gesture during her testimony before
the court. Her
foster family is eager to adopt her.
Adjudication
With
regard to the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights
of the father, David G., the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that he has failed to support this
child or manifest any reasonable parental interest, whatsoever, and has
abandoned her as that term is defined in Connecticut General
Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(A).
Further,
this child has been adjudicated neglected and the father has
failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation that
would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B).
As
the father has not had contact with Chloe for several
years and had made no realistic effort to establish any
contact, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
there is no ongoing parent child relationship pursuant to Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D).
*8
Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial,
the court finds that the mother, Elizabeth G., has failed
to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time,
considering the age and needs of the child, such parent
could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child. Connecticut
General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(B).
While
Elizabeth is well intentioned and has attempted to comply with
the expectations set for her, her limitations and emotional deficits
make such rehabilitation extremely unlikely and this child cannot wait
any longer, given her age. See
supra,
In
re Chloe M.,
29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992) , and
In
re Luis C.,
210 Conn. 157, 167-68, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Unfortunately,
although Elizabeth has visited with Chloe whenever permitted, all observers
note that there is no on-going parent child relationship. Elizabeth
appears at times ?to
be going through the motions?
and is unable to relate to her child as a
parent and the court so finds by clear and convincing
evidence. In
re Jessica M.,
217 Conn. 459, 463, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).
REQUIRED
FINDINGS
The
court makes the following factual findings required by Connecticut General
Statutes § 17a-112(e):
1)
Appropriate
and timely services were provided by the Department of Children
and Families, including counseling, transportation assistance, and visitation coordination. In
the father's case, such direct services have included one administrative
case review. Further
services were not sought by him. The
services offered to the mother were extensive and included significant
visitation coordination, counseling and assistance.
2)
The
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Department
of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify the
family, given the situation and circumstances, as far as possible.
The
court finds in this proceeding that the father, due to
his incarceration and other circumstances relating to the child, did
not have or seek visitation and did not avail himself
of such opportunities which were open to him to maintain
reasonable contact with the child. The
mother received ongoing and significant services for reunification, but the
mother was unable to rehabilitate herself.
3)
The
Department, with the approval of the Court, set reasonable and
realistic expectations and service agreements in order to reunify the
family. None
were set for the father due to his incarceration and
the nature of his crime. Nonetheless,
within the appropriate limits set by the court, he failed
to take advantage of those opportunities that he did have
open to him. The
expectations set for Elizabeth G. were both reasonable and realistic.
She
was unable to benefit from parenting education and personal counseling
due to her own focus on her relationship with her
husband to the exclusion of her child. As
noted by counsel for the minor child, the facts of
the father's incarceration and her loneliness have propelled the mother
and father together over these past years and in so
doing, they have pushed their child away.
*9
4)
The
child has strong emotional ties with the foster family who
have provided the physical, emotional and educational support this child
needs. The
evidence has clearly established the close and rich bond with
the foster family. The
child has no emotional ties to the biological father and
only limited ties to her mother.
5)
Finding
regarding the age of the child. Chloe
is four years and six months old.
6)
Finding
regarding efforts of the parents to adjust their circumstances, conduct
or conditions to make it in the best interests of
the child to return her to their home in the
foreseeable future and (A) the extent to which the parents
have maintained contact with the child as part of an
effort to reunite the child with the parents, provided that
the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or
contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications
with the guardian or other custodian of the child. The
father has done nothing to adjust his circumstances while incarcerated
to make it in the best interests of the child
to be returned to him. Further
such contact as he had with the child-a few cards
and presents-do not show any sustained effort. Indeed,
Dr. Sadler found that because Mr. G. holds himself blameless
for his own and his family's difficulties, any treatment of
his disorder would not be expected to rehabilitate him to
a state where he could offer parenting care better than
that already demonstrated by him. In
addition, he never contacted the Department to inquire concerning the
welfare of this child.
Elizabeth
G. has made more efforts than her husband, although unavailing.
She
was unable to maintain a safe and clean home for
this child, despite various services and assistance in doing so.
She
was unable to benefit from parenting classes or individual counseling
to address the issues which led to the removal of
her child including her inability to take action to protect
this child. While
her contact was sustained and she had regular and frequent
visitation, the evidence is overwhelming that she cannot rehabilitate herself
and it is not in this child's best interest to
be returned to her home.
7)
Finding
regarding the prevention of the parents from having a meaningful
relationship etc. No
inappropriate conduct is noted. It
is the criminal behavior of the father which removed him
from his daughter's life. The
Department has taken many steps to encourage the mother to
have a meaningful relationship with her child and to rehabilitate
herself, which she has been unable to accomplish. The
court finds that these grounds and circumstances have existed over
an extended period of time which is greater than one
year prior to the filing of the termination petition.
DISPOSITION
The
court finds, based upon the testimony and evidence presented, that
it is in Chloe's best interest to terminate the parental
rights of Elizabeth G. and David G. This
finding is made after considering this child's needs, the length
of time she has been separated from her family of
origin, her need for a secure and permanent environment, the
relationship that she has with her foster parents, and the
totality of circumstances surrounding her short and eventful life. This
court is aware of the ?deleterious
effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.?
In
re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD),
189 Conn. 276, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The
Appellate Court has also correctly noted, ?[b]ecause
of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young
children, time is of the essence ...?
In
re Alexander V.,
25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see
generally, JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
99 (1979).
*10
Based upon the foregoing findings, the court determines that it
is in Chloe's best interest for a termination of parental
rights to enter with respect to her parents, David and
Elizabeth G. and it is hereby ORDERED that the parental
rights of Elizabeth and David G. are terminated. The
Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby
appointed the statutory parent. If
the foster parents continue to be willing to adopt Chloe,
it is the court's direction that they receive first consideration.
A
permanency plan for Chloe shall be submitted within 90 days.
A
review plan for her shall be filed in accordance with
state and federal Law.
Conn.Super.,1997.
In
re Chloe G.
Not
Reported in A.2d, 1997 WL 752736
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