Establishing Standards for the Placement of Indian Children in Foster or Adoptive Homes, to Prevent the Breakup of Indian Families, and for Other Purposes

July 24, 1978.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Udall, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, submitted the following

Report

Together with

Dissenting Views

[To accompany H.R. 12533]

[Including the cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 12533) to establish standards for the placement of Indian children in foster or adoptive homes, to prevent the breakup of Indian families, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendment is as follows:

Page 1, beginning on line 3, strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

That this Act may be cited as the "Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978".

Sec. 2. Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people, the Congress finds—

(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce. . . with Indian tribes "and, through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs;

(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources;

(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and

(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have oftentimes violated the essential tribal rights of the Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.

Sec. 3. The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment of its special responsibility and legal obligations to the American Indian people, to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of this Act, except as may be specifically provided otherwise, the terms—

(1) "child custody proceeding" shall mean and include—

(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean and include the placement of an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated;

(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship;

(iii) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to the adoption of the child; and

(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption.

Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.

(2) "extended family member" shall be defined by the law or custom of the Indian tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or step-parent;

(3) "Indian person" means any person who is a member of an Indian tribe;

(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe;

(5) "Indian child’s tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the more significant contacts;

(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent, guardian, or Indian organization.

(7) "Indian organization" means any group, association, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, or a majority of whose members are Indians;

(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 3(c) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688, 697), as amended;

(9) "parent" means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established;

(10) "reservation" means Indian country as defined in section 1151 of title 18, United States Code, in any case where it has been judicially determined that an Indian reservation has been diminished or the boundaries disestablished and

Title I—Child Custody Proceedings

Sec. 101. (a) An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of the State, or the child's tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.

(b) In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of such tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to the will of the tribe.

(c) In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.

(d) The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, every Indian tribe shall have full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that such entities are accorded the United States, its States, and other Indian tribes full faith and credit.

Sec. 102. (a) An Indian tribe exercising in accordance with its constitution and bylaws shall have the right to appoint a court to hear and determine cases involving the custody of Indian children and who are members of the tribe or either of the parents are members of the tribe. An Indian tribe exercising its constitution and bylaws, or that an Indian child is a ward of the tribe, the child's tribe, the Secretary shall have the right to appoint a court to hear and determine cases involving the custody of Indian children and who are members of the tribe or either of the parents are members of the tribe, or who are wards of the tribe.

(b) In any case in which the court determines that the child needs the court-appointed counsel in any removal, placement, or termination of parental rights proceeding, the court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for the child. Where State law provides for the appointment of counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.

(c) In any case in which the court determines that the child needs the court-appointed counsel in any removal, placement, or termination of parental rights proceeding, the court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for the child. Where State law provides for the appointment of counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.

(d) Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that such efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
(a) No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

(b) No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

(c) Any consent given prior to, or within ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid.

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(z) Any consent given prior to, or within ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid.
(b) Such agreements may be revoked by either party upon one hundred and eighty days written notice to the other party. Such revocation shall not affect any action, or proceeding, over which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, unless the agreement provides otherwise.

Sec. 110. Where any petition in an Indian child custody proceeding before a State court has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent or Indian custodian or has improperly retained custody after a visit or temporary relinquishment of custody, the court may, having jurisdiction over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent or Indian custodian unless returning the child to his parent or custodian would subject the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.

Sec. 111. If the State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided in this title, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standards.

Sec. 112. Nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian child from his parent or Indian custodian or the emergency placement of such child in a foster home or institution, under applicable State law, in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. The State authority, official, or agency involved shall insure that the emergency removal or placement continues only for a reasonable time and shall expeditiously initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions of this title, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropriate.

Sec. 113. None of the provisions of this title, except section 111(a), shall affect any agreement under State law for foster care or the temporary placement, supervision, and visitation of biological or adoptive children, etc., if such agreement is completed prior to the enactment of this Act, but shall apply to any subsequent proceeding in the same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the custody or placement of the same child.

TITLE II—INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY PROGRAMS

Sec. 201. (a) The Secretary is authorized to make grants to Indian tribes and organizations in the establishment and operation of Indian child and family service programs on or near reservations and in the preparation and implementation of Indian child welfare codes. The objective of every Indian child welfare code shall be to prevent the breakdown of Indian families and, in particular, to assure that the permanent removal of an Indian child from the custody of his parent or Indian custodian shall be the last resort. Such child and family service programs may include, but are not limited to:

(1) Systems for licensing or otherwise regulating Indian foster and adoptive homes;

(2) The construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and treatment of Indian families and for the temporary custody of Indian children;

(3) Family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day care, after-school care, and employment, recreational activities, and respite care;

(4) Home improvement programs;

(5) Employment of professional and other trained personnel to assist the tribal court in the disposition of domestic relations and child welfare matters;

(6) Education and training of Indians, including tribal court judges and staff, relating to child and family assistance programs;

(7) A subsidy program under which Indian adoptive children are provided the same support as Indian foster children; and

(8) Guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved in tribal, State, or Federal child custody proceedings.

(b) Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary in accordance with this section may be utilized as non-Federal matching share in connection with funds provided under titles IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act or under any other Federal financial assistance programs which contribute to the purpose for which such funds are authorized to be appropriated for use under this Act. The provision or possibility of assistance under this Act shall not be a basis for the denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise authorized under titles IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act or any other federally-assisted program. For purposes of qualifying for assistance under a federally-assisted program, licensing or approval of foster or adoptive homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall be deemed equivalent to licensing or approval by a State.

Sec. 202. The Secretary is authorized to make grants to Indian organizations to establish and operate off-reservation Indian child and family service programs which may include, but are not limited to—

(1) A system for regulating, maintaining, and supporting Indian foster and adoptive homes, including a subsidy program under which Indian adoptive children are provided the same support as Indian foster children;

(2) The construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities and services for the adoption and treatment of Indian families and Indian foster and adoptive children;

(3) Family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day care, after-school care, and employment, recreational activities, and respite care; and

(4) Guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved in child custody proceedings.

Sec. 203. (a) In the establishment, operation, and funding of Indian child and family service programs, both on and off reservation, the Secretary may enter into agreements with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the latter Secretary is hereby authorized for such purposes to use funds appropriated for similar programs of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:

Provided. That authority to make payments pursuant to such agreements shall be effective only to the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in advance by appropriation Acts.

(b) Funds for the purposes of this Act may be appropriated pursuant to the provisions of the Act of November 2, 1921 (42 Stat. 208), as amended.

Sec. 204. For the purposes of sections 202 and 203 of this title, the term "Indian" shall include persons defined in section 4(e) of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 (30 Stat. 1400, 1401).

TITLE III—RECORD-KEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND TIMETABLES

Sec. 301. (a) Any State court entering a final decree or order in any Indian child adoption placement after the date of enactment of this Act shall provide the Secretary with a copy of such decree or order together with such other information as may be necessary to show—

(1) The name and tribal affiliation of the child;

(2) The names and addresses of the adoptive parents;

(3) The names and addresses of the biological parents; and

(4) The identity of any agency having files or information relating to such adoptive placement.

Where the court records contain an affidavit of the biological parent or parents of the child identifying them as confidential, the court shall include such affidavit with the other information. The Secretary shall insure that the confidentiality of such information is maintained and such information shall not be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (50 Stat. 381).

(b) Upon the request of the adoptive Indian child over the age of eighteen, the adoptive or foster parents of an Indian child, or an Indian tribe, the Secretary shall disclose such information as is necessary for the enrollment of an Indian child in programs to which the child may be eligible to the enrollment or for determining any rights or benefits associated with that membership. Where the documents relating to such child contain an affidavit from the biological parent or parents requesting anonymity, the Secretary shall notify the Indian child that, upon written warrants, that the child's parentage and other circumstances of birth entitle the child to enrollment under the criteria established by such tribe.

Sec. 302. (a) Within six months from the date of this Act, the Secretary shall consult with Indian tribes, Indian organizations, and Indian interest groups in the consideration and formulation of rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act.
Within seven months from the date of this Act, the Secretary shall present a report on the feasibility of providing Indian children with schools located near their homes, or institutions, in the United States Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.

Within eight months from the date of this Act, the Secretary shall publish proposed rules and regulations in the Federal Register for the purpose of receiving comments from interested parties.

Within ten months from the date of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act.

The Secretary is authorized and directed to prepare, in consultation with appropriate agencies in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, a report on the feasibility of locating Indian children near their homes, and to submit such report to the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the United States Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States House of Representatives within two years from the date of this Act. In developing this report, the Secretary shall give particular consideration to the provisions of educational facilities for children in the elementary grades.

Within sixty days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall send to the Governor, Chief Justice of the highest court of appeal, and the Attorney General of each State a copy of this Act, together with Committee reports and an explanation of the provisions of this Act.

If any provision of this Act or the applicability thereof is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act shall not be affected thereby.

The purpose of the bill (H.R. 12533), introduced by Mr. Udall et al., is to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes or institutions which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes and organizations in the operation of child and family service programs.

BACKGROUND

I can remember (the welfare worker) coming and taking some of my cousins and friends. I didn’t know why and I didn’t question it. It was just done and it had always been done **. **

The wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.

Surveys of States with large Indian populations conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate that approximately 25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. In some States the problem is getting worse: in Minnesota, one in every eight Indian children under 18 years of age is living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971–72, nearly one in every four Indian children under 1 year of age was adopted.

The disparity in placement rates for Indians and non-Indians is shocking. In Minnesota, Indian children are placed in foster care or in adoptive homes at a per capita rate five times greater than non-Indian children. In Montana, the ratio of Indian foster-care placement is at least 13 times greater. In South Dakota, 40 percent of all adoptions made by the State’s Department of Public Welfare since 1967–68 are of Indian children, yet Indians make up only 7 percent of the juvenile population. The number of South Dakota Indian children living in foster homes is nearly 18 years of age is living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971–72, nearly one in every four Indian children under 1 year of age was adopted.

The Federal boarding school and dormitory programs also contribute to the breakdown of Indian families.出台

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Standards

The Indian child welfare crisis will continue until the standards for defining mistreatment are revised. Very few Indian children are removed from their homes on the grounds of physical abuse. One study of a North Dakota reservation showed that these grounds were advanced in only 1 percent of the cases. Another study of a tribe in the Northwest showed the same incidence. The remaining 99 percent of the cases were argued on such vague grounds as “neglect” or “social deprivation” and on allegations of the emotional damage the children were subjected to by living with their parents. Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they regard as excellent caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers.

In judging the fitness of a particular family, many social workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life and so they frequently discover neglect or abandonment where none exists.

For example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, untrained in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights.

Because in some communities the social workers have, in a sense, become a part of the extended family, parents will sometimes turn to the welfare department for temporary care of their children, failing to realize that their action is perceived quite differently by non-Indians.

Indian child-rearing practices are also misinterpreted in evaluating a child’s behavior and parental concern. It may appear that the child is running wild and that the parents do not care. What is labelled “permissiveness” may often, in fact, simply be a different but effective way of disciplining children. BIA boarding schools are full of children with such spurious “behavioral problems.”

One of the grounds most frequently advanced for taking Indian children from their parents is the abuse of alcohol. However, this standard is applied unequally. In areas where rates of problem drinking among Indians and non-Indians are the same, it is rarely applied against non-Indian parents. Once again cultural biases frequently affect decisionmaking. The late Dr. Edward P. Dozier of Santa Clara Pueblo and other observers have argued that there are important cultural differences in the use of alcohol. Yet, by and large, non-Indian social workers draw conclusions about the meaning of acts or conduct in ignorance of these distinctions.

The courts tend to rely on the testimony of social workers who often lack the training and insights necessary to measure the emotional risk the child is running at home. In a number of cases, the AAIA has obtained evidence from competent psychiatrists who, after examining the defendants, have been able to contradict the allegations offered by the social workers. Rejecting the notion that poverty and cultural differences constitute social deprivation and psychological abuse, the Association argues that the State must prove that there is actual physical or emotional harm resulting from the acts of the parents.

The abusive actions of social workers would largely be nullified if more judges were themselves knowledgeable about Indian life and required a sharper definition of the standards of child abuse and neglect.

Discriminatory standards have made it virtually impossible for most Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents, since they are based on middle-class values. Recognizing that in some instances it is necessary to remove children from their homes, community leaders argue that there are Indian families within the tribe who could provide excellent care, although they are of modest means. While some progress is being made here and there, the figures cited above indicate that non-Indian parents continue to furnish almost all the foster and adoptive care for Indian children.

Due process

The decision to take Indian children from their natural homes is, in most cases, carried out without due process of law. For example, it is rare for either Indian children or their parents to be represented by counsel to or have the supporting testimony of expert witnesses.

Many cases do not go through an adjudicatory process at all, since the voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social workers to gain custody of children. Because of the availability of the waivers and because a great number of Indian parents depend on welfare payments for survival, they are exposed to the shortcomings of welfare departments of welfare programs. In the recent South Dakota case, an Indian parent in a time of trouble was persuaded to sign a waiver granting temporary custody to the State, only to find that this was being advanced as evidence of neglect and grounds for the permanent termination of parental rights. It is an unfortunate fact of life for many Indian parents that the primary service agency to which they must turn for financial help also exercises police powers over their family life and is, most frequently, the agency that initiates custody proceedings.

The conflict between Indian and non-Indian social systems operates to defeat due process. The extended family provides an example. By sharing the responsibility of child rearing, the extended family tends to strengthen the community’s commitment to the child. At the same time, however, it diminishes the possibility that the nuclear family will be able to mobilize itself quickly enough when an outside agency acts to assume custody. Because it is not unusual for Indian children to spend considerable time away with other relatives, there is no immediate realization of what is happening—possibly not until the opportunity for due process has slipped away.

Economic incentives

In some instances, financial considerations contribute to the crisis. For example, agencies established to place children have an incentive to find children to place.

Indian community leaders charge that federally-subsidized foster care programs encourage some non-Indian families to start “baby farms” in order to supplement their meager farm income with foster care payments and to obtain extra hands for farmwork. The disparity between the ratio of Indian children in foster care versus the number of Indian children that are adopted seems to bear this out. For example,
in Wyoming in 1969, Indians accounted for 70 percent of foster care placements but only 8 percent of adoptive placements. Foster care payments usually cease when a child is adopted.

In addition, there are economic disincentives. It will cost the Federal and State Governments a great deal of money to provide Indian communities with the means to remedy their situation. But over the long run, it will cost a great deal more money not to. At the very least, as a first step, we should find new and more effective ways to spend present funds.

Social conditions

Low-income, joblessness, poor health, substandard housing, and low educational attainment—these are the reasons most often cited for the disintegration of Indian family life. It is not that clear-cut. Not all impoverished societies, whether Indian or non-Indian, suffer from catastrophically high rates of family breakdown.

Cultural disorientation, a person's sense of powerlessness, his loss of self-esteem—these may be the most potent forces at work. They arise, in large measure, from our national attitudes as reflected in long-established Federal policy and from arbitrary acts of Government.

One of the effects of our national paternalism has been to alienate some Indian patents from their society that they abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare departments rather than entrust them to the care of relatives in the extended family. Another expression of it is the involuntary, arbitrary, and unwarranted separation of families.

It has already been noted that the harsh living conditions in many Indian communities will prompt a welfare department to make unwarranted placements and that they make it difficult for Indian people to qualify as foster or adoptive parents. Additionally, because these conditions are often viewed as the primary cause of family breakdown and because generally there is no end to Indian poverty in sight, agencies of government often fail to recognize immediate, practical means to reduce the incidence of neglect or separation.

As surely as poverty imposes severe strains on the stability of families to function—sometimes the extra burden that is too much to bear—so too family breakdown contributes to the cycle of poverty.

Constitutionality

The Department of Justice, in its reports to the committee of February 9 and May 23, 1978, raises questions regarding the constitutionality of certain of the provisions of the legislation. While the committee did not agree with the Department on these issues, certain changes were made in the legislation which will meet some of the Department's concerns. Other issues remain, however. In view of the constitutional doubts of the Department, the committee feels compelled to respond.

Supremacy clause

Clause 2 of article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States, which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.


The Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State as its own local laws and constitution. Their obligation "is imperative upon the State judges, in their official and not merely in their private capacities. From the very nature of their judicial duties, they would be called upon to pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution of the State, but according to the laws and treaties of the United States—'the supreme law of the land.' " Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816); State courts have both the power and duty to enforce obligations arising under Federal law. Clafkin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 356 (1947).

Plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs

The question is then: "Does Congress have power to legislate as proposed in the bill?" Clause 3, section 8, article I of the Constitution provides:

The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

In an unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832):

(There is an) undisputed fact that Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their form of government.

The Supreme Court has, time and again, upheld the sweeping power of Congress over Indian matters. The cases are far too numerous to cite, but two cases will serve to exemplify this position. In U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) the Court said:

These Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.

And in United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), the Court held:

The power of Congress to regulate or prohibit traffic with tribal Indians within a State whether upon or off an Indian reservation is well settled * * *. Its source is twofold; first, the clause of the Constitution expressly investing Congress with authority "to regulate Commerce * * * with the Indian tribes", and, second, the dependent relation of such tribes to the United States.

It cannot be questioned that Congress has broad, unique powers with respect to Indian tribes and affairs. There is only one caveat: While those powers may be plenary, the exercise may not be arbitrary. For example, Congress may not take Indian property without just compensation nor may it establish a religion for Indian tribes.

Plenary power and child welfare

The question then is: "Is the regulation of child custody proceedings and the imposition of minimum Federal standards an appropriate exercise of Congress plenary power over Indian affairs?"

We need only cite three cases to lay the foundation for the power of Congress to legislate in this area. In U.S. v. Holiday, 70 U.S. 407 (1869), the Court said:

Commercial power with foreign Nations, without doubt, means commerce between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of foreign governments as individuals. And so commerce with Indians tribes means commerce with the individuals composing those tribes.

In Dick v. U.S., 208 U.S. 340 (1908), the Court held:

As long as these Indians remain a distinct people, with an existing tribal organization, recognized by the political department of the Government, Congress has power to say with whom, and on what terms, they shall deal * * *

Knepper, in Legal Status of American Indian & His Property (1922), 7 Iowa L.B. 232, stated: "Commerce with the Indian tribes has been construed to mean practically every sort of intercourse with the Indians either in the tribes or as individuals."

Finally, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in a case involving the attempted adoption of an Indian child (Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A. 2d 228 (1978), stated:

We think it plain that child-rearing is an "essential tribal relation" within * * * (the test of) Williams v. Lee (358 U.S. 217 (1959)).

And again:

* * * (C)onsidering that there can be no greater threat to 'essential tribal relations' and no greater infringement on the right of the * * * tribe to govern themselves than to interfere with tribal control over the custody of their children, we agree with the conclusion expressed in Wisconsin Potowatomies (Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (1973)) that in determining subject matter jurisdiction in such circumstances, the only rational approach is to determine the domicile of the Indian child. By using the Indian child's domicile as the State's jurisdictional basis, the Indian tribe is afforded significant protection from losing its essential rights of childrearing and maintenance of tribal identity.

Even this State court recognized that a tribe's children are vital to its integrity and future. Since the United States has the responsibility to protect the integrity of the tribes, we can say with the Kagama court, "* * * there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."

Geographic scope of plenary power

Is the Congress limited to Indian lands or to the reservation in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs? The answer is clearly, "No". Again, we need only cite one or two cases to support this conclusion.

In U.S. v. Holiday, supra, the Court said:

If commerce, or traffic, or intercourse is carried on with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe, it is subject to be regulated by Congress; although within the limits of a State. The locality of the traffic can have nothing to do with the power. (Emphasis added.) The right to exercise it in reference to any Indian tribe, or any person who is a member of such tribe, is absolute, without reference to the locality of the traffic, or the locality of the tribe, or the member of the tribe with whom it is carried on.

In Perrin v. U.S., 232 U.S. 487 (1914), the Court held:

We come, then, to the objection that the prohibition in the act of 1894 confers an unnecessarily extensive territory and is not limited in duration, and so transcends the power of Congress. As the power is incident only to the presence of the Indians and their status as wards of the Government, it must be conceded that it does not go beyond what is reasonably essential to their protection; and, that, to be effective, its exercise must not be purely arbitrary, but founded upon some reasonable basis. * * * On the other hand, it must also be conceded that, in determining what is reasonably essential to the protection of the Indians Congress is invested with a wide discretion and its action, unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the court.

We cite again U.S. v. Nice, supra: "The power of Congress to regulate or prohibit traffic with tribal Indians within a State whether upon or off an Indian reservation is well settled * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Membership and plenary power

The question occurs, as raised by the Department of Justice in its report: "Is the power of Congress limited, constitutionally, to only those individuals who are formally enrolled as members of an Indian tribe?" Again, the answer is negative.

In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 938). Section 19 defined "Indians" as:

* * * all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.

Categories two and three of this definition are clearly not enrolled members of a tribe, by definition; yet Congress conferred the rights and benefits of the act upon this class of Indians, including the right to preference in Federal employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service. When the Supreme Court was called upon to construe the constitutionality of the Indian preference section of the Indian Reorganization Act in the case of Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), it was aware that Indians who were not enrolled members of a tribe were made eligible for this preference by act of Congress, but did not strike the law down as invidiously discriminatory.

The reason it did not was because it was aware of its own past decisions with respect to congressional power over Indians not members of a tribe, Congress may disregard the existing membership rolls and direct that per capita distributions be made upon the basis of a new roll, even though such act may modify prior legislation, treaties, or agreements with the tribe. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899). Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Sizemore v. Brady, 293 U.S. 441 (1914), said:

* * * Like other tribal Indians, the Creeks were wards of the United States, which possessed full power, if it deemed such a course wise, to assume full control over them and their affairs, to ascertain who were members of the tribe * * *.

In Federal Indian Law, at page 45 in note 10, it is said:

It has been held that Congress is not bound by the tribal rule regarding membership and may determine for itself who is an Indian from the standpoint of a Federal criminal statute. United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567 (1846).

In the very recent case of United States v. Antelope, 45 U.S.L.W. 4361 (April 19, 1977), the Supreme Court said:

It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction. * * *

Federal District Court Judge Battin, in Dillon v. Montana, (1978), ordered:

2. That for purposes of applying this (Federal) exemption, the class of "Indian persons" * * * shall include persons possessing the following qualifications:

(a) that the person possess some quantum of Indian blood;
(b) that the person be recognized as an Indian by the community in which he or she lives, and that the putative taxpayer's wardship status has not been terminated by the government;
(c) that the person be an enrolled member of a federal tribe or otherwise eligible to be recognized as an Indian ward by the Federal Government.

(Emphasis added.)

If the courts have found that Congress has the power to act with respect to nonenrolled Indians in the foregoing kinds of circumstances, how much more is its power to act to protect the valuable rights of a minor Indian who is eligible for enrollment in a tribe? This minor, perhaps infant, Indian does not have the capacity to initiate the formal, mechanical procedure necessary to become enrolled in his tribe to take advantage of the very valuable cultural and property benefits flowing therefrom. Obviously, Congress has power to act for their protection. The constitutional and plenary power of Congress over Indians and Indian tribes and affairs cannot be made to hinge upon the cranking into operation of a mechanical process established under tribal law, particularly with respect to Indian children who, because of their minority, cannot make a reasoned decision about their tribal and Indian identity.

Supremacy clause versus States' rights

From the foregoing, it is clear that Congress has full power to enact laws to protect and preserve the future and integrity of Indian tribes by providing minimal safeguards with respect to State proceedings for Indian child custody. The final question is, paraphrasing the Department of Justice: "Does Congress have power to control the incidents of child custody litigation involving nonresidence Indian children and parents pursuant to the Indian commerce clause sufficient to override the significant State interest in regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising jurisdiction over what is traditionally a State matter?"

First, let it be said that the provisions of the bill do not oust the State from the exercise of its legitimate police powers in regulating domestic relations.

The decisions of the Supreme Court will set to rest the principal objection. It is appropriate to begin with the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), where the Court stated:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.

In Brown v. Western Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 294 (1949), the Court said:

The argument is that while state courts are without power to detract from "substantive rights" granted by Congress * * * they are free to follow their own rules of "practice" and "procedure" * * *.* A long series of cases previously decided, from which we see no reason to depart,
makes it our duty to construe the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial granted him by Congress. This federal right cannot be defeated by forms of local practice. * * * Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by Federal laws.

In Dice v. Akron, C.Y.Y. R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), the Court held:

Congress * * * granted petitioner a right * * * , State laws are not controlling in determining what the incidents of this Federal right shall be."

Chief Justice Holmes, in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923), put it succinctly:

Whatever springs the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.

We will quote merely two other cases to support the proposition that Congress may, constitutionally, impose certain procedural burdens upon State courts in order to protect the substantive rights of Indian children, Indian parents, and Indian tribes in State court proceedings for child custody.

The Court, in American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923), held that:

The laws of the United States cannot be evaded by the forms of local practice * * *. The local rules applied as to the burden of proof narrowed the protection that the defendant had secured (under Federal law), and therefore contravened the law.

And finally, in an extensive quote from the landmark decision of the Court in Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), we examine the duty of State courts, otherwise having jurisdiction over the subject matter, to enforce federal substantive rights:

We come next to consider whether rights arising from congressional act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local law, is adequate to the occasion * * *. (The State court was of the opinion that it could decline to enforce the Federal right) because * * * it would be inconvenient and confusing for the same court, in dealing with cases of the same general class, to apply in some the standard of right established by congressional act and in others the different standards recognized by the laws of the State. * * * It never has been supposed that courts are at liberty to decline cognizance of cases merely because the rules of law to be applied in their adjudication are unlike those applied in other cases.

We conclude that rights arising under the (Federal) act in question may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local law, is adequate to the occasion.

 Conclusion

Under the rules of the House, this committee has been charged with the initial responsibility in implementing the plenary power over, and responsibility to, the Indians and Indian tribes. In the exercise of that responsibility, the committee has noted a growing crisis with respect to the breakup of Indian families and the placement of Indian children, at an alarming rate, with non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Contributing to this problem has been the failure of State officials, agencies, and procedures to take into account the special problems and circumstances of Indian families and the legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in preserving and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring of its own future.

While the committee does not feel that it is necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children falling within their geographic limits, it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings designed to protect the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian family and the Indian tribe.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

As amended by the committee, the legislation completely rewrites S. 1214 as passed by the Senate. In addition, the amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 12533, as further amended, differs significantly from H.R. 12533 as introduced. The following is a section-by-section analysis of the bill as reported with appropriate explanations.

Section 1

Section 1 provides that the bill may be cited as the “Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978”.

Section 2

Section 2 contains congressional findings. As amended, it lays the foundations for the power and responsibility of the Congress to legislate in the field of Indian child welfare.

Section 3

Section 3 contains a congressional declaration of policy. As amended, the section makes clear that the underlying principle of the bill is in the best interest of the Indian child. However, the committee notes that this legal principle is vague, at best. In a footnote on page 835 in the decision of Smith v. OFFER, 451 U.S. 820 (1977), the Supreme Court stated:

Moreover, judges too may find it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like “the best interests of the child”, to avoid decisions resting on subjective values.

SECTION 4

Section 4 defines various terms used in the bill.

Paragraph (1) defines the term “child custody placement” by defining four discrete legal proceedings included within the term. S. 1214 and H.R. 12533, as introduced, used the term “placement” which proved to be ambiguous with respect to the various provisions
Paragraph (2) defines the term "extended family member". The concept of the extended family maintains its vitality and strength in the Indian community. By custom and tradition, members of the extended family have definite responsibilities and duties in assisting in child rearing. Yet, many non-Indian public and private agencies have tended to view custody of an Indian child by a member of the extended family as prima facie evidence of parental neglect. It should be noted that the concept was not unknown in the non-Indian world. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977), noted:

In today's America, the "nuclear family" is the pattern so often found in much of white suburbia. The Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living. The "extended family" remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under goal of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society.

Paragraph (3) defines "Indian" as any person who is a member of an Indian tribe.

Paragraph (4) defines "Indian child." The committee rejects the use of the term "merely" by the Department of Justice to qualify the eligibility of an Indian to be a member of an Indian tribe, particularly with respect to a minor. Blood relationship is the very touchstone of a person's right to share in the cultural and property benefits of an Indian tribe. We do note that, for an adult Indian, there is an absolute right of expatriation from one's tribe. U.S. ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14891 (1879). However, this right has no relevance to an Indian child who, because of his minority, does not have the capacity to make a reasoned judgment about exercising his right to enroll in his tribe.

Paragraph (5) defines "Indian child's tribe." It is assumed that the appropriate official can make a reasonable judgment about which Indian tribe the Indian child has the more significant contacts in cases where the child is eligible for membership in more than one tribe.

Paragraph (6) defines "Indian custodian." Where the custody of an Indian child is lodged with someone other than the parents under formal custom or law of the tribe or under State law, no problem arises. But, because of the extended family concept in the Indian community, parents often transfer physical custody of the Indian child to such extended family member on an informal basis, often for extended periods of time and at great distances from the parents. While such a custodian may not have rights under State law, they do have rights under Indian custom which this bill seeks to protect, including the right to protect the parental interests of the parents.

Paragraph (7) defines "Indian organization".

Paragraph (8) defines "Indian tribe".

Paragraph (9) defines "parent". It should be noted that the last sentence of the last sentence of the paragraph addresses and applies the holding in cases such as DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Rosebud v. Kneip, 97 S. Ct. 1361 (1977).

Paragraph (10) defines "reservation". For the limited purpose of jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, the last sentence of the paragraph addresses and applies the holding in cases such as DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Rosebud v. Kneip, 97 S. Ct. 1361 (1977).

Paragraph (11) defines "Secretary" as the Secretary of the Interior.

Paragraph (12) defines "tribal court".
Section 103

Subsection (a) provides that consent to foster care placement or termination of parental rights must be executed in writing before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and that the judge must be satisfied the consequences of such consent was fully understood by the parent or custodian. Where the judge determines the parent or custodian does not have a sufficient command of the English language, it should be interpreted into a language such person does understand. The committee does not intend that the execution of the consent need be in open court where confidentiality is requested or indicated.

Subsection (b) permits a parent or Indian custodian to withdraw consent to a foster care placement at any time.

Subsection (c) authorizes a parent or Indian custodian to withdraw consent to termination of parental rights or adoptive placement of an Indian child at any time prior to the entry of a final decree.

Subsection (d) authorizes the setting aside of a final decree of adoption of an Indian child upon petition of the parent upon grounds that consent thereto was obtained through fraud or duress. This right is limited to 2 years after entry of the decree, unless a longer period is provided under State law. With respect to subsections (b), (c), and (d), the committee notes that nothing in those subsections prevents an appropriate party or agency from instituting an involuntary proceeding, subject to section 102, to prevent the return of the child, but does not wish to be understood as routinely inviting such actions.

Section 104

Section 104 authorizes the child, parent, or Indian custodian, or the tribe to move to set aside any foster care placement or termination of parental rights on the grounds that the rights secured under sections 101, 102, or 103 were violated.

Section 105

Section 105, as a whole, contemplates those instances where the parental rights of the Indian parent has already been terminated. The section seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.

Subsection (a) provides that, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, a preference shall be given to adoptive placement of an Indian child with the extended family; a member of the child's tribe; or another Indian family. This subsection and subsection (b) establish a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community, but is not to be read as precluding the placement of an Indian child with a non-Indian family.

Subsection (b) establishes a similar preference for foster care or preadoptive placements of an Indian child. The language was amended to conform to language in H.R. 7200 of this Congress relative to foster care and adoptive placements in the least restrictive settings.

Subsection (c) provides that the tribe may establish a different order of preference which will be followed in lieu of the Federal standards as long as such order is consistent with the least restrictive setting standard in subsection (b). Where appropriate, the preference
of the child or parent shall be considered and a request for anonymity of a consenting parent shall be given weight in applying the preferences. While the request for anonymity should be given weight in determining if a preference should be applied, it is not meant to outweigh the basic right of the child as an Indian.

Subsection (d) provides that the standards to be used in meeting the preference shall be those prevailing in the relevant Indian community. All too often, State public and private agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit for foster care or adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with the Indian family.

Subsection (e) requires the State to maintain records showing what efforts have been made to comply with the preference standards of this section and to make such records available to the tribe and Secretary.

Section 106

Subsection (a) authorizes a biological parent of an Indian child to petition for the return of the child when a previous adoption of such child fails. The child shall be returned to the parent upon such petition, unless there is a showing, in a proceeding subject to the provisions of section 102, that such return would not be in the best interests of the child.

Subsection (b) provides that when an Indian child is being removed from a foster care home for purposes of further foster care placement, preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement, such further placement shall be subject to the provisions of this act, unless the child is being returned to the parent or Indian custodian.

Section 107

Section 107 confers a right upon an adult Indian, who was the subject of adoption, to secure necessary information from the court which entered the decree to enable the person to protect and secure any rights he may have from his tribal affiliation. There appears to be a growing trend in State law, supported by developing psychology, that an adopted individual has an inherent right to know his genealogical background. However, this section and section 301 are not aimed at that right. These provisions are aimed at different, but no less valuable rights. One, these provisions will help protect the valuable rights an individual has as a member or potential member of an Indian tribe and any collateral benefits which may flow from the Federal Government because of such membership. Two, these provisions will help protect the rights and interests of an Indian tribe in having its children remain with or become a part of the tribe.

Section 108

Subsection (a) authorizes an Indian tribe, which became subject to State jurisdiction under Public Law 83-280 or any other Federal law, to reassert jurisdiction over child custody proceedings upon petition to the Secretary of the Interior including a suitable plan.

Subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary, in considering a petition for reassertion, to take into consideration various factors affecting the exercise of such jurisdiction, including membership rolls, size of reservation or former reservation, and population base. Depending on such circumstances, the Secretary is given the flexibility to authorize partial retrocession based upon the referral authority under section 101(b) or to limit the geographic scope of the full exercise of 101(a) jurisdiction. The subsection was adopted as an amendment in order to take into consideration special circumstances, such as those occurring in Alaska and Oklahoma.

Subsection (c) provides for publication of notice of reassumption by the Secretary in the Federal Register and for the effective date of such reassumption.

Subsection (d) provides that reassumption shall not affect ongoing proceedings at the time of reassumption unless provided for in an agreement under section 109.

Section 109

Section 109 authorizes Indian tribes and States to enter into mutual agreements or compacts with respect to jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings and related matters. It also provides for revocation of such agreements by the parties.

Section 110

Section 110 establishes a "clean hands" doctrine with respect to petitions in State court for the custody of an Indian child by a person who improperly has such child in physical custody. It is aimed at those persons who improperly secure or improperly retain custody of the child without the consent of the parent or Indian custodian and without the sanction of law. It is intended to bar such person from taking advantage of wrongful conduct in a subsequent petition for custody. The child is to be returned to the parent or Indian custodian by the court unless such return would result in substantial and immediate physical danger or threat of physical danger to the child. It is not intended that any such showing be by or on behalf of the wrongful petitioner.

Section 111

Section 111 provides that, where State law affords a higher degree of protection of the rights of the parent or Indian custodian, such standard will be applied by the State court in lieu of the related provision of this title. The section was amended by the committee to include any relevant protection or standard established under Federal law.

Section 112

Section 112 would permit, under applicable State law, the emergency removal of an Indian child from his parent or Indian custodian or emergency placement of such child in order to prevent imminent physical harm to the child notwithstanding the provisions of this title. Such emergency removal and/or placement is to continue only for a reasonable length of time and the committee expects that the appropriate State official or authority would take expedient action to return the child to the parent or custodian; transfer jurisdiction to the appropriate tribe; or institute a proceeding subject to the provisions of this title.

Section 113

Section 113 provides for the orderly phasing in of the effect of the provisions of this title. As amended, it provides that none of the pro-
visions of this title, except section 101(a), would apply to any State
decisions for foster care placement; for termination of parental rights; for
placement which was initiated or completed prior to enactment of this act. However, it is intended
that the provisions would apply to any subsequent discrete phase of
the same matter or with respect to the same child initiated after
enactment. For instance, if the foster care placement of an Indian
child was initiated or completed prior to enactment and then, subse-
quently to enactment, the child was replaced for foster care, or an
action for termination of parental rights was initiated, or the child
was placed in a preadoptive situation, or he was placed for adoption,
the provisions of the act would be applicable to those subsequent
actions.

Section 201

Subsection (a) authorizes the Secretary to make grants to Indian
tribes and organizations to fund Indian child and family service pro-
grams on or near the reservation and lists nonexclusionary services
to be provided in such programs.

Subsection (b) permits tribes and organizations to use such grant
money for non-Federal matching share with respect to titles IV-B and
XX of the Social Security Act or other similar Federal programs. It
would also recognize the licensing or approval of foster or adoptive
homes or institutions by Indian tribes as equivalent to State licensing
or approval.

Section 202

Section 202 authorizes the Secretary to make similar grants to
Indian organizations for off-reservation programs.

Section 203

Section 203 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior and the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare to enter into joint funding
agreements with respect to Indian child and family service programs,
to the extent that funds are made available by appropriation acts for
such purposes. The authority of the Snyder Act of November 2, 1921
(42 Stat. 208) is made available for the appropriation of funds for
grants to tribes and organizations.

Section 204

Section 204 provides that, solely with respect to sections 202 and
203 of this act, "Indian" shall have the meaning assigned to it in
section 4(c) of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976
(90 Stat. 1400, 1401).

Section 301

Subsection (a) provides that any State court entering a final decree
of adoption of an Indian child after the date of enactment of this act
shall provide a copy of such decree together with certain other basic
information to the Secretary, including any affidavit of a parent
requesting anonymity. The Secretary is required to maintain such
information and records and to insure that such information is kept
confidential. The subsection provides that such information shall not
be subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
On April 1, 1977, Senator Abourezk introduced S. 1214 which was referred to the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs. On August 4, 1977, the Senate committee held hearings on the bill again, taking testimony from the broad spectrum of concerned parties, public and private, Indian and non-Indian. The committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute and reported the amended bill to the Senate on November 3, 1977 (S. Rept. No. 95-597). The bill passed the Senate on November 4, 1977.

In the House, S. 1214 was referred to the Committee on Interior and Indian Affairs. On February 9 and March 9, 1978, the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands held hearings on the bill, hearing 8 hours of testimony from 34 witnesses. The subcommittee received comments on S. 1214, either by oral testimony or written communication, from 3 executive departments; 20 States; 22 non-Indian private organizations; 35 Indian organizations; and 38 Indian tribes.

On April 18, 1978, the subcommittee marked up S. 1214 and adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute. This substitute was subsequently introduced by Mr. Udall et al. as a clean bill, H.R. 12533. On June 21, 1978, the full committee took up consideration of the legislation and proceeded to the markup of H.R. 12533 in lieu of S. 1214. The committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 12533 which was further amended. H.R. 12533, as amended, was reported from the committee favorably, by voice vote.

COST AND BUDGET ACT COMPLIANCE

Title II of the bill directs the Secretary of the Interior to institute programs for child and family service assistance. These programs include authority to construct centers on and off reservations and to provide a variety of assistance programs directed toward the stability and integrity of the Indian family. CBO has projected a cost of approximately $125 million over the next 5 fiscal years. The committee feels this estimate is high and is based upon assumptions which are probably not valid, but it agrees that the costs will not exceed a total of $125 million. For instance, it assumes construction of family service centers in every case in which an Indian reservation or urban area might be eligible for such center. In fact, existing facilities, both on the reservation and in the urban areas, would probably be used to house the various programs contemplated in the bill. The analysis of H.R. 12533 by the Congressional Budget Office follows:


Hon. Morris K. Udall,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate for H.R. 12533, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.

Should the committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details on the attached cost estimate.

Sincerely,

Alice M. Rivlin, Director.
Estimate comparison: None.

Previous CBO estimate: On November 2, 1977, CBO prepared an estimate on S. 1214, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977. The Senate bill is essentially the same as H.R. 12533. However, S. 1214 did not assume the use of Snyder Act authorization and included additional authorization language to cover the provision of the bill setting an authorization level of $36 million for fiscal year 1979.

Estimate prepared by Deborah Kalcevic.

Estimate approved by James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

At the level of funding estimated by the Congressional Budget Office, enactment of this legislation would have some minimal inflationary impact. This impact is lessened since the cost will be spread out over 5 fiscal years.

OVERSIGHT STATEMENT

Other than normal oversight responsibilities exercised in conjunction with these legislative operations, the committee conducted no specific oversight hearings and no recommendations were submitted to the committee pursuant to rule X, clause 2(b)(2).

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, by a voice vote, recommends that the bill, as amended, be enacted.

DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS

The report of the Department of the Interior, dated June 6, 1978, and the reports of the Department of Justice, dated February 9, 1978, and May 23, 1978, are as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Office of the Secretary,

Hon. Morris K. Udall,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: This Department would like to make its views known on H.R. 12533, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, and urge the committee to make the recommended changes during markup of the bill. We understand the Department of Justice has communicated its concerns with the bill to the committee, and we urge the committee to amend the bill to address those concerns.

If H.R. 12533 is amended as detailed herein and as recommended by the Department of Justice's letter of May 23, 1978, we would recommend that the bill be enacted.

Title I of H.R. 12533 would establish nationwide procedures for the handling of Indian child placements. The bill would vest in tribal courts their already acknowledged right to exclusive jurisdiction over Indian child placements within their reservations. It would also provide for transfer of such a proceeding from a State court to a tribal court if the parent or Indian custodian so petitions or if the Indian tribe so petitions, and if neither of the parents nor the custodial objects.

Requirements dealing with notice to tribes and parents and consent to child placements are also a major element of the bill. Testimony on the problems with present Indian child placement proceedings repeatedly pointed out the lack of informed consent on the part of many Indian parents who have lost their children.

Title I would also impose on State courts evidentiary standards which would have to be met before an Indian child could be ordered removed from the custody of his parents or Indian custodian. Court-appointed counsel would be available to the parent or custodian upon a finding of indigency by the court.

State courts would also be required, under the provisions of H.R. 12533, to apply preference standards set forth in section 105 in the placing of an Indian child. These preferences would strengthen the chances of the Indian child staying within the Indian community and growing up with a consistent set of cultural values.

Title II of H.R. 12533, entitled "Indian Child and Family Programs," would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to make grants to Indian tribes and organizations for the establishment of Indian family service programs both on and off the reservation. Section 204 would authorize $26 million for that purpose.

Title III of H.R. 12533, entitled "Recordkeeping, Information Availability, and Timetables," would direct the Secretary of the Interior to maintain records, in a single central location, of all Indian child placements affected by the act. Those records would not be open, but information from them could be made available to an Indian child over age 18, to his adoptive or foster parent, or to an Indian tribe, for the purpose of assisting in the enrollment of that child in an Indian tribe.

Title IV of H.R. 12533, entitled "Placement Prevention Study," would direct the Secretary of the Interior to prepare and submit to Congress a plan, including a cost analysis statement, for the provision to Indian children of schools located near their homes.

Although we support the concept of promoting the welfare of Indian children, we urge that the bill be amended in the following ways.

Section 4(9) defines the term "placement." This definition is crucial to the carrying out of the provisions of title I. We believe that custody proceedings held pursuant to a divorce decree and delinquency proceedings where the act committed would be a crime if committed by an adult should be excepted from the definition of the term "placement". We believe that the protections provided by this act are not needed proceedings between parents. We also believe that the standards and preferences have no relevance in the context of a delinquency proceeding.

Section 101(a) would grant to Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction over Indian child placement proceedings. We believe that section 101(a) should be amended to make explicit that an Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction only if the Indian child is residing on the reservation with a parent or custodian who has legal custody. The bill does not address the situation where two parental views are involved. Therefore, the definition of domicile is inadequate and the use of the word "parent" as defined does not articulate the responsibilities of the courts to both parents.
We believe that reservations located in States subject to Public Law 83–280 should be specifically excluded from section 101(a), since the provisions of section 108, regarding retrocession of jurisdiction, deal with the reassertion of tribal jurisdiction in those States.

Section 101(b) should be amended to prohibit clearly the transfer of a child placement proceeding to a tribal court when any parent or child over the age of 12 objects to the transfer.

Section 101(c), regarding full faith and credit to tribal orders, should be amended to make clear that the full faith and credit intended is that which States presently give to other States.

Section 102(a) would provide that no placement hearing be held until at least 30 days after the parent and the tribe receive notice. We believe that in many cases 30 days is too long to delay the commencement of such a proceeding. We suggest that the section be amended to allow the proceeding to begin 10 days after such notice with a provision allowing the tribe or parent to request up to 20 additional days to prepare a case. This would allow cases where the parents or tribe do not wish a full 30 days' notice to be adjudicated quickly, while still affording time to the parent or tribe who needs that time to prepare a case. We also suggest that the section be amended to require the Secretary to make a good faith effort to locate the parent as quickly as possible and to provide for situations in which the parent or Indian custodian cannot be located.

We also believe that there is a need for specific emergency removal provisions in H.R. 12533. A section should be added allowing the removal of a child from the home without a court order when the physical or emotional well-being of the child is seriously and immediately threatened. That removal should not exceed 72 hours without an order of the Court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 102(b) would provide the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child the right to court-appointed counsel if the court determines that he or she is indigent.

We are opposed to the enactment of this section. We do not believe that there has been a significant demonstration of need for such a provision to justify the financial burden such a requirement would be to both the States and the Federal Government.

Section 102(c) would allow all parties to a placement to examine all documents and files upon which any decision with respect to that placement may be based. This provision conflicts with the Federal Child Abuse and Neglect Treatment Act, Public Law 93–247, which provides confidentiality for certain records in child abuse and neglect cases. We believe that such a broad opening of records would lead to less reporting of child abuse and neglect. However, we do recognize the right of the parent to confront and be given an opportunity to refute any evidence which the court may use in deciding the outcome of a child placement proceeding. We recommend that the Indian Child Welfare Act conform with the provisions of Public Law 93–247.

Section 102(e) of H.R. 12533 would require the State court to find beyond a reasonable doubt, before ordering the removal of the child from the home, that continued custody on the part of the parent or custodian will result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. We believe that the burden of proof is too high. We would support the language found in section 101(b) of the Senate-passed S. 1214, which would impose a burden of clear and convincing evidence and would set down certain social conditions which could not be considered by the court as prima facie evidence of neglect or abuse. We also believe that the language "will result" in serious damage to the child should be amended to read "is likely to result" in such damage. It is almost impossible to prove at such a high burden of proof that an act will definitely happen.

Section 105 of H.R. 12533 would impose on State courts certain preferences in placing an Indian child. Subsection (c) would substitute the preference list of the Indian child's tribe where the tribe has established a different order of preference by resolution.

Language should be included in that subsection which would require that resolution to be published in the Federal Register and later included in the Code of Federal Regulations. This would allow the State court easy access to the preferences of the various tribes.

It is also unclear what the last sentence in subsection (c) means by allowing the preference of the Indian child or parent to be considered "where appropriate." We believe that the preference of the child and the parent should be given due consideration by the court regardless of whether that court is following the preferences set forth in section 105(a) or 105(b), or whether it is following a preference list established by an Indian tribe. Therefore, we recommend that a separate subsection be added to section 105 stating that the preferences of the Indian child and of the parent be given due consideration by the court whenever an Indian child is being placed.

Section 106 deals with failed placements and requires that, whenever an Indian child is placed in a foster home or institution in which the child was placed for the purpose of further placement, such removal shall be considered a placement for purposes of the act. We see no reason for requiring a full proceeding every time a child is moved from one form of foster care to another. We do, however, recognize the need for notification of the parents and the tribe of such move and for applying the preferences set forth in section 105. Therefore, we recommend that subsection (b) of section 106 be amended to require the notice and preference provisions to apply when a child is moved from one form of foster care to another and to require the removal to be considered as a new placement only in the case where termination of parental rights is at issue.

Section 107 deals with the right of an Indian who has reached age 18 and who has been the subject of a placement to learn of his or her tribal affiliation. We believe that rather than apply to the court for such information, the individual involved should apply to the Secretary of the Interior. Under the provisions of title III, the Secretary would maintain a central file with the name and tribal affiliation of each subject to the provisions of the act. Therefore, the Secretary would be more likely than the State court to have the information needed to protect any rights of the individual involved which may flow from his or her tribal affiliation.

Finally, with respect to title I, we believe that a section should be added which would state that the provisions of the act apply only with respect to placement proceedings which begin 6 months after the date of the enactment of the act. This would allow States some time to familiarize themselves with the provisions of the act and
would thus avoid the chance of having large numbers of placements invalidated because of failure to follow the procedures of the act.

Such a section should also state that the intent of the act is not the pre-emption by the Federal Government of the whole area of Indian child welfare and placement. In any case where a state has laws which are more protective than the requirements of this act, e.g., with regard to notice and enforcement, those laws should apply.

We believe that many of the authorities granted by title II of the bill are unnecessary because they duplicate authorities in present law, and therefore, we recommend the deletion of title II.

We find especially objectionable in title II the following:

The authorization for an unlimited subsidy program for Indian adoptive children. We believe that any such program should be limited to hard-to-place children or children who are or would be eligible for foster care support from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. We also believe that the amount of any such support would have to be limited to the prevailing State foster care rate for maintenance and medical needs.

The authorization for grants to establish and operate off-reservation Indian child and family service programs.

The new separate authorization of $26 million in section 203(b) of title II.

The provisions of section 201(c) which would authorize every Indian tribe to construct, operate, and maintain family service facilities regardless of the size of the tribe or the availability of existing services and facilities.

The authorization for the use of Federal funds appropriated under title II to be used as the non-Federal matching share in connection with other Federal funds.

However, we believe that the last sentence of section 201(b), providing that licensing or approval by an Indian tribe should be deemed equivalent to that done by a State, should remain in the bill under title I as a separate section.

We have no objection to section 301 of title III of H.R. 12533. We believe that requiring the Secretary to maintain a central file on Indian child placements will better enable the Secretary to carry out his trust responsibility, especially when judgment funds are to be distributed.

However, we object to the provisions of section 302(c), which would require the Secretary to present any proposed revision or amendment of rules and regulations promulgated under that section to both Houses of Congress. Any such proposed revision or amendment would be published in the Federal Register and we believe that placing this additional responsibility on the Secretary is both burdensome and unnecessary.

We believe that section 401 of Title IV should be amended to read as follows:

Sec. 401. (a) It is the sense of Congress that the absence of locally convenient day schools may contribute to the breakup of Indian families.

(b) The Secretary is authorized and directed to prepare and submit to the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the United States Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives within 1 year from the date of this act, a report on the feasibility of providing Indian children with schools located near their homes. In developing this report the Secretary shall give particular consideration to the provision of educational facilities for children in the elementary grades.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this report from the standpoint of the administration's program, and that enactment of the House subcommittee's present version of H.R. 12533 would not be consistent with the administration's objectives.

Sincerely,

FORREST J. GERARD,
Assistant Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

HON. MORRIS K. UDALL,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to bring to your attention several areas where the Department of Justice perceives potential problems with S. 1214, a bill to establish standards for the placement of Indian children in foster or adoptive homes, to prevent the breakup of Indian families, and for other purposes. In our view, certain provisions of the bill raise serious constitutional problems because they provide for differing treatment of certain classes of persons based solely on race.

S. 1214 was passed by the Senate on November 4, 1977 and is now pending in the Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands.

This Department has not been involved in the hearings relating to the bill. Our comments therefore are based on a reading of the text of the bill rather than on a review of the testimony and legislative history which necessarily would be considered by a court which had to interpret its provisions and determine its constitutional validity.

As you may be aware, the courts have consistently recognized that tribal governments have exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic relationships of tribal members located on reservations, unless a State has assumed concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to Federal legislation such as Public Law 83-280. It is our understanding that this legal principle is often ignored by local welfare organizations and foster homes in cases where they believe Indian children have been neglected, and that S. 1214 is designed to remedy this, and to define the Indian rights in such cases.

The bill would appear to subject family relations matters of certain classes of persons to the jurisdiction of tribal courts which are presently adjudicated in State courts. The bill would accomplish this result with regard to three distinct categories of persons, all possessing the common trait of having enough Indian blood to qualify for membership in a tribe. One class would be members of a tribe. Another class would be nontribal members living on reservations, and a third would be nonmembers living off reservations. These three classes would be
denied access to State courts for the adjudication of certain family relations matters unless "good cause" is shown under section 102(e) of the bill.

The general constitutional question raised by S. 1214 is whether the denial of access to State courts constitutes invidious racial discrimination, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See Espy v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). This question is most properly addressed by focusing on each of the three classes described above and contrasting each class with a similarly situated class of persons whose access to State courts is not affected by the bill.

The class of persons whose rights under the bill may, in our opinion, constitutionally be circumscribed by this legislation are the members of a tribe, whether living on or near a reservation. In Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), the Supreme Court addressed an argument made by members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe that denial of access to the Montana State courts pursuant to adoption did not involve impermissible racial discrimination. In that case, both the persons seeking to pursue adoption of the child in question and the natural mother of the child who contested the right of the Montana courts to entertain the adoption proceeding were residents of the reservation and members of the tribe. The Court stated that:

The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under Federal law. Moreover, even if a jurisdictional holding occasioned results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the two classes of which he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–555 (1974). 424 U.S., at 390–91.

In Fisher, the class to which the Court was apparently referring consisted of members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. This is so because of the Court's citation to Morton v. Mancari, in which the Court has upheld preferential treatment of Indians in certain employment situations by reasoning that the "preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities." Id., at 394.

More recently, the Court has reiterated this notion in United States v. Antelope, 45 U.S.L.W. 4361 (U.S. April 19, 1977). In that case, enrolled Coeur d'Alene Indians contended that their Federal convictions for murder of a non-Indian on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation were products of invidious racial discrimination because a non-Indian participating in the same crime would have been tried in State court and would have had certain substantial advantages regarding the elements required to be proved for conviction.' The Court, in rejecting this claim, held that the Court d'Alene Indians "were not subjected to Federal criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 because they were of the Indian race but because they were enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe." Id., at 4363.

We believe that Mancari, Fisher, and Antelope directly support the constitutionality of this bill as it affects the access of tribal members to State courts. At the same time, these cases do not resolve the constitutionality of S. 1214 as it would affect the rights of nontribal members living either on or off reservations. Indeed, they can be read to suggest that, absent tribal membership, Congress' freedom to treat differently persons having Indian blood is diminished.

With regard to nonmembers living on a reservation, a footnote in the Antelope case would appear indirectly to address, but not resolve, the question presented by this bill:

"It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for Federal jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the reservation and maintained tribal relations with the Indians thereon." Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (CA 7 1938). See also United States v. Foss, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (CA 9 1974) (dicta).

Since respondents are enrolled tribal members, we are not called on to decide whether nonenrolled Indians are subject to [Federal criminal jurisdiction] and we therefore intimate no views on the matter.

In Ex parte Pero, supra, the seventh circuit affirmed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus to a nonenrolled Indian, who had been convicted of murder in a State court, holding that the Indian could only be tried in Federal court by virtue of what was then 18 U.S.C. § 548, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The court appeared to base its holding on the fact that the Indian was the "child of one Indian mother and half-blood father, whose both parents are recognized as Indians and maintain tribal relations, who himself lives on the reservation and maintains tribal relations and is recognized as an Indian * * *." Id., at 31.

With regard to nonmembers who are otherwise eligible for tribal membership who live on reservations, Pero at least stands for the proposition that the federal interest in the "guardian-ward relationship" is sufficient to secure to a nonenrolled Indian the protection of a Federal criminal proceeding as opposed to trial by a State court. Pero is, however, based on a Federal interest which would appear to us to differ in kind from the Federal interest identified in Mancari, Fisher, and Antelope. In those latter cases, the Federal interest in promoting Indian self-government was specifically identified as a touchstone of the Court's opinions. In our view, this weighty interest is present in S. 1214 in a more attenuated form with regard to nontribal members, even those living on reservations. An eligible Indian who has chosen, for whatever reasons, not to enroll in a tribe would be in no position to argue that depriving him of access to the State courts on matters related to family life would be invidious. Such an Indian presumably has under the first amendment, the same right of association as do all citizens, and indeed would appear to be in no different situation from a non-Indian living on a reservation who, under S. 1214, would have access to State courts. The only difference between them would, in fact, be the racial characteristics of the former.

We also think that even Pero only marginally supports the constitutionality of this bill as applied to nonmembers living on reserva-

1 Specifically, the State of Idaho, in which the crime occurred, did not have a felony murder rule as such. In order to be convicted of first-degree murder, the State would have had to prove certain elements that were not required to be proven in the Federal trial because a felony-murder rule was in effect in the latter court.

2 45 U.S.L.W. at 4363 n.7.
tions. In Pero, the focus of the Court's inquiry was on the contacts between the convicted Indian and the Indian tribe and reservation. In S. 1214, the inquiry would appear to be solely directed to contacts between the Indian child and the Indian tribe, whereas the persons whose rights are most directly affected by the bill are the parents or guardians of the child. Thus, there is little support for the constitutionality of this bill as applied to nontribal members living on reservations and the rationale applied by the Court in Mancari, Fisher, and Halvey does not save the bill. The simple fact is that the parents of an Indian child may find their substantive rights altered by virtue of their Indian blood and the simple fact of residence on a reservation.

The Court has never sanctioned such a racial classification which denied substantive rights, and we are unable to find any persuasive reason to suggest that it would do so.

Our conclusion with regard to nonmembers living on reservations is even more certain in the context of nonmembers living off reservations. In such a situation, we are firmly convinced that the Indian or possible non-Indian parent may not be unconstitutionally discriminated against under the fifth amendment and that the provisions of this bill would do so. Assuming a compelling governmental interest would otherwise justify this discrimination, we are unable to suggest what such an interest might be.

For reasons stated above, we consider that part of S. 1214 restricting access to State courts to be constitutional as applied to tribal members. However, we think that S. 1214 is of doubtful constitutionality as applied to nontribal members living on reservations and would almost certainly be held to be unconstitutional as applied to nonmembers living off reservations.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the administration's program.

Sincerely,

PATRICIA M. WALD,
Assistant Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

HON. MORRIS K. UDALL,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatves, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We would like to take this opportunity to comment on the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs version of S. 1214, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.

As you know, the Department presented at some length its views on one constitutional issue raised by S. 1214 as it passed the Senate in a letter to you dated February 9, 1978. Briefly, that constitutional issue concerned the fact that S. 1214 would have deprived parents of Indian children as defined by that bill of access to State courts for the adjudication of child custody and related matters based, at bottom, on the racial characteristics of the Indian child. We express in that letter our belief that such racial classification was suspect under the fifth amendment and that we saw no compelling reason which might justify its use in these circumstances. This problem has been, for the most part, eliminated in the subcommittee draft, which defines "Indian child" as "any unattached person who is under age 18 and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe."

We are still concerned, however, that exclusive tribal jurisdiction based on the "(b)" portion of the definition of "Indian child" may constitute racial discrimination. So long as a parent who is a tribal member has legal custody of a child who is merely eligible for membership at the time of a proceeding, no constitutional problem arises. Where, however, legal custody of a child who is merely eligible for membership is lodged exclusively with nontribal members, exclusive tribal jurisdiction cannot be justified because no one directly affected by the adjudication is an actual tribal member. We do not think that the blood connection between the child and a biological but noncustodial parent is a sufficient basis upon which to deny the present parents and the child access to State courts. This problem could be resolved either by limiting the definition of Indian child to children who are actually tribal members or by modifying the "(b)" portion to read, "eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is in the custody of a parent who is a member of an Indian tribe."

A second constitutional question may be raised by §101(c) of the House draft. That section could, in our view, be read to require Federal, State, and other courts to give "full faith and credit" to the "public acts, records and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child placements" even though such proceedings might not be "final" under the terms of this bill itself. So read, the provision might well raise constitutional questions under several Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).

We think that problem can be resolved by amending that provision to make clear that the full faith and credit be given to tribal court orders is no greater than the full faith and credit one State is required to give to the court orders of a sister State.

A third and more serious constitutional question is, we think, raised by section 102 of the House draft. That section, taken together with sections 103 and 104, deals generally with the adjudication of proceedings involving Indian children by State courts. Section 102 establishes a fairly detailed set of procedures and substantive standards which State courts would be required to follow in adjudicating the placement of an Indian child as defined by section 4(4) of the House draft.

The views expressed in that letter were subsequently presented to the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of your Committee in testimony by this Department on Mar. 9, 1978.
As we understand section 102, it would, for example, impose these detailed procedures on a New York State court sitting in Manhattan, where that court was adjudicating the custody of an Indian child and even though the procedures otherwise applicable in this State-court proceeding were constitutionally sufficient. While we think that Congress might impose such requirements on State courts exercising jurisdiction over reservation Indians pursuant to Public Law 83-280, we are not convinced that Congress' power to control the incidents of such litigation involving nonreservation Indian children and parents pursuant to the Indian commerce clause is sufficient to override the significant State interest in regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising State jurisdiction over what is a traditionally State matter. It seems to us that the Federal interest in the off-reservation context is so attenuated that the 10th Amendment and general principles of federalism preclude the wholesale invasion of State power contemplated by section 102. See Hart, "The Relations Between State and Federal Law," 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954).2

Finally, we think that section 101(b) of the House draft should be revised to permit any parent or custodian of an Indian child or the child himself, if found competent by the State court, to object to transfer of a placement proceeding to a tribal court. Although the balancing of interests between parents, custodians, Indian children, and tribes is not an easy one, it is our view that the constitutional power of Congress to force any of the persons described above who are not in fact tribal members to have such matters heard before tribal courts is questionable under our analysis of section 102 above and the views discussed above in regard to section 4(4).

II. NONCONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

There are, in addition, a number of drafting deficiencies in the House draft. First, we are concerned about some language used in sections 2 and 3 regarding "the Federal responsibility for the care of the Indian people" and the "special responsibilities and legal obligations to American Indian people." The use of such language has been relied on by at least one court to hold the Federal Government responsible for the financial support of Indians even though Congress has not appropriated any money for such purposes. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977). We fear the language in this bill could be used by a court to hold the United States liable for the financial support of Indian families far in excess of the provisions of title II of the bill and the apparent intent of the drafters.

Second, section 101(a) of the House draft, if read literally, would appear to displace any existing State court jurisdiction over these matters based on Public Law 83-280. We doubt that is the intent of the draft because, inter alia, there may not be in existence tribal courts to assume such State-court jurisdiction as would apparently be obliterated by this provision.

Third, the apparent intent of section 4(10) is, in effect, to reestablish the diminished or disestablished boundaries of Indian reservations for the limited purpose of tribal jurisdiction over Indian child placements. We think that such reestablishment, in order to avoid potential constitutional problems, should be done in a straightforward manner after the reservations potentially affected are identified and Congress has taken into account both the impact on the residents of the area to be affected and any other factors Congress may deem appropriate.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this letter and that enactment of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs version of S. 1214 would not be consistent with the administration's objectives.

Sincerely,

PATRICIA M. WALD,
Assistant Attorney General.
DISSENTING VIEWS:

H.R. 12533 should be sent back to the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands for additional consideration because of major defects in the bill and because of inadequate opportunity for affected States and agencies to testify on the bill.

I feel a special responsibility to the House of Representatives to submit this dissenting opinion because I was the only Member expressing grave concerns about many of the bill's provisions.

Largely because of my concerns about legal protection for the Indian child, the natural parents, and the adoptive parents, many changes were made at a staff level to improve the bill. These changes were many and substantive and much improvement was made in this regard. Amendments also helped improve the bill but major defects remain.

Among these numerous issues are the cost to the States to enforce the provisions, new layers of programs for Indian tribes, and basic constitutional issues like State-Indian jurisdiction. These were not carefully enough considered during markup.

I call these problems to the attention of my colleagues and urge that the bill be rejected until those issues can more carefully be discussed by both the Congress and the public. Below I detail the problems.

HISTORY OF H.R. 12533

H.R. 12533 is the outgrowth of S. 1214 which was passed by the Senate and assigned to the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands. This bill was the markup vehicle in the subcommittee and was reported with very little discussion or participation by members.

Subsequent to the subcommittee markup, the subcommittee staff, apparently noting the major defects of S. 1214, drafted an entirely new bill, H.R. 12533, and circulated it as the markup vehicle for the full Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.

Markup was scheduled for 2 or 3 weeks during which time I raised objection and numerous questions which resulted in many of the changes being made to improve the legal protections now contained in the bill.

To my knowledge the new bill, H.R. 12533 and the subsequent drafts were never generally circulated to the States, juvenile judges, public and private welfare agencies, or even to the Indian tribes.

The bill should have been circulated for comment in light of the major revisions made and being considered.

MANY GROUPS SOUGHT ADDITIONAL TIME

It should be pointed out that many groups, including the Departments of Interior and Justice, expressed the need for either major changes or additional time to study the bill and comment.

For example the Justice Department in a letter dated May 23, 1978, for Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to the committee chairman expressed numerous practical and constitutional concerns with the language in S. 1214. While some of those problems may have been alleviated in H.R. 12533, I am unaware of any further review by the Justice Department. In that letter, discussing the House version, Ms. Wald raised some serious questions: (1) Whether the bill under White v. Califano might hold the Federal Government responsible for the financial support of Indians even though no money had been appropriated, (2) whether the bill might displace any existing State court jurisdiction on Indian child welfare matters in Public Law 250 States even where tribal courts did not exist, and (3) whether the bill might have the effect of reestablishing diminished or disestablished boundaries of Indian reservations for the limited purpose of tribal jurisdiction over Indian child placements.

In regard to (3) she wrote:

We think that such reestablishment, in order to avoid potential constitutional problems, should be done in a straightforward manner after the reservations potentially affected are identified and Congress has taken into account both the impact on the residents of the area to be affected and any other factors Congress may deem appropriate.

To my knowledge this issue was never discussed.

The Department of Interior, in a seven-page letter dated June 6, 1978 from Assistant Secretary Forrest J. Gerard, raised numerous questions about H.R. 12533. Among other considerations Mr. Gerard said:

We believe that many of the authorities granted by title II of the bill are unnecessary because they duplicate authorities in present law, and therefore, we recommend the deletion of title II.

I would point out that title II remains in the bill largely as drafted and that it even provides payment to adoptive parents of Indian children. In addition, it provides for construction of Indian family service facilities off of reservations regardless of the size of the tribe or the availability of existing services and facilities.

It should be noted that many of the concerns expressed by Mr. Gerard, who is a strong advocate of Indian, were not, in my opinion, properly addressed.

In a memorandum dated June 19, 1978, from the Congressional Research Service, additional points were raised which I believe should have been considered more thoroughly.

Aside from the above Federal concerns, I am even more distressed by objections raised by officials in my State of Montana after I forwarded a copy of the bill for review.

On June 20, 1978, the following telegram was received by the committee from Gov. Thomas L. Judge, of Montana.

It has come to my attention that you have scheduled the markup on H.R. 12533, the Indian Child Welfare Act. This legislation identifies some real problems and we are in agreement with the intent of the bill. However, there may be some
I urge you to hold hearings on the bill to allow us time to present our concern. I am sure you want to insure that problems are solved without creating new ones at the same time. Thank you very much for your consideration of this request.

That message was received just 1 day before reporting the bill and the request was not granted. I suspect the concerns of Governor Judge would have been reflected by other States, especially Public Law 280 States, had they been more aware of the provisions.

Below is a letter from the State of Montana attorney for social and rehabilitation services. The letter is unsigned because it was first transmitted to me by telecopier on the day before the markup and subsequently sent in the form below and not received in my office until 5 days after the markup. I suggest all Members will want to read this letter before voting on the bill.

**STATE OF MONTANA,**
**SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES,**
**Helena, Mont., June 20, 1978.**

**Hon. Ron Marleene,**
**Congressman from Montana, U.S. House of Representatives,**
**Washington, D.C.**

**DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARLENEE:** In response to a request from Bob Ziemer of your staff, the Office of Legal Affairs of the Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services has reviewed H.R. 12533—The Indian Child Welfare Act.

Our study of the bill has been hurried, but we can foresee numerous problems in the delivery of social services to Montana Indian children and families if the act is passed in its present form. For this reason we urge you to ask the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to defer further markup on the bill until affected States, and especially Montana, can more fully comment on its consequences.

Constitutional questions aside, several problems of implementation are readily apparent from reading the bill. For example, although the bill requires State courts to give preference to certain homes in placing Indian children based on evidence in the record, the bill does not provide any mechanism requiring the family or the tribe to present such evidence. Nor does it create a means by which already overburdened State courts can discover such evidence on their own.

But even more disturbing to the Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services is the bill's lack of clarity on the issue of payment for social services for Indian children and families. Section 201(b) of title II of the bill states:

**The provision or possibility of assistance under this act shall not be a basis for the denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise authorized under titles IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act or any other other federally assisted program.**

This language suggests a strong possibility that a State whose courts had not exercised jurisdiction over an Indian child or family would be called upon to fund at least part of the social services delivered to that Indian child or family. This office believes that in all cases in which an Indian tribal court exercises jurisdiction the financial burden for providing social services should fall exclusively upon the tribe and the Federal Government.

In addition, it appears that tribal courts may pick and choose those Indian children over which they will exercise jurisdiction, however State courts are allowed no choice. One potential result, of course, is that tribal courts will waive jurisdiction in all difficult or expensive cases while State courts and, hence, the State agencies administering title IV and title XX will have no choice but to accept those cases. Such a situation is clearly inequitable.

As can be seen from these comments the Indian Child Welfare Act leaves many issues unresolved. Although quick action on the bill may be politically expedient, the Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services strongly recommends that full and deliberate consideration be given to all aspects of the bill.

If we can provide further assistance to you, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely yours,

**Richard A. Werner,**
**Staff Attorney, Office of Legal Affairs,**
**Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services.**

With regard to the above letter, Members will note the concern expressed about the possible financial burden. I need not remind my colleagues that one of the major costs of local and State governments are the courts. And in light of the Proposition 13 attitude across this country I question the wisdom of passing legislation which may have significant impact on State and county budgets without one iota of evidence in the record as to what that cost might be. On this issue alone the bill ought to be rejected and returned to committee for additional hearings.

It should be noted, in fairness, that many church groups urged passage of the bill. However, the National Conference of Catholic Charities raised many substantive questions. While many of those were resolved in the redrafting of the bill and the amendment process, others remain outstanding.

But perhaps one of the strongest arguments for defeating the bill came in a letter of June 12, 1978, from the National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators. The concluding paragraph of that letter said:

**The National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators believes that H.R. 12533 should not be enacted prior to a much broader consultation than has thus far been achieved by the responsible congressional committees.**

**Enclosed is a resolution approved by representatives of 38 States and two jurisdictions present at the council meeting on June 7-8, 1978 in support of this recommendation.**

Below is a copy of the resolution adopted by over two-thirds of the States public welfare administrators.
Indian Child Welfare Act—H.R. 12533 (S. 1214)

1. Support objectives of proposed legislation to establish safeguards against separation of Indian children from their parents and inappropriate foster care or adoptive placements outside the cultural setting of the Indian child.

2. Recommend the council note that, while many constructive changes over the Senate-passed bill (S. 1214) have been incorporated in the House version, there remain a significant number of provisions whose impact on Indian families, tribal courts, State courts, and State and local child welfare services programs needs to be explored more extensively than has been done.

3. Express concern that the bill as written may work against its objective of achieving stability and permanency for the Indian child whose home situation is such that temporary or permanent placement becomes a necessity, and that the result may be many such children will be well served neither by the state/local public child welfare system or by the Indian community.

4. Recommend that H.R. 12533 in its June 7 version be widely disseminated for discussion among affected groups, including the more than 270 federally recognized governing bodies of Indian tribes, bands, and groups, as well as to representatives of State courts, juvenile judges, and public and private child welfare services agencies, before being debated by the full House.

In addition, it is my understanding that a telegram was received by the full committee just prior to markup from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, or a similar organization, asking for additional time for review. I did not see a copy of that communication but I was advised it exists.

I apologize for this lengthy dissent because basically I agree that some legislation is needed to give Indian tribes greater voice in the placement of Indian children. However, this bill goes way beyond what is needed by authorizing a whole new layer of Indian programs both on and off the reservations, payments to adoptive parents of adopted children, a certain impact on State courts, and the possible upsetting of boundaries for jurisdictional questions. For these and the other reasons outlined above I urge my colleagues to defeat this bill.

Ron Marleene.

Approved by the National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators on June 7, 1978.