2026 WL 2936587
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. IT MAY BE SUBJECT TO A MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER. IT MAY BE MODIFIED, SUPERSEDED OR WITHDRAWN.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District,
In Division.
In the Interest of W.M.G., Greene County Juvenile Office, Respondent,
v.
R.D.G., II, Appellant.

Case Number SD 39476
|
Filed: September 30, 2026

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY, Honorable Daniel R. Wichmer, Judge

Opinion

BECKY J. WEST, C.J.

R.D.G. (“Father”) appeals the circuit court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to W.M.G. (“Child”). Because Child is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. sections 1901-1963, ICWA required the circuit court to make additional determinations before terminating Father’s parental rights. In three points, Father contends: (1) the judgment does not comply with section 211.477.5, RSMo. 2016, because it fails to recite the facts supporting the ICWA determinations; (2) no substantial evidence supports the determination that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and proved unsuccessful; and (3) no substantial evidence supports the determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Father’s continued custody of Child was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In June 2023, the Children’s Division (“the Division”) received a report that Child, who was then approximately one year old, had been left with an individual who did not know the whereabouts of Child’s parents. When contacted by law enforcement, J.M. (“Mother”) reported that she and Father were at a hospital following a shooting. Father was arrested on an outstanding warrant after the parents returned. The Division implemented a safety plan requiring Mother and Child to stay with a designated individual if they lacked other suitable housing.

Several days later, law enforcement found Mother and Child sleeping near a loading dock. Mother reported that they were homeless and that she had chosen to sleep there. Child was wearing only a diaper and appeared not to have been bathed recently. Law enforcement observed that Mother did not have adequate food or diapers for Child. Mother and Child had not stayed at the residence identified in the safety plan. Law enforcement took Child into protective custody, and the circuit court later placed Child in the temporary legal custody of the Division.

Jesse Schaden, (“Schaden”) was assigned as the case manager shortly after Child entered care and remained the case manager through the termination proceeding. The Division developed a treatment plan requiring Mother to complete a psychological evaluation, maintain safe and stable housing, participate in Child’s medical and mental-health care, maintain a safe and sober lifestyle, complete recommended substance-abuse treatment, obtain legal income, maintain communication with the Division, execute requested releases, and attend visitation consistently. The Division referred Mother for a psychological evaluation, substance-abuse assessment, therapy, employment and housing resources, shelters, parenting education, pregnancy housing, and visitation.

There were reports that the ICWA might apply due to Father’s tribal ancestry. It was determined that Father was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe (“the Tribe”), thus Child was either a member of, or eligible for enrollment in, the Tribe and was an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA. Schaden contacted the Tribe to process the Child’s application to register as a tribal member.

Father was incarcerated very soon after Child came into care and remained incarcerated throughout the duration of the proceedings. At the time of the trial in this case, Father was serving an eleven-year sentence. Thus, when Schaden first met with him during the summer of 2023, Father was incarcerated. Although Father’s paternity had not yet been established, Schaden reviewed the juvenile proceeding with Father and initiated the process for genetic testing. Father was later transferred among several correctional facilities. Those transfers, together with the process used to obtain genetic testing for an incarcerated person, delayed the establishment of Father’s paternity for approximately eight months. Schaden acknowledged that the delay was not attributable to Father.

After paternity was established, the circuit court adopted an incarcerated-parent treatment plan for Father. The plan required Father to communicate with Schaden at least monthly, sign requested releases, participate in services available at his correctional facility, and maintain contact with Child.

During the underlying abuse-and-neglect proceeding, Schaden used an e-mail address provided for the Tribe’s representative to invite the Tribe to monthly family-support-team meetings. Schaden also contacted the Tribe directly concerning the process for registering Child as a tribal member. On October 30, 2023, the Tribe filed a formal notice of intervention.

On October 29, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. Father and Mother appeared with counsel, Child appeared through her guardian ad litem, and the Juvenile Office and contracted case management also appeared. Before receiving testimony, the circuit court took judicial notice of the underlying abuse-and-neglect proceeding and the termination case without objection. The circuit court also admitted the Juvenile Office’s documentary exhibits, except for one exhibit that the Juvenile Office withdrew.

Regarding Father, Schaden testified that he attempted to contact Father approximately once each month and provided him with information concerning Child. Because Father could not visit Child while incarcerated, Schaden encouraged him to maintain contact by writing letters. Father sent Child approximately three letters during the pendency of the proceeding. Schaden considered the language in Father’s first letter inappropriate and discussed with Father how future correspondence could be written in a manner suitable for Child.

Schaden also encouraged Father to participate in programs available through the Department of Corrections. Father was transferred among several correctional facilities and spent portions of his incarceration in administrative segregation. Schaden contacted institutional caseworkers to determine what services were available to Father but was unable to identify a particular program in which Father could participate. Schaden further testified that he could not identify a specific release he had asked Father to sign that Father had refused to sign.

According to Schaden, Father did not independently contact him to request information about Child. Father provided no financial or in-kind support for Child and did not send Child cards or gifts. Father remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and acknowledged that he could not personally care for Child while incarcerated.

The circuit court also heard evidence concerning Father’s conduct while incarcerated. Schaden testified that Father had been involved in more than one altercation with other inmates and had experienced repeated difficulty complying with institutional boundaries. Father told Schaden that he had been found in possession of a blade approximately six inches long shortly before the termination hearing.

Regarding Mother, Schaden testified he communicated with Mother about the referrals in the treatment plan through text messages, email, and telephone conversations. Many of the referrals consisted of providing contact information, internet links, telephone numbers, or information identifying agencies that could provide assistance. Schaden testified that Mother did not request help completing applications and appeared able to navigate the referral process.

Mother completed a psychological evaluation and participated in counseling until she was assigned a male therapist, after which she requested but had not received a female therapist. Her housing remained unstable, and she lived at approximately nineteen locations before residing with friends under an arrangement Schaden understood to be temporary. Mother attended approximately sixty-five percent of her scheduled visits with Child during the period supervised by Cody Weeks (“Weeks”). Weeks testified that Mother and Child greeted one another affectionately and that Mother generally interacted appropriately with Child, but Mother frequently used her telephone during visits despite repeated reminders.

The Division also investigated relatives as possible placements for Child. It used family-search services and contacted members of both the maternal and paternal families. Early in the case, the Division contacted the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and assessed whether Child could be placed with either of them. The Division further explored placement with members of Mother’s extended family. The Division later contacted a maternal cousin, but the team declined the identified maternal placements because of insufficient contact and because the maternal aunt had an active warrant and had recently been involved in a domestic incident. Schaden testified that the Division completed a home study for the maternal cousin and that he conducted a walk-through and spoke extensively with Mother’s sister, Destiny, about possible placement at the beginning of the case.

The Division also contacted Father’s father and other paternal relatives after Father’s paternity was established. Father initially expressed concern that his father would not be an appropriate placement because of substance-use concerns. Other paternal relatives either did not maintain contact with the Division or had criminal-history or household circumstances that caused the Division to question their suitability. The Division did not conduct or request a home study of a paternal relative.1

Schaden further testified that Child had lived in the same foster home for approximately two years and they were willing to provide Child with a permanent home. Child was placed with a sibling and had formed attachments to the foster family and that sibling.

The Juvenile Office presented testimony from Richard England as its qualified expert witness under ICWA. England was a licensed clinical social worker and a member of the Yurok Tribe. He testified that he had served as an expert in more than 3,800 ICWA proceedings and had experience working with the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and other Sioux tribes. Over Father’s objection, the circuit court qualified England as an ICWA expert.

England based his opinions on records provided by the Division, including permanency-review summaries, treatment information, visitation reports, police reports, Father’s criminal history, and documents concerning Child. England had not personally observed Father with Child. England understood that the Tribe was not participating actively in the proceeding because the tribal representative had not responded to his communications or appeared at the hearing.

England testified that the Division had made active efforts to reunify Child with her parents. As to Father, England relied on the Division’s communication with Father during his incarceration. England opined that a causal relationship existed between the parents’ lack of progress and the risk of emotional or physical harm to Child. He testified that the circumstances that caused Child to enter care had not been remedied and that removing Child from her current placement would be psychologically and emotionally damaging. England’s written report stated that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt established that continued custody by Father and Mother was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to Child.

After the hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to Child. The court found statutory grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights based on abandonment, neglect, failure to rectify, and parental unfitness. The court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests.

The circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts had been made, in the context of the prevailing social and cultural standards and conditions of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts had proved unsuccessful. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence including England’s testimony, that continued custody by Father and Mother was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to Child. The court further found a causal relationship between the parents’ lack of progress and the risk of such damage.

Standard of Review

We will affirm a judgment terminating parental rights unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. In re Q.A.H., 426 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. banc 2014). We will reverse only if we are left with a firm conviction that the judgment is wrong. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and defer to the circuit court’s credibility determinations because it is better positioned to evaluate witness credibility and weigh the evidence in the context of the entire record. J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626-27 (Mo. banc 2014). Whether the circuit court erroneously declared or applied the law is a question of law that we review de novo. Interest of D.L.P., 638 S.W.3d 82, 96 (Mo.App. 2021). The circuit court’s judgment is presumed correct and it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate its incorrectness. Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 186 (Mo.App. 2010).

Discussion

For ease of reference, we address Father’s points out of order, and address points II and III first. Father’s points II and III both assert that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. A not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge requires three sequential steps:

(1) Identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment;

(2) Identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; and

(3) Demonstrate why that favorable evidence, when considered along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, does not have probative force upon the proposition such that the trier of fact could not reasonably decide the existence of the proposition.

Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 187. In reviewing no-substantial-evidence challenges, we consider the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the challenged determinations and decide whether they have sufficient probative force to permit a reasonable fact-finder to make those determinations under the governing burdens of proof. Id. at 186. We disregard evidence and inferences contrary to the judgment. Id. at 187.

Point II

In Point II, Father contends “the [circuit] court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family because that finding is not supported by substantial evidence, in that the evidence established only referrals, generalized case management, and communication with the parents, which lack probative force to induce belief that Children’s Division undertook the affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts required by 25 U.S.C. section 1912(d).” We disagree.

Section 1912(d) of ICWA requires the circuit court to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts proved unsuccessful. 25 U.S.C. section 1912(d).2

Active effort means affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her family. Where an agency is involved in the child-custody proceeding, active efforts must involve assisting the parent or parents or Indian custodian through the steps of a case plan and with accessing or developing the resources necessary to satisfy the case plan. To the maximum extent possible, active efforts should be provided in a manner consistent with the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of the Indian child’s Tribe and should be conducted in partnership with the Indian child and the Indian child’s parents, extended family members, Indian custodians, and Tribe. 25 C.F.R. section 23.2.

The regulation’s nonexclusive examples include assessing the family’s circumstances with a focus on reunification; identifying services and helping parents overcome barriers to obtaining them; involving the Tribe and extended family; keeping siblings together when possible; identifying community resources; monitoring participation; and considering alternatives when optimal services are unavailable. 25 C.F.R. section 23.2(1)-(11). The examples guide the inquiry but do not impose an inflexible checklist. Id.

Active efforts must be documented in detail in the record. 25 C.F.R. section 23.120(b). Neither the statute nor the regulations require the details of those efforts to be repeated in the judgment or organized in a section for each parent.

Father correctly identifies the factual proposition that is necessary to sustain the judgment: the Juvenile Office had to prove that the active efforts required by section 1912(d) were made and proved unsuccessful. In arguing why the favorable evidence, when considered along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, does not have the necessary probative force, Father argues that:

[T]he record reflects that Children’s Division developed treatment plans for both parents, referred Mother to counseling, housing resources, employment resources, parenting education, substance abuse treatment, shelters, pregnancy housing, and food assistance, supplied website links, telephone numbers, referral forms, and housing vacancy lists, maintained periodic communication with Father during his incarceration, encouraged Father to write letters to [Child] and participate in whatever programming might be available through the Department of Corrections, communicated with the Tribe through electronic correspondence, and presented Richard England’s testimony that active efforts had been made.”

Despite these efforts, however, Father argues that the record does not demonstrate that the Division actively assisted Mother or Father.

The circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts, provided in a manner consistent with the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, had been made but were unsuccessful. Respondent asserts substantial evidence supports that finding and we agree.

The Division contacted Father at the jail within the first weeks of Child coming into care and before paternity testing was completed. The Division reviewed the initial case documents with him, and submitted the referral necessary to obtain DNA testing while Father was incarcerated. After paternity was established, the Division developed an incarcerated-parent treatment plan requiring Father to maintain monthly contact with the case manager, execute requested releases, participate in services available within his institution, and maintain contact with Child. The case manager attempted to contact Father each month, provided him with information for his attorney and the Juvenile Office, gave him updates concerning Child, encouraged him to participate in institutional services, and repeatedly encouraged him to maintain a relationship with Child through letters.

The case manager’s efforts, detailed above, went above and beyond simply telling Father to locate services on his own. The caseworker contacted institutional caseworkers to determine what programming was available to Father in his respective prison settings, but most facilities reported that no programming was available. The case manager was unable to identify a specific available service to which he could direct Father within the prison system. Father’s repeated transfers and placement in administrative segregation further restricted his access to programming.

Other jurisdictions that have examined this question have held that active efforts are those that are tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case. Alaskan courts, which deal with ICWA cases at a much higher proportion than ours, have noted that, in determining active efforts, courts may look to “the State’s involvement in its entirety and may consider a parent’s demonstrated lack of willingness to participate in treatment.” Bob S. v. State, 400 P.3d 99, 107 (Alaska 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, ICWA does not require an agency to provide a service that the correctional institution does not make available and we agree. See, 25 C.F.R. section 23.2; In re E.L., 61 Kan.App.2d 311, 502 P.3d 1049, 1068 (2021); A.A. v. State, Dep’t of Fam. & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999). Furthermore, courts examining the issue of an incarcerated parent frequently recognize that the practical circumstances surrounding a parent’s incarceration will have a direct impact on what active remedial efforts are possible in any given situation. While an agency must always provide active remedial efforts to a parent, the difficulty of providing those services, the unavailability of specific resources, and the length of incarceration may have a specific impact on what active remedial efforts are possible. See, Matter of N.D.M., 288 N.C.App. 554, 565, 886 S.E.2d 640 (2023) (finding the Department of Social Services did not engage in active remedial efforts where there was no evidence that the department assisted Father through the steps of the case plan, communicated with Father or prison staff to ascertain availability of prison programs to help Father achieve his goals, or made any efforts to facilitate communication between father and his child; in fact there was no evidence that the department did anything to assist incarcerated Father other than send him a paternity test in prison). Said another way, “a parent’s incarceration may limit the remedial and rehabilitative services that the State can make available to the parent to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.” In re M.S., 2014 MT 265, para. 25, 376 Mont. 394, 401, 336 P.3d 930, 936. In this case, despite Father’s incarceration, the record shows that the Division took active steps to assist Father.

Furthermore, the Division also actively attempted to preserve Father’s family’s relationships with Child. It referred the Child’s case to “FosterAdopt Connect” for a family member search, contacted Father’s paternal relatives, maintained contact with Father’s father and aunt, and arranged monthly visits between those relatives and Child The family search did not produce an available and appropriate relative placement, and Father initially expressed concern that his father was unsuitable because of substance use. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe formally intervened in the proceeding, but the Tribe did not thereafter actively participate, and its representative did not respond to England’s efforts to communicate regarding the case. At the time of trial, Child remained placed with a sibling, a relationship England described as particularly important within the Tribe’s culture.

Father remained incarcerated and acknowledged that he could not personally care for Child while incarcerated. Although the case manager encouraged Father to maintain a relationship with Child, Father only sent Child three letters, one of which contained inappropriate and aggressive language. Father also provided no financial or in-kind support for Child.

Father emphasizes that the case manager could not identify a particular institutional program available to him and that the Division did not personally conduct a home study of his relatives. Those limitations were in the record for the circuit court to consider, but they do not require us to disregard the efforts the Division did undertake to actively assist Father.

The Division also directed active efforts toward Mother. Other jurisdictions have stated that active efforts to facilitate a child’s reunification with one parent can be considered when determining if active efforts have been made towards the other parent. See, Josh L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. Of Children’s Servs., 276 P.3d 457, 467 (Alaska 2012). In his attempts to reunite Child with Mother, Schaden developed a court-ordered treatment plan addressing Mother’s mental health, housing, participation in Child’s medical care, sobriety, substance-use assessment and treatment, employment, and visitation. He met with Mother to connect her with food-assistance and employment resources and provided referrals for drug testing, therapy, housing, sober-living programs, a parent aide, shelters, parenting education, and maternity housing. The Division referred Mother for a psychiatric evaluation, which she completed, and Schaden communicated with the Missouri Empowerment Project concerning Mother’s request for a female therapist and encouraged her to continue participating in therapy. The Division directed Mother to shelters, domestic-living facilities, sober-living homes, and maternity housing, but Mother declined the shelter and maternity-housing options because she did not want to be separated from her partner. Mother completed a substance-use assessment through Preferred Family Healthcare and attempted to obtain an additional assessment through the RPG program, and the Division continued to recommend drug testing. The Division also referred a parent aide, arranged supervised visitation, provided Mother with information and reminders concerning Child’s medical appointments, updated her regarding Child’s health, and made-up visits canceled because of Child’s health, dental appointments, holidays, or weather.

The record shows sustained outreach to Mother and Father, an individualized incarcerated-parent plan, institutional inquiries, assistance establishing paternity, repeated encouragement and information, involvement of the Tribe, a diligent family search for both parents, and efforts to preserve Child’s familial relationships. This evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, have sufficient probative force to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.

Point II is denied.

Point III

In Point III, Father contends “the [circuit] court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Father’s continued custody of the child was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage because that finding is not supported by substantial evidence, in that the evidence established Father’s incarceration, limited contact with the child during his incarceration, and the child’s successful foster placement, but lacked probative force to induce belief that Father’s continued custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage as required by 25 U.S.C. section 1912(f).

Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the court must determine, upon evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that includes testimony from a qualified expert witness, that continued custody by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. section 1912(f); 25 C.F.R. section 23.121(b). The evidence must demonstrate a causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage to the particular child. 25 C.F.R. section 23.121(c). Without that causal relationship, evidence showing only poverty, isolation, single parenthood, inadequate housing, substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior is insufficient by itself. 25 C.F.R. section 23.121(d).

Section 1912(f) requires the evidence supporting the required determination to include testimony from a qualified expert witness; it does not require the expert’s testimony, standing alone, to establish the determination. In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947, 957 (Mo.App. 1992) (“Dr. Inniss’ testimony, combined with other evidence at trial, supports this finding as required by section 1912(f) of the Act.”). See also, Thea G. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, 291 P.3d 957, 964 (Alaska 2013) (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Cissy A., 513 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2022) (stating that “[t]hese elements may be proved through the testimony of one or more expert witnesses, or by aggregating the testimony of lay and expert witnesses.”)

Father identifies the necessary factual proposition as whether his continued custody of Child was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage. He argues that the evidence showed only his incarceration, limited contact with Child, and Child’s successful foster placement and therefore did not establish the required causal relationship.

We therefore consider England’s testimony together with the other evidence relevant to whether Father’s continued custody of Child was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to Child.

England was accepted as an ICWA qualified expert after testifying that he was a Yurok tribal member, had served as an expert in more than 3,800 cases, had substantial knowledge of the prevailing cultural and social standards of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and had worked with that Tribe and other Sioux tribes.

England reviewed case records concerning Child, the parents, Father’s criminal history, the reasons Child entered care, the services provided, and Child’s placement. Based on that information and his knowledge of Rosebud Sioux cultural and social standards, England opined that returning Child to her parents at the time of trial would cause psychological and emotional damage. He further opined that removing Child from her existing placement would be psychologically damaging because Child had formed bonds and attachments with her foster family and, importantly, with the sibling placed with her, noting the sibling relationship was very important to the tribal culture.

When asked if he believed there was a relationship between Mother’s and Father’s lack of progress and the risk of emotional harm to Child, England responded as follows:

Yes. Based on the information I’ve reviewed, I believe there’s a causal relationship and that it would impact [Child]. The issues that were initially stated as to why she was removed have not been fully remediated or addressed. With the treatment program, with domestic violence services, with homelessness, those things have not been addressed to provide stability for [Child] at this time.

England went on to emphasize that Mother and Father had failed to address those issues that led to Child’s removal in the first place, and that to remove her from her current stable placement back with Mother’s and Father’s unaddressed issues would “cause psychological and emotional damage.”

England’s opinion did not stand alone. The court also heard evidence concerning Father’s circumstances, conduct, relationship with Child, and inability to provide care. Father had been continuously incarcerated for nearly the entire time Child was in care and was serving an eleven-year sentence at the time of the trial in this case. Father acknowledged that his incarceration prevented him from personally caring for Child. Father had not established a meaningful relationship with Child, had sent only three letters to Child despite repeated encouragement by the caseworker to send more, had provided no financial or in-kind support, and had not independently maintained contact with the case manager.

Father correctly observes that England did not separately trace each circumstance attributable to Father to a particular anticipated injury to Child. But section 1912(f) requires qualified-expert testimony to be included in the evidence; it does not assign the expert the exclusive role of establishing every component of the determination. In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d at 957. England linked the parents’ unremedied circumstances and a return of custody to psychological and emotional damage. The remaining evidence supplied the Father-specific basis for that opinion: an extended inability to provide any home or care, the absence of a meaningful parent-child relationship, a history of violent conduct, continuing weapons-related and institutional misconduct, and no identified, approved family placement. Evidence of Child’s successful placement did not substitute for the required causal relationship; it informed England’s assessment of the emotional consequences to this Child.

Considered together, the evidence had sufficient probative force to permit the circuit court to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Father’s continued custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to Child.

Point III is denied.

Point I

In his first point, Father contends “the [circuit] court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights because the judgment fails to recite specific factual findings demonstrating compliance with the heightened requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act and section 211.477.5, in that the judgment states legal conclusions that active efforts were made and that continued custody by Father would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage without setting forth the underlying Father-specific facts supporting those conclusions.”

This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute de novo. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 1004). Because of the fundamental liberty interest natural parents have in raising their children, “[s]tatutes that provide for the termination of parental rights are strictly construed in favor of the parent and preservation of the natural parent-child relationship.” Id. Interest of E.G., 683 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Mo. 2024). Section 211.477.5 provides that every termination order “shall recite the jurisdictional facts, factual findings on the existence of grounds for termination and that the best interests of the child are served by the disposition stated in the order.”

Section 1912(d) requires the circuit court to be satisfied that active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts proved unsuccessful. 25 U.S.C. section 1912(d). Section 1912(f) requires a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that includes qualified-expert testimony, that continued custody by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. section 1912(f). The evidence supporting the latter determination must demonstrate a causal relationship between the particular conditions and the likelihood of serious damage to the particular child. 25 C.F.R. section 23.121(c).

Neither section 1912(d) nor section 1912(f) specifies where within the written judgment the corresponding determination or its supporting facts must appear. Nor does either provision require the judgment to characterize its findings as “Father-specific.” However, the circuit court’s judgment in this case was specific about Father’s (and Mother’s) conduct throughout the pendency of the case that led it to conclude that not only had the requirements for termination of Father’s parental rights been met under Missouri standards, but under ICWA standards as well.

The circuit court expressly made both required ICWA determinations:

The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts were made in the context of the prevailing social and cultural standards and conditions of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and these efforts have proved unsuccessful. Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the continued custody of the child by [Father] and [Mother] is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to [Child].

The judgment, as discussed above, also contains lengthy and specific findings concerning Father’s continued incarceration, lack of contact with Child for the eighteen months during which he knew he was Child’s father, lack of support, in-kind or otherwise, for Child, failure to comply with his incarcerated treatment plan – including Father’s failure to sign any releases of information so the case manager could determine what services, if any, Father engaged in while incarcerated. All of these findings, delineated in the judgment, led the circuit court to conclude that termination of Father’s parental rights complied with the heightened standards under ICWA, as stated above. Father therefore has not demonstrated that the judgment omitted a determination or factual finding required by ICWA or section 211.477.5. Point I is denied and the judgment is affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – Concurs

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – Concurs

All Citations
--- S.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 2936587

Footnotes
1	At the termination hearing, Father identified additional paternal relatives whom he believed could care for Child during his incarceration. Father asked the circuit court to deny the petition and allow the Division additional time to investigate those relatives.
2	While section 1912(d) does not prescribe a burden of proof, the circuit court made its determination beyond a reasonable doubt, and we use that same higher burden for our analysis here, without determining specifically what burden of proof is required by that portion of the statute.