2026 WL 2118671
Supreme Court of North Dakota.

In the Interest of K.B., a child
Charles A. STOCK, State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee
v.
K.B., a child; N.B., father, Respondents
and
C.P., mother, Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of G.B., a child
Charles A. Stock, State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee
v.
G.B., a child; N.B., father, Respondents
and
C.P., mother, Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of M.W., a child
Charles A. Stock, State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee
v.
M.W., a child; M.W., father, Respondents
and
C.P., mother, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20260063, No. 20260064, No. 20260065
|
Filed July 23, 2026

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Traill County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Daniel E. Gast, Judicial Referee.

Opinion

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] C.P. appeals from a juvenile court order finding her three children in need of protection and placing them in the care, custody, and control of the Agassiz Valley Human Service Zone for up to twelve months. She argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to vacate a default entered against her, and that the evidence was insufficient under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01 to support the finding that continued custody of the two Indian children was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In October 2025, C.P.’s three children—K.B., G.B., and M.W.—were taken into protective custody following a domestic disturbance in Traill County. K.B. and G.B. are the sons of C.P. and N.B. and are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963; N.D.C.C. ch. 27-19.1. They are members of, or eligible for membership in, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian child”); N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(1)(f) (same). The State petitioned to have the children adjudicated in need of protection. The juvenile court appointed counsel for C.P., who appeared at the initial appearance and opposed the petition.

[¶3] At a December 1, 2025 status conference, no parent appeared, and the juvenile court orally found the parents in default. After learning the parents had not yet been properly served with a summons, the court vacated that default by written order and returned the matter to the trial track. A second summons was served by publication, and C.P. and her counsel appeared at a December 29, 2025 status conference. At that conference, the court announced on the record that it would hold a status conference on January 26, 2026, and a trial on January 30, 2026.

[¶4] C.P. did not appear at the January 26 status conference, and the court found her in default. She appeared with counsel at the January 30 trial, where her counsel moved to vacate the default. The court denied the motion. The State, the guardian ad litem, and the Cherokee Nation each opposed vacating the default.

[¶5] Holly Etter, a child welfare specialist and citizen of the Cherokee Nation, testified as the ICWA qualified expert witness. She described the tribe’s prevailing social and cultural standards, testified that she had reviewed the removal affidavits and court orders, that she had maintained contact with the case workers, and that active efforts had been made. When asked whether returning the children to their parents would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage, she answered, “Yes,” and testified that “It is the tribe’s opinion that returning the children to care would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage to the children at this time.” She added that this was “not my opinion, specifically,” but “the opinion of the tribe after being staffed.” Neither parent’s counsel cross-examined her. The juvenile court found the children in need of protection, ICWA applies to K.B. and G.B., and continued custody of the children by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage. It placed the children with the Zone for up to twelve months and adopted a permanency goal of reunification.

II

[¶6] C.P. first argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion to vacate the default entered against her, contending that she did not receive the notice that the North Dakota Rules of Juvenile Procedure require. When interpreting a court rule, we apply principles of statutory construction, looking first to the rule’s language and giving the words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. In re B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 23, 23 N.W.3d 718. “In determining whether the district court abused its discretion through misapplication or misinterpretation of the law, we review questions of law de novo.” Twete v. Mullin, 2020 ND 264, ¶ 3, 952 N.W.2d 91 (citing State v. Kostelecky, 2018 ND 12, ¶ 6, 906 N.W.2d 77).

[¶7] C.P. contends that she was never served with a written summons or notice setting January 30 as the date of the evidentiary hearing, and that oral notice cannot substitute for a summons. The Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide otherwise. After the initial summons is served and the court’s jurisdiction is established, Rule 9(a)(3) governs notice of a continued proceeding: “The court must, either in writing or orally on the record, provide notice to the parties of the date and time of the continued proceeding.” N.D.R.Juv.P. 9(a)(3). “If after being properly served with a summons or notice a parent, guardian or custodian fails to appear at a hearing, the court may receive evidence in support of the petition or reschedule the hearing.” N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1). Here, the court announced the January 26 status conference on the record at the December 29 status conference, at which C.P. and her counsel were present. C.P. thus received notice of the January 26 hearing required under Rule 10(b)(1) and failed to appear at that hearing. Because C.P. received the notice the Rules of Juvenile Procedure require, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to vacate the default.

III

[¶8] C.P. also argues that the evidence was insufficient under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(3) to support the finding that continued custody of the Indian children was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage. Whether continued custody is likely to result in such damage is a finding of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. In re B.V., 2025 ND 28, ¶¶ 10, 18–24, 17 N.W.3d 549. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” In re B.B., 2010 ND 9, ¶ 5, 777 N.W.2d 350. We give the juvenile court’s findings “appreciable weight” and give due regard to the court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

[¶9] Before ordering the involuntary foster-care placement of an Indian child, the court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that “continued custody of the Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child.” N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(3); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). The evidence “must show a causal relationship between the particular conditions in the home and the likelihood that continued custody of the Indian child will result in serious emotional or physical damage to the particular Indian child who is the subject of the proceeding.” N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(3); accord 25 C.F.R. § 23.121(c). The court must also require the testimony of a qualified expert witness. N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(5); see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e); 25 C.F.R. § 23.122. C.P. asks this Court to rely on our decision in In re A.P. to hold that Etter’s testimony was inadequate under the statute. 2024 ND 43, ¶¶ 20–21, 4 N.W.3d 232. This case, however, is unlike In re A.P., where the court accepted the qualified expert witness’s affidavit in lieu of live testimony without the stipulation the statute requires. Id. Here, Etter testified live and under oath as the qualified expert witness, and C.P.’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine her.

[¶10] C.P.’s argument reduces to the contention that Etter’s clarification—that the harm opinion was “not my opinion, specifically,” but “the opinion of the tribe after being staffed”—disclaimed any expert opinion and made her a mere conduit for a determination reached outside the courtroom. Read in context, the testimony supports the finding rather than undermining it. Etter answered “Yes” when asked whether returning the children was likely to result in serious physical or emotional damage, and she confirmed that her opinion was based on her review of the affidavits and her monitoring of the case. Her clarification identified the opinion as the product of the tribe’s staffing process and as one shared by the tribe—not as an opinion she rejected. That understanding is consistent with the cultural framework she described, in which the tribe values “the opinions of our elders and of our community stakeholders,” and with her parallel testimony that active efforts had been made “after reviewing everything and staffing with the tribe.” The juvenile court, which heard the testimony, could reasonably understand the clarification to bolster the expert opinion by showing that it was vetted through the tribe’s staffing process, not to disavow it.

[¶11] The finding rested on more than Etter’s testimony. The juvenile court incorporated into its findings the affidavit in support of the petition, which was admitted into evidence and which described the October 2025 domestic-violence incident—in which a third party intentionally rammed the vehicle carrying the sleeping children as C.P. attempted to leave—as well as the family’s homelessness, parental drug use, and prior confirmed findings of maltreatment. That evidence supplied the causal connection between the conditions the children faced and the likelihood of serious harm. Giving the court’s findings appreciable weight and due regard to its assessment of credibility, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. The finding that continued custody of K.B. and G.B. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage is not clearly erroneous.

IV

[¶12] We have considered C.P.’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit and do not require discussion. To the extent C.P. raised arguments for the first time at oral argument, we do not consider them. State v. Johnson, 2024 ND 222, ¶ 9, 14 N.W.3d 597 (“We do not consider issues raised for the first time at oral argument.”) (cleaned up). We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

[¶13] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.

Jerod E. Tufte

Jon J. Jensen

Douglas A. Bahr

Mark A. Friese

All Citations
--- N.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 2118671, 2026 ND 149