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(Cite as: 121 P.3d 843)

Court of Appeals of Arizona.

Division 1, Department C.

ARIZONA MINORITY COALITION FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING;  State Senator Ramon

Valadez;  State Senator Peter Rios;  State Senator Carlos Avelar;  State

Senator James Sedillo;  Maricopa County Supervisor Mary Rose Garrido Wilcox;

Esther Lumm;  Virginia Rivera;  Los Abogados, an Arizona corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

City of Flagstaff, Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

THE ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION;  Steven W. Lynn, in his

official capacity as Chairman and a Commissioner thereof;  Andrea Minkoff, in

her official capacity as Vice Chairman and a Commissioner thereof;  Daniel R.

Elder, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof;  Joshua M. Hall, in

his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof;  James R. Huntwork, in his

official capacity as a Commissioner thereof, Defendants-Appellants,

and

Arizonans for Fair and Legal Redistricting, an Arizona non-profit corporation;

Dr. Jose Burell;  Francis Ann Burell;  Ephram Cordova;  Craig Echeveste;

Armando Gaypan;  Jesse Hernandez;  Gina Marcela;  Al Pena;  Al Rodriguez;  Raul

B. Romero;  Raul R. Romero, Sr.;  Martin Sepulveda;  Ilia Terrazas;  City of

Kingman;  Mohave County;  Lake Havasu City, Intervenors-Appellants,

The Navajo Nation;  Leonard Gorman, Intervenors-Appellants,

v.

Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, a state agency;  Janice K.

Brewer, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, Defendants-

Appellees,

and

The Hopi Tribe, Arizonans for Fair and Legal Redistricting, Inc., an Arizona

non-profit corporation;  Dr. Jose Burell;  Francis Ann Burell;  Ephram

Cordova;  Craig Echeveste;  Armando Gaypan;  Jesse Hernandez;  Gina Marcela;

Al Pena;  Al Rodriguez;  Raul B. Romero;  Raul R. Romero, Sr.;  Martin

Sepulveda;  Ilia Terrazas, Intervenors-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 04-0061.


Oct. 21, 2005.

 

*847 Gammage & Burnham, P.L.C., By Lisa T. Hauser, Cameron C. Artigue, Leonard W. Aragon, Phoenix, for Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and Commissioners.


Haralson Miller Pitt Feldman & McAnally, PLC, By Jose de Jesus Rivera, Peter T. Limperis, Jane E. Reidel, Amy Hernandez, Phoenix, for Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and Commissioners.


Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A., By Mark C. Dangerfield, Phoenix, for Arizonans for Fair & Legal Redistricting.


Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, By Michael A. Carvin, Admitted pro hac vice, Washington, DC, for Arizonans for Fair & Legal Redistricting.


Perkins Coie Brown & Bain, By Paul F. Eckstein, Michael S. Mandell, Suzanne R. Scheiner Marwil, Charles A. Blanchard, Phoenix, for Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting, et al.


Lewis and Roca, LLP, By Richard A. Halloran, Susan E. Anderson,  Susan M. Freeman, Phoenix, for Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting, et al.


Law Offices of Aaron Kizer, PLC, By Aaron Kizer, Phoenix, Co-Counsel for Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting.


Sacks Tierney, By Marvin S. Cohen, Judith M. Dworkin, Patricia Ferguson-Bohnee, Scottsdale, for The Navajo Nation and Leonard Gorman.


Navajo Nation, Department of Justice, By Dana L. Bobroff, Assistant Attorney General, Window Rock, for The Navajo Nation and Leonard Gorman.


Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General, By Mary R. O'Grady, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica Gifford Funkhouser, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for Arizona Secretary of State.


Jennings Strouss & Salmon, PLC, By David B. Earl, David J. Cantelme, Phoenix, for City of Flagstaff.


Robert A. Taylor, Kingman City Attorney, Kingman, for City of Kingman.


Lake Havasu City Attorney's Office, By W. Kent Foree, Lake Havasu City, for Lake Havasu City.


Matthew J. Smith, Mohave County Attorney, By Jeffrey D. Dollins, Deputy County Attorney, Deborah L. Herbert, Deputy County Attorney, Kingman, for Mohave County.


Roush McCracken Guerrero & Miller, By Daniel R. Ortega, Jr., Phoenix, for Hopi Tribe.


AMENDED OPINION

PER CURIAM.


¶  1 In November 2000, Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, which amended the Arizona Constitution and transferred the power to redraw lines for both legislative and congressional districts from the state legislature to the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission ("Commission").  Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 206 Ariz. 130, 134, ¶ 4, 75 P.3d 1088, 1092 (App.2003);  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1. In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court correctly ruled on constitutional challenges to districts established by the Commission for use in elections held from 2004 through 2010.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.


BACKGROUND

¶  2 The Commission consists of five appointed volunteers who serve concurrent ten-year terms.  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, §§ 1(3), (23).  Commission members represent both major political parties;  however, the chairperson must not be a registered member of either party.  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1. [FN1]


FN1. The highest ranking officer of the state House of Representatives, the House minority party leader, the highest ranking officer of the state Senate, and the Senate minority party leader each are allowed to appoint a commission member from a pool of candidates selected by the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(6).  The four members then select the fifth member and chair of the Commission, who must not be registered with any party represented on the Commission.  Id. at § 1(8).


*848 ¶  3 Pursuant to the redistricting provisions created by the passage of Proposition 106, the redistricting process begins with the creation of districts with equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state. Thereafter, the Commission is required to make adjustments to the grid, "as necessary," to accommodate various goals, including compliance with the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) ("VRA") and respecting geographic, community, and competitive interests.  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).  [FN2]


FN2. The constitutionally mandated goals are:

A. Districts shall comply with the United States [C]onstitution and the [U]nited [S]tates [V]oting [R]ights [A]ct;

B. Congressional districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable, and state legislative districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable;

C. Districts shall be geographically compact and contiguous to the extent practicable;

D. District boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable;

E. To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts;

F. To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).


¶  4 The Commission must exclude party registration and voting history data from the initial phase of the mapping process but may use such information to test maps for compliance with the above-listed goals.  Id. at § 1(15).  "The places of residence of incumbents or candidates shall not be identified or considered."  Id. Additionally, the Commission is required to advertise a draft map for comment by the public and for recommendations by the legislature.  Id. at § 1(16).  The recommendations "shall be considered" in establishing the final boundaries.  Id.


¶  5 The Commission hired National Demographics Corporation ("NDC") to consult on the commencement of the mapping process.  Thereafter, on June 7, 2001, the Commission adopted its grid map, based solely on formulating districts of equal population, and then held the first round of hearings for the public to review and comment on the grid.  The Commission next considered the other criteria required by Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) of the constitution in order to modify the grid map and create a draft map, which the Commission adopted on August 17. [FN3]  The Commission then presented its draft map and invited comments during a second round of public hearings.


FN3. The parties dispute when, if at all, the Commission first considered the criterion of competitive districts.


¶  6 On November 9, the Commission certified the 2001 legislative and congressional plans to the Arizona secretary of state, who certified the plans for the 2002 elections.  In compliance with Section 5 of the VRA, [FN4] the plans were then submitted to the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") for preclearance. [FN5]


FN4. See Fields, 206 Ariz. at 134, ¶ 3, 75 P.3d at 1092 (explaining that because of past violations of the VRA, Arizona must submit redistricting plans for preclearance to either the United States Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia).


FN5. The DOJ precleared the congressional plan, but denied preclearance of the legislative plan on March 26, 2002, requiring increased effective Hispanic voting strength in at least three legislative districts.  See Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 230 F.Supp.2d 998, 1003 (D.Ariz.2002).  The Commission then filed suit in federal court in May 2002 seeking approval of an emergency legislative interim plan for the 2002 elections.  Id. The Commission reconfigured the three affected districts, and the district court approved the interim plan for the 2002 elections.  Id. at 1016.  The Commission continued to work on a plan for use in 2004--2010 and, on August 14, 2002, adopted a final legislative redistricting plan.  In February 2003, DOJ precleared this plan.  The plaintiffs contesting the legislative plan in this case amended their complaints to challenge the 2002 final legislative redistricting plan.


¶  7 On March 6, 2002, the Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting, several *849 state legislators, and others (collectively, the "Coalition") filed suit in superior court against the Commission challenging the legislative plan.  The Coalition asserted that the Commission had failed to comply with Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14)(F) by foregoing the creation of competitive districts when "it was possible to do so."  The complaint alleged that, in violation of the voters' mandate, the Commission's proposed map would result in fewer, rather than more, competitive legislative districts.  The Coalition contended that its own alternative plan accomplished all of the Section 1(14) goals better than the Commission's plan.  The Coalition sought a writ of mandamus and declaratory or injunctive relief.


¶  8 On March 14, 2002, a separate action challenging the congressional plan was filed, alleging the Commission violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14), Article 2, Sections 4 and 13, and Article 20, Section 7, by adopting a plan that discriminated on the basis of race.  The superior court consolidated the cases on March 19, 2002.  Arizonans for Fair and Legal Redistricting ("AFLR"), [FN6] Mohave County, the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe and the cities of Lake Havasu, Flagstaff, and Kingman intervened to protect their respective interests.


FN6. AFLR is an organization formed "to advance Republican Party interests in the Arizona redistricting process."


¶  9 During the course of the litigation, the Navajo Nation and the Commission stipulated to a statement of facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the former's challenge to the congressional plan. [FN7] Specifically, the Navajo Nation contested the plan because it removed the Hopi Tribe, which is completely surrounded by the Navajo Nation, from congressional district 1, the district in which the Navajo Nation was placed, and put the Hopi Tribe in adjoining district 2. The Commission achieved this by using a narrow, 103-mile serpentine corridor that partially follows the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon to connect the Hopi Tribe with the rest of district 2.  [FN8] Forty-two Navajo citizens reside within that corridor and were therefore separated from district 1. The Navajo Nation alleged that the Commission violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) by carving out a community residing within district 1 to place it within district 2. The trial court granted the Commission's motion and denied the Navajo Nation's motion, ruling that the constitution allows the Commission flexibility in applying the enumerated criteria as long as its decisions have a basis.  The Navajo Nation appeals this ruling.


FN7. The Hopi Tribe joined in the Commission's motion for summary judgment.


FN8. A map of the contested portion of proposed districts 1 and 2 follow this Opinion as Appendix A.


¶  10 Following the completion of discovery, a trial to the court took place in late 2003 concerning the challenges to the legislative plan, and the court issued a ruling in January 2004.  In detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found that the final legislative plan did not sufficiently favor competitive districts and therefore enjoined use of the plan.  It also ruled that the new constitutional provisions were not "self-executing," and consequently directed the Commission to formulate various definitions and standards.  The Commission, AFLR, and thirteen individual intervenors appeal this ruling.  However, in compliance with the court's order, the Commission prepared a new legislative plan on April 12, 2004, which the court approved on April 16.  The Commission and AFLR then amended their notices of appeal to include an appeal from the latter order. [FN9]  The City of Kingman and Mohave County appeal the order approving the revised plan.


FN9. By decision order entered May 28, 2004, this court stayed the trial court's January 16 and April 16 orders pending the outcome of the appeal.


¶  11 We have jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003) and 12-2101(B) (2003).


STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶  12 In reviewing the court's rulings in the legislative redistricting case, we will *850 not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a);  Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 207 Ariz. 553, 558, ¶ 18, 88 P.3d 1165, 1170 (App.2004).  "A finding is clearly erroneous if no reasonable evidence supports it."  In re B.S., 205 Ariz. 611, 614, ¶ 5, 74 P.3d 285, 288 (App.2003).  However, we are not bound by the court's conclusions of law and draw our own legal conclusions from the facts.  Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 167 Ariz. 254, 257, 806 P.2d 348, 351 (1991).  Likewise, we are not bound by findings of fact that are induced by a mistaken view of the law.  Id.


¶  13 We review the trial court's entry of summary judgment in the congressional redistricting case de novo.  S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 202 Ariz. 326, 329-30, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 1006, 1009-10 (App.2002).  Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990).


¶  14 Finally, we review the court's interpretation of the constitution de novo as a question of law.  Univ. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 201 Ariz. 447, 450, ¶ 14, 36 P.3d 1217, 1220 (App.2001).


ANALYSIS

I. Judicial review of the Commission's redistricting plans


¶  15 The United States Supreme Court has held that redistricting is a legislative matter "which the [ ] courts should make every effort not to preempt."  Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978).  It has directed that courts not become "bogged down" in redistricting cases by coming up with their own alternative plans and that "such involvements [by courts] should never begin."  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 750-51, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973).  In giving such direction, the Court reiterated frequent prior admonitions that redistricting is the function of state and local governments or those entities to whom the legislature assigns the task.  Id.


¶  16 Based on the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court, state courts have restricted their involvement in redistricting cases to determining whether proposed redistricting plans are constitutional.  See In re Senate Bill 177, 132 Vt. 282, 318 A.2d 157, 162 (1974) (ruling that "[w]hatever this Court may believe about the wisdom of an alternative [redistricting] solution, our testing of this legislative function must be confined to its constitutional and statutory propriety");  Hartung v. Bradbury, 332 Or. 570, 33 P.3d 972, 980-81 (2001) (noting that the court's responsibility is to determine the redistricting plan's compliance with constitutional criteria and that "the court is not privileged to substitute its judgment about the wisdom of the plan");  Jensen v. Ky. State Bd. of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Ky.1997) (opining that "[o]ur only role in this process is to ascertain whether a particular redistricting plan passes constitutional muster, not whether a better plan could be crafted").  As the Colorado Supreme Court stated:

Our role in this proceeding is a narrow one:  to measure the present reapportionment plan against the constitutional standards.  The choice among alternative plans, each consistent with constitutional requirements, is for the Commission and not the Court.

 In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 189  (Colo.1992) (quoting In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194 (Colo.1982)).


¶  17 Accordingly, it is not the function of the trial or appellate court to direct how the Commission should change or improve plans, or to determine which of a number of proposed plans is superior.  Id. Such discretion is given solely to the Commission.  See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 751, 93 S.Ct. 2321. Instead, judicial review is necessarily confined to constitutional challenges to the selected plans.  With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments.


*851 A. Equal Protection claims


¶  18 Before the trial court, the Coalition and others alleged that the legislative and congressional plans, as originally adopted by the Commission, violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and/or Arizona Constitutions. [FN10]  Equal protection claims are subject to one of three standards of review.  Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir.2003).  The least deferential is strict scrutiny, which applies when a law "substantially burdens fundamental rights" or makes distinctions based on certain suspect classes, such as race.  Id. An intermediate level of scrutiny applies to distinctions of quasi-suspect classes, such as gender. Id. All other laws are subject to a rational basis analysis, the most deferential standard of review, and "will be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."  Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)).


FN10. The record does not clearly reflect whether all parties asserted equal protection violations under both constitutions.  Regardless, no party disputes that the Equal Protection Clauses of each constitution have the same effect, and we agree.  See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 554, 159 P.2d 292, 299 (1945);  State v. Bonnewell, 196 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 15, 2 P.3d 682, 686 (App.1999).  We therefore confine our discussion to federal equal protection principles.


¶  19 In the instant case, the trial court utilized the strict scrutiny standard in deciding the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges.  The Coalition and Flagstaff contend that the trial court was correct in applying this standard.  The Coalition argues that the strict scrutiny standard is required because the Commission's redistricting plans implicate the "core constitutional right to vote."  Specifically, the Coalition contends that the legislative plan "packs" minority votes in legislative district 14, thus violating the VRA and diluting Hispanic voting strength.


¶  20 The Coalition and Flagstaff also assert that the Commission created its redistricting plans without first defining constitutional terms and thereby failed to apply uniform standards, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Flagstaff asserts that without uniform definitions for terms such as "competitiveness" and "communities of interest," voters cannot be certain they have been treated equally.  Citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000), it reasons that the Commission thus "performed its work in an arbitrary fashion ... with no means of assuring that it did not ... 'value one person's vote over that of another." '  Flagstaff therefore contends that the Commission is precluded from applying different standards to different voters depending on where they live.


¶  21 The Navajo Nation also advocates for the strict scrutiny standard.  It claims that the congressional plan neither creates geographically compact and contiguous districts nor utilizes undivided census tracts.  It alleges that the Commission failed to use visible geographic features in establishing district lines and that it wrongly split the Navajo Nation into two districts, thus failing to respect both the Navajo Nation's community of interest and the community of interest it shares with other tribes.  The Navajo Nation further claims that the plan "creates a gerrymandered district for the sole purpose of excluding the Hopi Tribe from the adopted Congressional District 1."


¶  22 In opposition, the Commission asserts that the trial court erred when it applied the strict scrutiny standard to review the plans, arguing that the court should have utilized the more deferential rational basis standard of review.  While the Commission admits that redistricting will affect where individuals will cast their votes, and thus relates to the fundamental, constitutional right to vote, it argues that the mere relationship between redistricting and voting does not, in the absence of any impairment of the right to vote, mandate strict scrutiny review.  Further, the Commission contends that application of the strict scrutiny standard is inappropriate when, as here, there are no allegations of racial gerrymandering.


1. Has the right to vote been impaired?


¶  23 We first consider whether the Commission's plans substantially burdened a fundamental right, thereby triggering use of the strict scrutiny standard of review.  All *852 agree that the right to vote is "the protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters."  San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n. 78, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).  However, this does not mean that every law or constitutional provision relating to voting triggers strict scrutiny review.


¶  24 Strict scrutiny review applies when citizens' voting rights are substantially burdened.  See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (striking down a durational residence law that denied new residents the right to vote);  Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d 377, 404-05 (2002) (Orr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a redistricting plan allowing some voters to elect multiple representatives while limiting others to electing only one representative).  For example, in Charfauros v. Board of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 952-53 (9th Cir.2001), the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to overturn an election rule that disqualified four voters residing on a small island within the Northern Mariana Islands.  The court stressed the importance of the "right to participate in elections on an equal basis," id. at 951 (quoting Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336, 92 S.Ct. 995), and noted that while the government could impose some restrictions, it could not "choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity."  Id. (quoting Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343, 92 S.Ct. 995).


¶  25 However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that "any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny," emphasizing that "[o]ur cases do not" support that "erroneous assumption." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (upholding a state's ban on write-in candidates).  The Burdick Court explained that states have the right to regulate their state elections, and it noted that "government must play an active role in structuring" those elections.  Id. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059. The Court emphasized that "there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest" and promote order in our democracy.  Id. The Court acknowledged that such regulations would necessarily impose some burdens upon voters.  Id. It concluded, however, that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny ... would tie the hands of [s]tates seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently."  Id. Thus, the level of scrutiny used to review a state election law depends on the extent of the burden imposed on voters' rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059.  As such, only "severe" restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review.  Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). Accordingly, in Burdick, the ban on write-in voting, as part of a larger system that afforded "constitutionally sufficient ballot access, d[id] not impose an unconstitutional burden" and was not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 441, 112 S.Ct. 2059;  see also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 2194, 72 L.Ed.2d 628 (1982) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Puerto Rico's system of allowing only members of ex-representative's party to elect interim representative and noting that choice of system entitled to substantial deference).


¶  26 The Coalition and Flagstaff rely heavily on Mayor of Tucson v. Royal, 20 Ariz.App. 83, 510 P.2d 394 (1973), to support their claim that redistricting affects the right to vote and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny review. In Royal, government officials created a redistricting plan pursuant to the city charter in order to equalize population in six voting wards.  Id. at 83-84, 510 P.2d at 394-95.  Three of the wards held primary and at-large elections in 1973, while the remaining three wards held elections in 1975. Id. at 84, 510 P.2d at 395.  The redistricting plan dispersed voters among all wards, thereby depriving approximately 47,000 voters of the ability to vote in the 1973 primary election.  Id. The Royal court concluded that "[l]aws which impair the right to vote are unconstitutional unless the governmental body can demonstrate that the laws are necessary to promote a[c]ompelling governmental interest."  Id. at 87, 510 P.2d at *853 398.  It upheld the trial court's decision to strike the redistricting plan because it was not necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest "in the face of the temporary disenfranchisement of [thousands of] voters" when there existed "an apparent less disruptive alternative."  Id. at 89, 510 P.2d at 400.


¶  27 We distinguish Royal from the present case.  The record before us does not reflect that any citizen would be denied the right to vote under the redistricting plans.  Indeed, no party has even alleged such a result. Because Royal involved the disenfranchisement of voters, and such disenfranchisement does not exist in this case, we are not persuaded that Royal supports utilization of the strict scrutiny standard. [FN11]


FN11. Moreover, even if we were to agree that Royal stands for the proposition that strict scrutiny is the required standard of review in all redistricting cases, such an interpretation would be contrary to more recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court.  See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432, 112 S.Ct. 2059;  Norman, 502 U.S. at 289, 112 S.Ct. 698; Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 8, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 2194.


¶  28 The common thread in redistricting cases applying strict scrutiny review is the denial of the right to vote on an equal basis with others.  That element is absent in this case.  The Commission's redistricting plans do not impose "severe" restrictions, see Green, 340 F.3d at 896, substantially burden the right to vote, see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Royal, 20 Ariz.App. at 87, 510 P.2d at 398, or treat voters unequally, see Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 951.  Rather, they merely place residents into districts after applying the required constitutional criteria.


¶  29 The Coalition and Flagstaff further rely on Gore to argue that the Commission's failure to define those terms found in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) necessarily resulted in the use of disparate standards when adopting the plans and drawing the districts.  They assert that this constituted arbitrary and disparate treatment of voters because it could cause one person's vote to be valued above another's, in express prohibition of  Gore. See 531 U.S. at 104, 121 S.Ct. 525.  This reliance on Gore is misplaced.


¶  30 The controversy in Gore arose from the recounting of hole-punched presidential ballots cast in Florida in the 2000 election that had not been properly perforated.  Id. at 105, 121 S.Ct. 525.  Specifically, some ballots had only indentations where voters apparently had attempted to indicate their selections for president, while other ballots had partially punched holes of various degrees, commonly known as "hanging chads."  Id. Florida's respective counties, and recount teams within those counties, used their own standards to define a "legal vote," with one county even changing its standard in the middle of the recount.  Id. at 106.  Thus, similarly looking ballots were counted differently depending on where the voter lived and who was doing the counting.  Id. The United States Supreme Court held that Florida could not apply varying standards from county to county, or from one recount team to the next within a county, to interpret voters' intentions.  Id. at 110, 121 S.Ct. 525.  It further held that such inconsistencies were arbitrary and did not treat citizens' votes equally.  Id. at 107, 121 S.Ct. 525.  The Court stated that one source of the fundamental right to vote "lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter," and concluded that Florida could not "value one person's vote over that of another."  Id. at 104-05, 121 S.Ct. 525.


¶  31 Under the Commission's plans, all Arizona registered voters would be allowed to vote and each ballot would be counted equally.  Although the subjective application of the mandated constitutional standards may have varied district to district in determining where to draw district lines, those boundaries did not determine whether someone would be allowed to vote or whether that vote would count.  This is quite different from the impermissible arbitrary exclusion of otherwise qualified ballots at issue in Gore. Id. at 104-06, 121 S.Ct. 525.  Here, no such arbitrary or disparate treatment has occurred.  The alleged lack of uniformity in applying the criteria among the districts does not constitute the valuing of one person's *854 vote over another, and Gore does not stand for the proposition that each voter must be allowed to reside in his or her district of choice.  Gore only guarantees that once all votes are cast, they must be treated with "equal weight."  Id. at 104, 121 S.Ct. 525.


¶  32 Flagstaff nevertheless asserts that redistricting "has a direct impact on the weight of each vote," presumably because grouping like-minded people theoretically makes it easier for an elected official to represent the interests of those people.  However, Flagstaff cites no authority for a constitutional right to "ease of representation," and we find none. [FN12]


FN12. Flagstaff further argues that voters possess the right to have their districts drawn in satisfaction of the constitutional mandates, as such compliance may affect the weight of any given vote and impact the outcome of an election.  We conclude, however, that such a result does not impair the right to vote itself.  Therefore, it does not trigger strict scrutiny review.


¶  33 Finally, Flagstaff argues that by approving Proposition 106, the voters "constitutionalized" the redistricting process, just as the framers enshrined the right to bring legal action for recovery of personal damages. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (1984) (employing strict scrutiny review of medical malpractice litigation procedures). Flagstaff fails to explain, however, how Kenyon applies to its claims or how the redistricting plans impair the right to vote.  Rather, as explained previously, redistricting does not affect "the essence of the fundamental right" to vote, and strict scrutiny is thus inapplicable.  See id. Moreover, it is well settled that the regulation of elections will necessarily place certain burdens upon voters;  however, as discussed previously, such burdens are not sufficiently substantial to trigger strict scrutiny review. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432, 112 S.Ct. 2059.  For all these reasons, the redistricting plans do not impermissibly or substantially burden the fundamental right to vote.


2. Has a suspect class been impacted?


¶  34 We next consider whether the Commission was predominantly motivated by race when it created the redistricting plans, thereby triggering strict scrutiny review.  Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997);  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913, 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (strict scrutiny applicable when the "dominant and controlling rationale" in creating districts was "race for its own sake" and "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations").


¶  35 In Bush v. Vera, the United States Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny review to examine claims that district lines were drawn based on race.  517 U.S. 952, 972-73, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996). However, such review was only applied to those districts where "intensive and pervasive use of race" was used to maximize minority populations irrespective of traditional redistricting guidelines.  Id. The Court pointedly confirmed its prior ruling in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), that the threshold for applying strict scrutiny in this setting is reached only when "redistricting legislation ... is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles."  Id. at 958, 116 S.Ct. 1941.  Strict scrutiny is not automatically triggered in every case involving the intention to create majority-minority districts or in cases where lines are drawn "with consciousness of race."  Id. The Court reiterated that "[f]or strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting principles were subordinated to race" and that race was "the predominant factor."  Id. at 959, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475).


¶  36 The parties challenging the redistricting plans did not allege that race was the predominant motive of the Commission in creating the plans or that it subordinated legitimate race-neutral criteria to race. [FN13] See *855 id.  Rather, the complaints are premised on allegations that the Commission improperly applied the constitutional criteria in developing the maps, failed to fulfill its constitutional duties, and thereby violated the plaintiffs' "fundamental right to vote."  However, the plans are not so "extremely irregular" that segregation for voting purposes is the only reasonable explanation.  See id. at 958, 116 S.Ct. 1941.  Accordingly, there has been no unconstitutional identification of or discrimination against a suspect class that warrants strict scrutiny review. [FN14]


FN13. The complaints clearly allege political gerrymandering, which has been distinguished from racial gerrymandering.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (holding that "[t]he Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political entities" and confirming that "[t]he reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.") (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973)).  But, "[b]y contrast, the purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race is not a lawful one."  Id. at 286, 124 S.Ct. 1769.


FN14. Similarly, as no party alleges that the Commission engaged in gender bias when creating the districts, an intermediate level of scrutiny is not warranted.


¶  37 In summary, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the strict scrutiny standard to review challenges to the Commission's redistricting plans.  [FN15]  We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment entered by the court on January 16, 2004, that invalidated the legislative redistricting plan and ordered the Commission to take additional action in constructing a new plan.  We remand to the trial court to consider whether the legislative redistricting plan at issue before January 16, 2004 is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. [FN16]


FN15. The Commission contends that because it exercised "true legislative power," it is entitled to the "greatest" deferential standard of judicial review.  We need not address this argument, however, because we have otherwise concluded that rational basis review is required.


FN16. The trial court, in its discretion and after consultation with the parties, can determine whether and to what extent a new trial is warranted, or whether selected submission of additional evidence and/or argument is appropriate.


¶  38 Bearing the appropriate standard of review in mind, and with the goal of providing some guidance to the trial court on remand, we now analyze the court's rulings concerning legislative redistricting and then review the propriety of granting summary judgment in the congressional redistricting portion of the case.


II. Legislative redistricting appeal


A. Equal Protection


¶  39 The viability of an equal protection challenge in a redistricting case, absent evidence of racial discrimination or impairment of the right to vote, is questionable.  In Vieth, the Supreme Court concluded that "political gerrymandering" claims are non-justiciable, and that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution does not provide a judicially enforceable limit on political considerations that may be taken into account when redistricting.  541 U.S. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 1769.  The Court held that the Constitution contains no provision that grants groups a right to proportional representation.  Id. at 288, 124 S.Ct. 1769.  In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Constitution "guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently sized groups.  It nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded political strength proportionate to their numbers."  Id. Applying this reasoning, no matter how district lines are drawn, it would be impossible to guarantee a certain result in representation.  Id. at 289, 124 S.Ct. 1769.


¶  40 Notwithstanding the above, the Coalition asserted and the trial court found an equal protection violation because the Commission had never adopted definitions of essential terms in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14), of the Arizona Constitution, such as "community of interest," "extent practicable," "competitive," and "significant detriment."  The trial court also concluded that the terms were not self-executing, were subject to varying definitions, and had been applied arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the plaintiffs' equal protection rights. The trial *856 court therefore ordered the Commission to adopt definitions of the aforementioned terms.  The Commission contests these conclusions and argues that no authority supports them.


¶  41 The Coalition counters that without standards to guide them, the Commissioners relied on individual, subjective ad hoc rationales in applying the map-drawing criteria and, in so doing, failed to treat all voters alike. Similarly, Flagstaff contends that lack of definitions both allowed the Commission to perform its work in an arbitrary fashion and prevented adequate evaluation to ensure uniform treatment.  It also argues that standards are needed, for example, to assist the Commission in identifying communities of interest because if a community were placed in a single district, the votes of that community "have weight behind the[m]."  [FN17]


FN17. We observe that election results are not determined only by party or group affiliation, but by a variety of factors that change with each candidate and election.  Therefore, to say that placing all of a "community of interest" in one district and giving "weight" to the votes of that community implicates equal protection ignores both the principle that equal protection protects the individual and the unavoidable result that individuals within the community may indeed vote differently.

As Justice Scalia noted in Vieth, even presuming that political gerrymandering creates more partisan representatives in fact,

the Constitution does not answer the question whether it is better for Democratic voters to have their State's congressional delegation include 10 wishy-washy Democrats (because Democratic voters are "effectively" distributed so as to constitute bare majorities in many districts), or 5 hardcore Democrats (because Democratic voters are tightly packed in a few districts).  Choosing the former "dilutes" the vote of the radical Democrat;  choosing the latter does the same to the moderate.  Neither Article I, § 2, nor the Equal Protection Clause takes sides in this dispute. 541 U.S. at 288 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 1769. Applying this logic to "communities of interest," it is clear that the principles of equal protection would no more guarantee that a community be "packed" into one district or "cracked" into several than it would a political party.


¶  42 In asserting that the Commission violated the Equal Protection Clause and failed to uniformly apply the various criteria in adopting its final 2002 legislative plan, the Coalition and Flagstaff rely on Gore. As previously noted, in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court found that "the use of standardless manual recounts" in a presidential election denied equal protection to some members of the electorate.  531 U.S. at 103, 121 S.Ct. 525.  The Court observed that an important aspect of the right to vote is the equal weight and dignity of each vote;  accordingly, having "granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."  Id. at 104-05, 121 S.Ct. 525.  The Florida Supreme Court seriously infringed upon this right by ordering examination of some ballots for which the voting machines had not detected a vote for president to discern the voter's intent when the counties conducting the examination used different rules to evaluate intent.  Id. at 105, 121 S.Ct. 525.  As a result, the votes of some citizens would be validated and counted while the ballots of others would not be re-examined.  Id. at 107-08, 121 S.Ct. 525.  After concluding that equal protection demanded that the ballots be evaluated by uniform rules so that similarly situated voters would be treated alike, the Court emphasized that its holding was limited "to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."  Id. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 525.


¶  43 The Commission contends that no other court, including the Supreme Court, has cited Gore in a redistricting case and that Gore is limited to its unique facts.  Flagstaff responds that Gore is not so limited because the Ninth Circuit cited it in Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 951-55, a case striking down inequitable voter qualification challenges.  In Charfauros, an Elections Board regulation created two classes of voters based on party affiliation.  Id. at 945.  Challenges to the eligibility of one class occurred and were resolved before the election but challenges to the qualifications of the other class were not resolved until after the election, and its votes were not counted.  Id. at 946.  The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Board's regulation imposed arbitrary and disparate treatment on some citizens and cited Gore for the proposition *857 that "once the legislature prescribes a particular voting procedure, the right to vote in that precise manner is a fundamental right."  Id. at 953.


¶  44 Both Gore and Charfauros involved denial of the right of some individuals to have their votes counted on an equal basis, but neither case applies to the Commission's redistricting efforts here.  Gore, 531 U.S. at 100-05, 121 S.Ct. 525;  Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 950-55.  Neither the Coalition nor Flagstaff claims that Arizona lacks uniform standards to determine if a vote will be counted, as in Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-10, 121 S.Ct. 525, or that the redistricting plans classify voters in a way that denies or impairs their ability to vote on an equal basis with others, as in Charfauros, 249 F.3d at 950-51.  Instead, the Coalition contends that to avoid arbitrary use or interpretation of the redistricting criteria, the Commission must adopt uniform definitions and rules.


¶  45 The trial court accepted the assertion that lack of definitions for the criteria listed in Section 1(14) violates equal protection.  It concluded as a matter of law that the terms of Section 1(14) were not "self-executing" because otherwise the Commission would not need to hire experts on competitiveness, hold hearings to identify communities of interest, or decide how to apply the various criteria.  The Commission responds, however, that the court erred because Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(17) clearly states that "[t]he provisions regarding this section are self-executing," and the next sentence states that the Commission "shall certify [the districting maps] to the secretary of state."  Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(17) (emphasis added).


¶  46 "Self-executing" means that the legislature need not pass a statute enacting the redistricting plans.  See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, 166, ¶ 12, 83 P.3d 1103, 1107 (App.2004) (stating that a constitutional provision is self-executing if it is effective immediately and does not require ancillary legislation or other action).  Once the Commission certifies the maps, the secretary of state must use them in conducting the next election.  The trial court, however, found the various criteria set out in Section 1(14) not to be "self-executing."  We do not think the court intended to contradict the express words of Section 1(17) but meant instead that some of the critical terms in Section 1(14) are not self-explanatory or cannot be implemented without further study or investigation.


¶  47 The Coalition insists, however, that without standards, the application of the constitutional criteria may be subject to differences of opinion among the Commissioners.  Even presuming some disagreement, the Commission can take official action if at least three Commissioners cast affirmative votes.  See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(12).  Further, although the existence of standards may aid the Commission in reaching agreement, standards do not guarantee unanimity, and unanimity is not mandated.


¶  48 Our discussion of the role of standards in guiding the Commission illustrates the overriding fact that districting decisions require judgment, particularly because the Commission is charged with considering a number of variables that may often conflict with each other.  See, e.g., Mayor of Cambridge v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 476, 765 N.E.2d 749, 755 (2002) (acknowledging that the redistricting process requires the use of discretion and compromise);  State ex rel. S. St. Paul v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298, 61 N.W.2d 737, 742 (1953) (acknowledging that those charged with redistricting must exercise their own discretion, but that there are limits thereon), cited in Ziols v. Rice County Bd. of Comm'rs, 661 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Minn.App.2003).  At present, it is not possible to produce a perfect map by feeding data into a computer.  Instead, the people of Arizona have entrusted a politically balanced group of five individuals with discretion to reach reasonable conclusions on how to draw district lines.  Even if the Commission adopts a definition of "competitive" or "compact" so that proposed districts may be measured against an agreed-upon yardstick, the Commission still must have flexibility to give more emphasis to one goal over another when, for example, to respect a community of interest, a district must be less compact and contiguous.


¶  49 This is not to say that the Commission can ignore any of the constitutional criteria, *858 can favor one criterion without considering the others, or can apply or interpret them in a way that no rational Commission would.  However, the Coalition has not demonstrated that equal protection principles demand definitions in order to prevent the Commission from invidiously discriminating against some voters.  We find no basis in the Equal Protection Clause to compel the Commission to adopt definitions, and the trial court's order in that regard was error.


B. Competitiveness as an equal goal under the Arizona Constitution


¶  50 The trial court ruled that "[c]reating competitive districts is no less important than meeting any of the other goals of Article 4, [P] art 2, [Section] 1(14)(B)--(E) and, in fact, is mandatory."  Consequently, the court concluded that the Commission misinterpreted Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) as subordinating the competitiveness goal and violated that provision by failing to favor competitiveness in establishing districts. Specifically, the court ruled that the Commission erred by addressing competitiveness only after it considered the goals set forth in subsections (B)--(E), was not permitted "to create homogenous districts comprised of like-minded, yet distinct, communities of interest, at the expense of [creating] competitive districts," and failed to favor competitiveness by creating majority-minority districts with Hispanic voting populations in excess of the requirements of Section 5 of the VRA. The court further found that a more competitive plan was plausible based on the existence of a proposed plan known as the "Hall-Minkoff Plan," which the Commission had rejected.  Ultimately, the court ordered the Commission "to adopt a legislative plan that gives appropriate consideration to competitiveness" and "at a minimum contains the same number of competitive districts [seven] as the Hall-Minkoff Plan."


¶  51 The Commission and AFLR  [FN18] argue that the trial court erred by elevating the importance of competitiveness as described in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14).  They contend the plain meaning of the constitution subordinates competitiveness as a factor to consider in the redistricting process.  The Coalition responds that because competitiveness is the only goal "favored" in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14), and all constitutional provisions are mandatory unless specifically described as discretionary, the court's ruling on this issue was correct.  We review this issue de novo as a question of law.  Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County, 199 Ariz. 402, 405, ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 713, 716 (App.2001).


FN18. Intervenors-appellants Mohave County, City of Kingman, and Lake Havasu City join in the arguments urged by the Commission and AFLR on this issue.


¶  52 To understand the contours of a constitutional provision, we begin, as always, by examining its language.  In interpreting Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14), our primary focus is on the intent of the electorate that voted to amend the constitution, Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994), "and we do not [step] outside the plain language of the provision unless the language is unclear."  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 207 Ariz. 95, 109, ¶ 42, 83 P.3d 573, 587 (App.2004).  If we find the language unclear, we may then consider "the context, effect, consequences and spirit of the law."  State v. Superior Court (Coronado), 186 Ariz. 363, 365, 922 P.2d 927, 929 (App.1996).  Finally, we give words their natural, obvious and ordinary meaning unless defined otherwise in the constitution.  McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 290, 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982).  With these principles in mind, we examine the language of the constitutional provisions at issue.


¶  53 Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14)--(15), sets forth a four-phase method the Commission must follow in establishing legislative and congressional districts.  During phase one, the Commission must create "districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state." Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).  The Commission cannot consider party registration and voting history data during this phase.  Id. at § 1(15). The Commission is additionally prohibited from identifying or considering the places of residence of incumbents or candidates.  Id. No party disputes *859 this description of the Commission's constitutional mandate during this phase.


¶  54 In phase two, the Commission "shall" make adjustments to the grid created during phase one "as necessary to accommodate" six listed goals.  Id. at § 1(14)(A)--(F).  It is the priority and binding nature of these goals that form the crux of the parties' dispute.  Thus, we again quote the language of the contested provision:

A. Districts shall comply with the United States [C]onstitution and the [U]nited [S]tates [V]oting [R]ights [A]ct;

B. Congressional districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable, and state legislative districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable;

C. Districts shall be geographically compact and contiguous to the extent practicable;

D. District boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable;

E. To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts;

F. To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.

 Id. at § 1(14).  The Commission may use party registration and voting history data to test maps for compliance with these goals.  Id. at § 1(15). As in phase one, however, the Commission cannot identify or consider the places of residence of incumbents or ca