365 F.Supp.2d 448

(Cite as: 365 F.Supp.2d 448)


United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

D. Scott CARRUTHERS, Springhawk,LLC, and Summerhawk, LLC, Plaintiffs,


David FLAUM, Flaum Management Company, Inc., Russell Galbut, 3D Associates, LLC,
Stanley Gallant, Individually and as Assignee of ACB Pacific Reality, LLC, LJM
Enterprises, LLC, as Assignee of ABC Pacific Realty, LLC, A.P. Equity, Inc.,
Ancestral Reclamation, LLC, Alan H. Young, individually, d/b/a Lindenbaum and
Young, and as partner in Lindenbaum and Young, Lindenbaum and Young, Charles
Petri, County of Sullivan Industrial Development Agency, and Gene Barbanti,
individually and d/b/a The Barbanti Group Real Estate, Defendants.

No. 03 CIV.7768(CM).

March 31, 2005.

*451 Peter D. Grubea, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Joshua E. Kimmerling, Cuddy & Feder & Worby LLP, White Plains, NY, Gerald Orseck,
Orseck Law Offices, Liberty, NY, Benjamin Ostrer, Attorney at Law, Chester, NY,
Tara C. Fappiano, Ohrenstein & Brown, L.L.P., New York, NY, for Defendants.


McMAHON, District Judge.

This is a case about a misguided effort to cash in on the as-yet unrealized
boomlet in casino gambling in Sullivan County.

The Unkechaug Indian Nation want to open gaming facilities at one or more sites
in Sullivan County and have sought land of suitable geographic location and
ancestral connection. (Cplt.P 25.) The tribe (about which the complaint says
almost nothing) has been recognized by the State of New York, pursuant to Indian
Law, Art. 10, ss 150-53. However, the Tribe has not been federally recognized
and, as far as this court knows, has never even applied for federal recognition.

Because the Unkechaugs are not a federally-recognized Indian tribe, it cannot
take advantage of the provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. ss
2701, et seq. ("IGRA"), to overcome New York State's longstanding prohibition
against gambling. Nonetheless, plaintiff D. Scott Carruthers, together with two
other individuals named James Simermeyer and Mitchell Stanley, established two
limited liability corporations-Springhawk LLC and Summerhawk LLC-for the express
purpose of developing and operating high-stakes bingo and other gaming facilities
on the ancestral land of the Unkechaugs*452 in Sullivan County (Springhawk's
domain) and on Long Island (Summerhawk's domain). Carruthers, Simermeyer and
Stanley allegedly entered into oral contracts (known as "operating agreements")
with each other relating to their interest in Springhawk and Summerhawk.
Thereafter, the two corporations entered into contracts with the Unkechaugs
relating to the development of such a high-stakes bingo operation and other gaming
facilities on land purporting to be ancestral Unkechaug land (the "gaming

Carruthers here sues multiple defendants-attorneys Alan H. Young and Charles
Petri and their law firm, Lindenbaum and Young; real estate agent Gene Barbanti
and a firm controlled by him, AP Equity, Inc.; and a firm known as Ancestral
Reclamation LLC-for tortiously interfering with his relationship with his partners
Simermeyer and Stanley (who appear to have parted ways with him) pursuant to the
Springhawk and Summerhawk operating agreements. (First Cause of Action).
Carruthers also alleges that the other defendants-including David Flaum and Flaum
Management, a Rochester developer with an interest in gaming operations; and
Stanley Gallant and Russell Galbut, real estate developers from New York
City-tortiously interfered with the gaming contracts between Springhawk and
Summerhawk, on the one hand, and the Unkechaugs on the other.

All defendants except Gallant and his related entities have moved for judgment
on the pleadings dismissing the first sixteen claims, on the ground that the
underlying contracts are invalid and unenforceable. The Gallant defendants move
separately for summary judgment dismissing the entire complaint as against them,
on the ground that they had absolutely nothing to do with this whole situation.

The contracts with which defendants allegedly interfered fall into three
categories: the "operating agreements" that govern the relations among the
principals in plaintiffs Springhawk and Summerhawk; the "gaming agreements" (as
plaintiffs call them) that Springhawk and Summerhawk entered into with the
Unkechaug; and an "employment agreement" between Springhawk and someone named
Robert Kingsley.

The gaming agreements are not valid agreements and cannot be enforced under New
York law because they have as their purpose an illegal activity-gambling-and they
fall within no exception to New York State's longstanding prohibition against all
forms of gaming. For that reason, defendants are entitled to dismissal of
plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the gaming agreements are valid
(Sixteenth Cause of Action).

Moreover, one cannot tortiously interfere with an illegal and unenforceable
agreement. Nor can one interfere with the so-called "employment agreement" with
Kingsley, which was nothing more than an open-ended consulting agreement designed
to lead to employment in the future. The Eighth through Fifteenth Causes of
Action must thus be dismissed as well.

In the First Cause of Action Carruthers personally seeks relief against
Ancestral, AP Equity, Petri, Young and Barbanti (the "AP Equity Defendants") for
allegedly interfering with his relations with his limited liability partners.
Insofar as this claim relates to the operating agreement that established
Springhawk, it must be dismissed with prejudice, because the complaint
specifically alleges that Springhawk was established for the patently illegal
purpose of developing and operating high-stakes bingo and other gaming facilities
in *453 Sullivan County, New York, on ancestral land of the Unkechaug Indian
Nation. Nothing whatever is alleged in the complaint concerning the Summerhawk
operating agreement (except that it exists), and so any claim relating thereto
must be dismissed for that reason alone-and with prejudice, for reasons that will
become clear below.

Finally, the Second through Seventh Causes of Action must be dismissed because
the complaint does not identify what agreement or agreements to which Carruthers
(the only plaintiff on those claims) was a party were the subject of any allegedly
tortious interference.

Defendants David Flaum and Flaum Management Company (the "Flaum Defendants")
move to dismiss the remaining claims asserted against them: the Eighteenth (for
breach of contract), Twenty-First (for fraud and misrepresentation), and
Twenty-Fifth (to pierce the corporate veil) causes of action. For the reasons
stated below, the Flaum Defendants' motion to dismiss the non-tortious
interference claims is GRANTED as to the Twenty-Fifth Causes of Action, but DENIED
as to the others.

Finally, Defendants Stanley Gallant, Jack Sternklar, and LJM Enterprises LLC
(the "Gallant Defendants") separately move for summary judgment to dismiss the
remaining claims asserted against them. Four of these pertain to Gallant
himself: the Eighteenth (for breach of contract), Twenty-First (Fraud and
misrepresentation), Twenty-Fifth (to pierce the corporate veil), and Twenty-Sixth
(constructive trust) causes of action. The Twenty-Seventh (unjust enrichment;
resulting trust) pertains to all three Gallant Defendants. For the reasons
stated below, the Gallant Defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss the
non-tortious interference claims is GRANTED as to the Twenty-Fifth Causes of
Action, and adjourned until the completion of Rule 56(f) discovery as to all other

Standards of Review

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The standard of review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c) is whether "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 47
F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir.1995). This standard is the same as that applicable to a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Nat'l
Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d 904, 909 n. 2 (2d Cir.1988). A
court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
only "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Phillip v. University of
Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 293 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Kaltman-Glasel v. Dooley, 156 F.Supp.2d
225, 226 (D.Conn.2001).

The function of the Court is not to weigh the evidence that may be presented at
trial. Instead, the Court must determine if the claims are legally sufficient.
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985); see also King v. Simpson,
189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir.1999). The Court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff and accept the allegations contained in the
claims as true. See Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d
198, 202 (2d Cir.1999). Therefore, a court must evaluate whether the allegations
in the complaint can sustain a cause of action under applicable law, and should
grant the motion to dismiss only if the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in
*454 support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. See Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); King v.
Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 286 (2d Cir.1999). The issue is not whether the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d

However, it is well settled that on a motion to dismiss, where the validity of
contracts is challenged, the court may review and properly consider the terms of
the contracts that were referenced in the pleadings. See Cortec Industries, Inc.
v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1991). Here the defendants argue
that the contracts with which they allegedly interfered are invalid and
unenforceable (and thus cannot be the subject of a tortious interference claim).
Therefore, it is appropriate for the court to examine those contracts. I have
obtained copies of those that are reduced to writing, and a description of those
that are not, from plaintiff's counsel. Obtaining these agreements does not
convert the motion for a judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary

However, because some of the agreements at issue turn out to be oral
agreements, plaintiff's counsel has provided the court with a letter brief
describing the pleaded contracts that were never reduced to writing. In making
my determination about the validity of the employment agreement with Kingsley I
have relied on that statement. Should that be deemed a conversion of this motion
into one for summary judgment, I note that this is the rare instance in which no
advance notice to the parties of the court's intent to convert the motion is
required. Generally, a court should give the parties explicit notice of its
intention to convert such a motion. First Financial Ins. Co. v. Allstate Interior
Demolition Corp., 193 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1999). However, in certain
circumstances, explicit notice is not necessary. Green v. Doukas, 205 F.3d 1322,
1323 (2d Cir.2000). The "essential inquiry" is whether the parties were taken by
surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the
pleading. In re G & A Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 294-95; see also Metrokane, Inc.
v. Wine Enthusiast, 185 F.Supp.2d 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y.2002).

Here, the only thing extrinsic to the pleadings (and the pleaded contracts)
that has been considered by the court is plaintiff's counsel's description of the
alleged oral agreements. No one was taken by surprise that I considered this
information; I solicited it, in order to determine defendants' challenge to the
validity of the pleaded contracts. Some of the moving defendants submitted
letters commenting on plaintiff's description of the contracts at issue, so
defendants were not deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the
pleadings. Additionally, Defendants have not been prejudiced by my consideration
of plaintiff's presentation. Rather, they have been assisted, since plaintiff's
description of the oral agreements helps to establish their invalidity.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted where there is
no "genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law," that is, where the party opposing summary judgment
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, a party opposing summary
judgment must point to "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial," by proffering *455 "significant probative evidence tending to support
[its] complaint." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). The non-movant "may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e), or upon "mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the
facts." Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir.1995). However,
where there has been no opportunity for discovery, a court may either refuse the
application for judgment or order a continuance. Rule 56(f).

Background Allegations

The Operating Agreements

According to the complaint, Springhawk is a Delaware Limited Liability Company
that was established for the purpose of developing and operating high-stakes bingo
and other gaming facilities in Sullivan County, New York, on ancestral land of the
Unkechaug Indian Nation. The members of Springhawk at its inception were
Carruthers, Simermeyer and Stanley. Summerhawk is a second Delaware Limited
Liability Company founded by Carruthers, Simermeyer and Stanley.

Upon the formation of Springhawk, the three members entered into operating
agreements-one for Springhawk and one for Summerhawk-which governed their
relations vis a vis one another. The operating agreements that are alleged in
the complaint are oral agreements, with terms that, according to a recent
clarifying letter from plaintiff's counsel, are imposed by default under the
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. At all time relevant to this action (and
until February 2003, well after the events in suit took place), there was no
written operating agreement for either LLC.FN1 However, according to the
complaint, Carruthers was to be controlling members of Springhawk, with a 56.25%
ownership stake. Simermeyer and Stanley were to have 25% and 19.25% interests,
respectively. (Cplt.PP 18-21.)

FN1. According to a letter written by plaintiffs' counsel at the request of
the court, dated March 16, 2005, the members of Springhawk and Summerhawk
entered into written agreements, which counsel described as "amended and
restated" operating agreements, in February 2003. Counsel states that
these written agreements have no bearing on the claims asserted in this
action, since they post-date the relevant events. I agree.

The Gaming Agreements

Springhawk entered into two separate written agreements with the Unkechaug
Indians. (Cplt.P 22.) These "gaming agreements" (as plaintiffs denominate them)
are appended to the motion record as court exhibits.

The first agreement, or the "A" Agreement, dated April 26, 2002, is entitled
"Casino Gaming Management Agreement By and Between Unkechaug Indian Nation and
Spring Hawk, LLC, for Casino Gaming Facilities at Sullivan County, New York."
(Court Ex. 1) It recites that the Unkechaug are in the process of developing a
full scale gaming facility at Exit 106 off Route 17 West (which is in Sullivan
County) and it granted Springhawk the exclusive right to operate and manage that
gaming facility for a period of ten years beginning on the day when the gaming
facility first opened. (Id.) It also granted Springhawk a "pre-opening management
term" for the period between the time the agreement was signed and the opening of
the casino.

A companion, or "B" agreement, entitled "Economic Development and Management
Agreement," (Court Ex. 2), purported to grant the Springhawk "similar rights" with
respect to "other economic development projects" undertaken by the Unkechaugs.
Id.; (Cplt.P 22). The words of the complaint*456 suggest that this contract
entitled Springhawk to operate and manage economic development projects other than
gaming facilities that were undertaken by the Unkechaugs. However, when
plaintiffs were forced to produce the agreement itself, it turns out that it (1)
vests in Springhawk the irrevocable and exclusive right to develop and operate
gaming facilities on property to be acquired by the Unkechaug in Schodack, New
York (located in Rensellaer County) and (2) grants Springhawk the exclusive and
irrevocable right to handle all other economic development activities at Schodack,
including hotels, shopping centers, restaurants, transportation, infrastructure,
waste management, communications, insurance, financial, tourism, advertising,
gasoline, convenience vending and sale of tobacco products, as well as anything
else the parties might agree upon at a later date. The agreement then goes on to
set forth the details of the Gaming Facility to be developed at Schodack and the
distribution of profits as between the Tribe and the plaintiffs-one section
describing the distribution of profits from gaming and one section describing
distribution of profits for non-gaming enterprises. Attached to the agreement is
the first page of a document called the "Unkechaug Nation Gaming Ordinance." (The
document is obviously longer than the single page transmitted to me).

Two months earlier, in February 2002, Summerhawk had entered into two virtually
identical "A" and "B" agreements relating to "High Stakes Bingo and Gaming
Management" on Long Island (Court Ex. 3) and "Economic Development and Management"
on Long Island (Court Ex. 4). There is not a single factual allegation in the
complaint before this court that addresses these agreements, or Summerhawk, or
activities on Long Island. Nonetheless, plaintiff seeks relief with regard to
these agreements, specifically, a declaration (in the Sixteenth Cause of Action)
that these agreements are valid and enforceable.

Purchase of Apollo Mall Plaza and 3D Industrial Park (Springhawk Gaming Contracts)

The Unkechaug wanted to open gaming facilities at one or more sites in Sullivan
County. They looked for land that they could identify as "ancestral land,"
believing that they could develop gaming facilities thereon "outside of state and
federal control." (Cplt.P 25.)

In March or April of 2002, Barbanti, Petri, and Young were introduced by
Simermeyer to Carruthers. They sought to convince Carruthers and the Unkechaug
that they could assemble the necessary land and assist in the financing for
multiple gaming contracts. (Cplt.P 26.)

The Unkechaug eventually decided to acquire two parcels of land in Sullivan
County: the Apollo Mall Plaza and the 3D Industrial Park, both located in the
Town of Thompson. (Cplt.PP 27, 28.) The Unkechaug believed that they had
ancestral claims to both of these properties. Id.

Petri, Young, and Barbanti allegedly gave verbal and/or written assurances to
Carruthers and the Unkechaug that the two properties-the Apollo Mall Plaza and 3D
Industrial Park-were owned and controlled by defendant Ancestral Reclamation.
(Cplt.P 30.) Plaintiffs contend that these assurances were untrue, and that in
fact the land underlying the Apollo Mall was owned by the Sullivan County
Industrial Development Agency, while the ground lease on the property was owned by
defendant AP Equity, a company headed by Barbanti that had recently emerged from
bankruptcy. (Cplt.PP 30, 37-38.)

Plaintiffs Carruthers and Springhawk agreed to advance the Tribe the money *457
needed to make a $550,000 initial deposit on these properties, (Cplt.P 29), and
one or more "written memoranda of agreements" were signed by the Unkechaug (as
purchaser), Springhawk (as co-developer of the two properties), and Ancestral (as
seller). (Cplt.P 31.) Pursuant to the agreement, Ancestral was to transfer both
the Apollo Mall Plaza and 3D Industrial Park to the Unkechaug, although Ancestral
was aware that Carruthers and Springhawk were paying the initial deposits.
(Cplt.P 32.)

Mortgage on the Apollo Mall Plaza

During the negotiations, Petri, Young, and Barbanti indicated that the Apollo
Mall property was encumbered with approximately $500,000 in tax and government
liens, and had a mortgage outstanding on the property in favor of the Bank of
Kuwait with a balance of $3,500,000. They allegedly represented that the
mortgage would be settled for a reduced amount. (Cplt.PP 33, 34.) Defendant
Young, a licensed New York attorney, agreed to hold the $550,000 down payment that
had been advanced by Carruthers and Springhawk in escrow pending a formal
settlement of the mortgage. (Cplt.PP 35, 238, 240.)

Plaintiffs allege that the various representations made by Petri, Young, and
Barbanti regarding this mortgage were "almost all untrue." (Cplt.P 36.)

(1) Petri and/or Young and/or Barbanti allegedly represented that the
$3,500,000 mortgage on the Apollo Mall would be settled for a reduced
amount-approximately $1,500,000. (Cplt.PP 33-35.)

(2) Petri and/or Young and/or Barbanti stated that the mortgage against the
property and ground lease of Apollo Mall was owned by the Bank of Kuwait, when in
fact it was owned by a company known as ABC Pacific Realty, LLC, which had taken
an assignment of the mortgage in May 2001. (Cplt.P 39.)

Purported Transfer of Ownership and Subsequent Events

A purported deed for the Apollo Mall Plaza was executed and delivered to the
Unkechaug on April 26, 2002, by AP Equity (signed by Barbanti and notarized by
Young). (Cplt.P 41.) At the time the "deed" was executed and notarized,
Barbanti and Young are alleged to have been aware of the true ownership status of
the property-i.e, that it was not owned by Ancestral. (Cplt.PP 39-41.)

On about May 3, 2002-a week after "selling" the Apollo Mall to the Unkechaug-AP
Equity allegedly purchased the Apollo Mall property from the Sullivan County IDA,
utilizing all or a portion of the escrowed $550,000 deposit to make the payment.
(Cplt.P 43.)

Defendants Petri, Young, and Barbanti never resolved the Apollo Mall Plaza
mortgage claim. (Cplt.P 43.) Instead, on or about May 15, 2002-allegedly with
the assistance of Young and Petri-the mortgage against the Apollo Mall Plaza was
assigned by its real owner, ABC Pacific Realty, LLC, to defendants Gallant,
Sternklar, and LJM Enterprises. (Cplt.PP 44, 45.) Far from compromising the
mortgage for a lesser amount, Gallant, Sternklar, and LJM Enterprises "continued"
the foreclosure action against the Apollo Mall Plaza property (plaintiff's choice
of words suggests that ABC Pacific had already commenced a foreclosure action) and
eventually purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. They now claim
ownership of that property free and clear of any claim by plaintiffs or the
Unkechaugs. (Cplt.P 46.)

According to the complaint, the 3D Industrial Park was never transferred to the
Unkechaug or plaintiffs. (Cplt.P 47.)

*458 The Alleged Tortious Interference: The Operating Agreements

From the date of his introduction to Petri, Young, and Barbanti until May 14,
2002, Carruthers was under the belief that Petri, Young, and Barbanti (as well as
AP Equity and Ancestral) were interested only in the real estate development
aspects and certain financing aspects of the Unkechaugs' gaming plans, not in the
operation or management of the gaming facilities themselves. (Cplt.P 48.)
However, Carruthers belatedly learned that Petri, Young, and Barbanti were engaged
in other activities relating to the Unkechaug. First, he discovered that they
were attempting to convince Simermeyer and Stanley to breach the operating
agreements (of both Springhawk and Summerhawk) by promising them they would earn
"greater fortune" if they breached their contractual obligations to Carruthers.
(Cplt PP 49-50.) According to the complaint, Simermeyer and Stanley succumbed to
these blandishments and breached the Springhawk operating agreement by, inter
alia, inducing Carruthers to advance the $550,000 purchase deposit for the
Sullivan County properties at a time when they had already decided to attempt to
oust Carruthers as the majority member of Springhawk and Summerhawk. (Cplt.P 59.)
This allegedly violated either unspecified terms of the operating agreement or
certain implied contractual obligations of honesty, care, and loyalty. (Cplt.PP
53-54.) In keeping with the complete absence of any factual allegations
regarding Summerhawk or the Long Island projects, the complaint recites no
specific factual allegation about how Simermeyer and Stanley allegedly violated
the Summerhawk operating agreement.

The interfering actions of the AP Equity Defendants also allegedly strained the
relationship between Springhawk and the Unkechaug, and "caused inexcusable delay
and perhaps permanent cancellation in the opening of gaming facilities by the
Unkechaug Indian Nation in Sullivan County and elsewhere." (Cplt.P 60.)

Carruthers anticipated earning some $450,000,000 from the work of Springhawk
and Summerhawk "over the life of the gaming contracts." (Cplt.P 61.) He seeks
damages in that amount from the AP Equity Defendants, jointly and severally, for
inducing the breaches of the operating agreements by Simermeyer and Stanley (First
Cause of Action).

Alleged Tortious Interference: The Gaming Contracts

The Eighth through Fourteenth claims assert that the various groups of
defendants tortiously interfered with Springhawk's and Summerhawk's gaming
contracts with the Unkechaug, as well as with the employment contract of a key
employee of Springhawk's named Bob Kingsley. These claims all incorporate
factual allegations that are pleaded in connection with the Second through Seventh
Causes of Action.

The Eighth Cause of Action is asserted against the AP Equity Defendants as
principals acting for their own benefit. It asserts that they tortiously
interfered with the contracts described above. Despite the verbosity of the
complaint, the actions specified therein as having constituted the tortious
interference are few. The AP Equity Defendants are accused of using inducements,
including offering to fund a "settlement" through which Carruthers would have
given up his majority interest in Springhawk and Summerhawk, to persuade Stanley
and Simermeyer to oust plaintiff from his controlling position in those
corporations. (Cplt.PP 137-38.) They are also accused of making material
misrepresentations in connection with the *459 Tribe's acquisition (or
non-acquisition) of the Apollo Mall and 3D Industrial Park.

Additionally, the Eighth Cause of Action specifically alleges that the AP
Equity Defendants induced the Unkechaug to breach the gaming contracts with
Springhawk and Summerhawk "through persuasion, offering better contractual terms,
and other means (as hereinbefore described)." (Cplt.P 145.) The pleading does
not specifically assert that the defendants entered into a competing gaming
agreement with the Unkechaug-indeed, it contains the extraordinary allegation
that, "the extent of the breach and the Unkechaug Indian Nation's ability to cure
the breach has not yet been determined." (Cplt.P 149.)

Springhawk and Summerhawk seek "the value of the benefit [Springhawk/
Summerhawk] expected to receive under the gaming contracts" as damages for the
alleged tortious interference with the gaming contracts and the Kingsley
employment contract. (Cplt.PP 147, 150-51.) Springhawk claims $250,000,000 in
damages and Summerhawk claims $500,000,000. (Cplt.PP 152-53.)

The Ninth through Fourteenth Causes of Action seek to attribute the actions of
the AP Equity Defendants (as set forth in the Eighth Cause of Action) to the other
three groups of defendants.

The Flaum Defendants: Flaum Management is a real estate development company in
Rochester New York. Its principal is defendant David Flaum.

At some time between 1997 and 2000, defendant David Flaum allegedly began to
acquire property in Sullivan County for the eventual development of gaming and
related facilities. (Cplt.PP 65, 66.) At the time, Flaum was acting in
conjunction with the Cayuga Indian Nation (Cplt.P 64), Barbanti allegedly acted as
Flaum's real estate broker in connection with these purchases, and Petri acted as
the Flaum Defendants' agent in their dealings with local officials in Sullivan
County. (Cplt.PP 67-68.)

As is well known, the Cayuga are not the only tribe interested in casino
development in the Catskills. According to the complaint, there came a point
when Flaum came to believe that his enterprise with the Cayuga was unlikely to
receive the necessary governmental approvals required to open a Catskills casino.
At some point in early 2002, Flaum allegedly became aware of the Unkechaugs' plan
to develop gaming facilities in Sullivan County without any federal or state
approvals or control, and wanted to become involved with this development.
However, because of his existing (and potentially competing) plans with the
Cayuga, Flaum preferred to use intermediaries to deal with the Unkechaugs and
Springhawk. The Flaum Defendants therefore allegedly authorized the AP
Defendants to act as their agents to deal with the Unkechaugs and Springhawk.

The complaint alleges that "Although Petri, Young and Barbanti were also
motivated by self-interest, their actions [concerning the Apollo Mall and 3D
Industrial Park, as alleged above] were allegedly undertaken for the sole or
primary benefit of the Flaum Defendants." FN2 (Cplt.PP 72-75.) In particular,
plaintiffs allege that when Ancestral contracted to transfer the Apollo Mall Plaza
and 3D Industrial Park to the Unkechaugs, the Flaum Defendants were secretly the
controlling shareholders, directors, officers and/or managers of AP Equity (Cplt.P
76), and that Ancestral's *460 commitments under the agreements with Springhawk
and the Unkechaugs "could not have been accomplished without the approval and
active participation of Flaum and Flaum Management." (Cplt.P 78.) Since the
only such commitments pleaded in the complaint are the commitments to transfer the
two properties to the Unkechaugs, as a matter of logic, these transfers would have
to be the "commitments" referred to by plaintiffs at Paragraph 78 of the

FN2. Plaintiffs do not explain how dealings motivated by self-interest can
be undertaken solely for the benefit of someone else, but if I quibbled with
the many illogical statements and non-sequiturs in the complaint I could
never finish this opinion.

The Gallant Defendants: Stanley Gallant is alleged to be a purchaser and
developer of distressed real estate in the New York City area. Gallant allegedly
learned of the pending foreclosure against the Apollo Mall Plaza and the
Unkechaugs' interest in acquiring the property for their gaming facility. Upon
learning of this, and purportedly desiring to develop the Mall into a gaming
facility with the Unkechaugs, Gallant allegedly arranged to purchase the mortgage
from ABC Pacific Realty, and reached an understanding with Flaum that gave him
control over the development of the Apollo Mall Plaza property.

The Galbut Defendants: The discussion of the unacquired 3D Industrial Park
property introduces a new character-Russell Galbut-yet another real estate
developer who purportedly wanted to muscle out Carruthers and do a deal with the
Unkechaugs himself. "Upon information and belief," plaintiff alleges that Galbut
reached an understanding with Flaum and Gallant that gave Galbut control over the
development of 3D Industrial Park-the other parcel the Unkechaugs were supposed to
acquire-as well as the development of 1,800 acres elsewhere in New York FN3 that
the Unkechaugs never contracted to acquire. At some point in March 2002, Galbut
allegedly authorized the AP Equity Defendants to "take the steps hereinbefore
described" in order to rupture the relationship between Carruthers and his
partners. Insofar as their actions involved the 3D Industrial Park and the other
parcel, the AP Defendants were allegedly motivated solely or primarily for the
benefit of Galbut and his company, 3D Associates.FN4

FN3. There is no allegation in the complaint that Springhawk and Summerhawk
ever had any interest in this property. I do not know why there is any
reference to it in the complaint, and I strike all reference to the 1800
acres Mamakating property as surplusage.

FN4. The complaint does not explain what actions the AP Equity Defendants
may have undertaken "solely or primarily" on behalf of the Flaum Defendants;
the actions they allegedly took with regard to the Apollo Mall were
performed "solely or primarily" for Gallant and the actions taken in
connection with the other properties mentioned in the complaint were
performed "solely or primarily" for Galbut.

A claim more or less identical to the Eighth Cause of Action is asserted, in
purely conclusory fashion, against the Flaum Defendants (Ninth Cause of Action)
the Gallant Defendants (Eleventh Cause of Action) and the Galbut Defendants
(Thirteenth Cause of Action). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Flaum
defendants, Gallant, Galbut and 3D Associates authorized the AP Equity Defendants,
acting as their respective agents, to sell land to the Unkechaug and Springhawk
with the intention of interfering with the Springhawk and Summerhawk operating
agreements (Cplt. PP 71, 73, 76, 77)-I presume by thereafter taking the land, via
the mortgage foreclosure route, and thus angering the Unkechaug, who may have
fired the Carruthers-controlled corporations soon *461 after.FN5 Springhawk and
Summerhawk further allege that the Flaum, Gallant and Galbut Defendants authorized
the AP Equity Defendants, acting as their agents, to interfere with the gaming
contracts by: (1) convincing Simermeyer and Stanley to breach their operating
agreements with Carruthers (Cplt.P 137); (2) assisting Simermeyer and Stanley in
their (apparently unsuccessful) efforts to oust Carruthers and assume control of
Springhawk and Summerhawk (Cplt.P 139); and (3) making efforts to induce the
Unkechaugs to ignore gaming contracts with Springhawk and Summerhawk and enter new
contracts with Ancestral (Cplt.P 143).

FN5. Again, I am surmising, in an effort to figure out exactly what is being
alleged here. The complaint says nothing about what the Unkechaug did or
did not do vis a vis the gaming contracts-apparently because, as noted
above, the extent of the Tribe's breach "cannot presently be determined."
Frankly, I do not think Carruthers knows whether the Unkechaug have entered
into a competing contract with any of the named defendants or not. To that
extent, this lawsuit can best be characterized as a fishing expedition.

Alleged Tortious Interference with Employment Contract

The AP Equity Defendants also allegedly induced a key Springhawk employee named
Bob Kingsley to breach his "employment agreement" with Springhawk and to assist
them in operating gaming facilities under new agreements with the Unkechaug. The
alleged employment agreement is not attached to the complaint, but like all the
other agreements, its validity is specifically challenged by the motions for
judgment on the pleadings. In response to a request for a copy of the agreement,
plaintiffs' counsel represented that Kingsley did not have a written employment
contract; that he was hired as a "paid consultant" to advise and manage all
aspects of casino development, as well as certain non-gaming aspects of the
proposed project (setting up restaurants and non-gaming concessions).
Plaintiff's counsel represents that Kingsley was paid as a consultant (not an
employee) at the rate of $15,000-$20,000 per month. Counsel further represents,
"The oral agreement with Mr. Kingsley was open-ended, and the parties contemplated
it would be a permanent arrangement, though the contractual relationship would
presumably have been terminable at will by either party." (Letter of March 16,
2005, at 2). None of this, of course, is set forth in the complaint; indeed,
much of it contradicts what is sketchily pleaded in the complaint.

The three other groups of defendants are alleged to have induced Kingsley to
breach his employment agreement through the actions of the AP Equity Defendants.
(Cplt.PP 144, 146.)

Springhawk does not assert any claim for additional damages as a result of the
alleged interference with Kingsley's contract. It seeks only the estimated value
of what plaintiffs contend they would have received if the terms of the gaming
agreements had been carried out and the gambling and related facilities developed.

Some Speculation

I gather that what may have happened here is that the Unkechaug may have
repudiated their contracts with Springhawk and Summerhawk (which are apparently
still controlled by Carruthers, or he would not be able to maintain a lawsuit on
their behalf). They may have entered contracts with the AP Equity Defendants,
who may or may not be acting as a front for the other three defendant groups as
well as for themselves. Kingsley, who once served as a consultant for Springhawk
and Summerhawk, may no longer be working with Carruthers and his partners and may
be working hand in glove with the defendants*462 and the Unkechaug. The same
may or may not be true of Simermeyer and /or Stanley. It is hard to say.
Plaintiff's pleading is deliberately obtuse about these and other matters.
Fortunately, the only thing I need to deal with here is the validity of the
agreements that are the subject of the tortious interference claims, and that has
nothing to do with any of the above.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs sued the various listed defendants in Sullivan County Supreme Court.
There being complete diversity, the action was removed by defendants on October 2,
2003, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1332(a). Plaintiffs have voluntarily discontinued
their claims against defendant Sullivan County Industrial Development Agency.

The AP Equity, Flaum and Galbut Defendants have answered and moved for judgment
on the pleadings. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

The Gallant Defendants, who did not originally make a dispositive motion,
recently moved for summary judgment dismissing them from the case, on the ground
that they had nothing to do with any of this except to take an assignment of a
mortgage as part of a workout of other deals. Plaintiffs, in a letter from
counsel dated March 16, 2005, state that they do not presently intend to contest
the Gallant motion, but ask to be allowed to take discovery pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) concerning the Gallant Defendants' involvement. The letter
sets out plaintiffs' purported good faith basis for suing the Gallant Defendants.
Counsel asserts that plaintiffs will discontinue the action against the Gallant
Defendants if that discovery shows no involvement on their part in the matters
pleaded in the complaint.


I. Tortious Interference Claims

[1] Under New York law, the elements of a tortious interference with contract
claim are: "(a) that a valid contract exists; (b) that a third party had
knowledge of the contract; (c) that the third party intentionally and improperly
procured the breach of the contract; and (d) that the breach resulted in damage
to the plaintiff." Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir.1996) (citing
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99-100, 151 N.Y.S.2d
1, 5 (1956); Kaminski v. United Parcel Serv., 120 A.D.2d 409, 412, 501 N.Y.S.2d
871, 873 (1st Dep't 1986)).

[2] In the first Fifteen Causes of Action, Carruthers, Springhawk, and
Summerhawk seek relief against various groups of defendants for interfering with
various contracts-the operating agreements, the gaming agreements and the
employment agreement. The threshold issue raised by defendants' motions for
judgment on the pleadings/summary judgment as to each of these claims is whether
the contract that is allegedly interfered with is a valid and enforceable
contract. If the contract upon which recovery is sought is premised on an
illegal purpose, than the contract is void, and it cannot be the subject of a
claim for tortious interference. See e.g., Harris v. Economic Opportunity Com'n
of Nassau County, Inc., 171 A.D.2d 223, 230, 575 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1991);
Nielsen v. Donnelly, 110 Misc. 266, 268, 181 N.Y.S. 509 (Mun. Ct. Manhattan 1920);
see also Hartman v. Harris, 810 F.Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y.1992) ("It is well settled
under New York law that a contract to perform an illegal act is void and
unenforceable.") (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-12, 22 N.E. 188

*463 The contracts that were allegedly tortiously interfered with were (1) the
operating agreements among Carruthers, Simermeyer and Stanley (First Cause of
Action); (2) the gaming contracts between Springhawk, Summerhawk and the
Unkechaug (Eighth through Fourteenth Causes of Action); and (3) the employment
contract between Kingsley and Springhawk (Eighth through Fourteenth Causes of

Defendants contend that all of the contracts at issue here are void because all
are predicated on the Unkechaugs' ability to maintain gaming facilities on their
"ancestral lands." They do not make this argument particularly effectively, so I
will try to make it for them:

1. The gaming agreements are void because they give Springhawk and Summerhawk
the exclusive right to operate and manage any gaming facilities opened by the
Unkechaug Indian Nation in Sullivan County and on Long Island.

2. The operating agreements are void because they contemplate that those
corporations will be formed to engage in illegal activities.

3. The Kingsley employment contract is void and unenforceable because it calls
for him to engage in conduct that is itself illegal-namely, managing and operating
the Unkechaug gaming facilities once they open.

4. Moreover, all the damages sought for the alleged tortious interference,
whether by Carruthers personally or by Springhawk and Summerhawk, are stated to be
the amounts that would allegedly have been earned by those plaintiffs "over the
life of the gaming contracts" from the various illegal operations that the
Unkechaug were supposed to open in partnership with plaintiffs.

Plaintiff argues that all the contracts are perfectly legal, and that
defendants have mischaracterized the nature of at least some of those contracts.

Summary of Conclusions

The two gaming contracts labeled "Agreement A"-the Casino Gaming Management
Agreement between the Unkechaug and Springhawk and the High Stakes Bingo and
Gaming Management Agreement between the Unkechaug and Summerhawk-are
unquestionably illegal, unenforceable and void. The "B" agreements between the
Unkechaug and the two LLCs-otherwise known as the "Economic Development and
Management Agreements"-are also illegal, unenforceable and void because the main
objective of each of those agreements-the "Project" described by those
agreements-is illegal gaming, and the non-gaming development projects contemplated
therein are incidental to that illegal purpose. Defendants are thus entitled to
dismissal of the Eighth through Fifteenth Causes of Action to the extent those
counts allege tortious interference with these gaming contracts or seek an
injunction against further interference with those "contracts."

The non-existent "employment agreement" with Kingsley-which, per counsel's most
recent letter, is apparently a consulting agreement that was designed to lead to
an employment agreement in the future-cannot be interfered with as a matter of New
York law, because the "agreement" is not for a definite term. See, e.g.,
American Preferred Prescription, Inc. v. Health Management, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 414,
417, 678 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1998). That it is also for an illegal purpose, in
that it called for Kingsley to engage in activities relating to illegal gaming, is
icing on the cake. To the extent that the Eighth through Fourteenth Causes of
Action seek redress from anyone for interfering with Kingsley's "employment
contract," they are dismissed with prejudice.

*464 The oral "operating agreement" that formed Springhawk is not valid and
enforceable. The complaint specifically alleges that the corporation Springhawk
was formed for the purpose of developing and managing illegal gaming operations on
the ancestral lands of the Unkechaug. (Cplt.P 18.) No other purpose for
Springhawk is alleged. The operating agreement was thus formed for an illegal
purpose; it can neither be enforced nor interfered with; and the First Cause of
Action is dismissed with prejudice to the extent of the Springhawk operating

Nothing whatever is alleged about the unwritten Summerhawk operating agreement.
Its purpose and terms are nowhere described in the complaint. Moreover, none of
the factual allegations in the complaint concerns the activities of Summerhawk or
that operating agreement. I must, therefore, dismiss any claim relating to the
tortious interference with the Summerhawk operating agreement for failure to state
any claim on which relief can be granted. Ordinarily that dismissal would be
without prejudice. However, as the damages Carruthers seeks to recover for the
alleged interference with the Summerhawk operating agreement are predicated on the
carrying out of the activities described in the Summerhawk gaming agreements, they
cannot be recovered. Thus, dismissal is with prejudice.

The Second through Seventh Causes of Action, which are brought by Carruthers
personally, must be dismissed as well. Although they purport to be claims for
tortious interference with contract, they do not identify any contract to which
Carruthers himself was a party that was subject to interference by any of the
defendants. Carruthers, through his lawyer, has stated that the operating
agreements are not the subject of the Second through Seventh Causes of Action, and
they are the only contracts to which Carruthers personally is a party.

Additionally, all fifteen tortious interference claims must be
dismissed-whether or not the underlying agreements are enforceable-because the
damages sought by plaintiffs cannot be recovered, since they are (1) predicated on
the operation of illegal gaming activity; and (2) utterly speculative. See
Catskill Development, L.L.C. v. Park Place Entertainment Corp., 345 F.Supp.2d 360,
368 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

Last, as the gaming agreements are manifestly illegal, plaintiff's prayer for
declaratory relief that they are valid and enforceable (Sixteenth Cause of Action)
must also be dismissed.

A. The Eighth Through Fifteenth Causes of Action Must be Dismissed

[3] The Eighth through Fifteenth Causes of Action seek relief for tortious
interference with the gaming and employment agreements. These claims must be
dismissed because it is not possible to interfere, tortiously or otherwise, with
any of those contracts.

1. The Gaming Agreements

The "A" Agreements

Each plaintiff LLC entered into an agreement with the Unkechaug concerning the
management of gaming operations -Springhawk in the Catskills and Summerhawk on
Long Island. These contracts, which have been provided to the court by
plaintiffs' counsel, deal solely with the operation and management of gaming
facilities. Because the contemplated facilities cannot be opened legally in New
York State, the "A" agreements are necessarily void.

Pursuant to Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of New York,
no *465 bookmaking or any other kind of gambling is authorized or allowed within
this state, and the legislature is empowered to pass appropriate laws to prevent
offenses against the provisions of this section. Armed with this authority, the
Legislature has enacted Section 991 of the Penal Law, which reads: "All wagers,
bets or stakes, made to depend upon any race, or upon any gaming by lot or chance,
or upon any lot, chance, casualty, or unknown or contingent event whatever, shall
be unlawful."

The "A" agreements anticipate the development of casino gambling on Unkechaug
land in Sullivan County (Springhawk), and high stakes bingo and other gaming on
Long Island (Summerhawk). This activity is patently unlawful under New York's

There are limited exceptions to the general prohibition on gaming under New
York State law. Two articles of the General Municipal Law-Art. 9-A (games of
chance licensing law) and Art. 14-H (bingo licensing law)-permit "authorized
organizations" to engage in certain types of otherwise illegal gaming. Under
both of these laws, "exempt organizations" are defined as any:

bona fide religious or charitable organization or bona fide educational,
fraternal or service organization or bona fide veterans or volunteer firemen ...
provided that each shall operate without profit to its members, and provided
that each such organization has engaged in serving one of the lawful purposes as
defined in this article for a period of three years immediately prior to
applying for a license.

Art. 9-A, s 186(4); Art. 14-H, s 476(4). The "lawful purposes" identified in
both laws are limited to: "[benefitting] needy or deserving persons indefinite in
number by enhancing their opportunity for religious or educational advancement, by
relieving them of disease, suffering or distress, or by contributing to their
physical well being" (s 186(5)(a)), "initiate, perform or foster worthy public
works or ... further the erection or maintenance of public structures" (s
186(5)(b)), "those who lessen the burdens borne by government or ... voluntarily
... augment or supplement services which government would normally render to the
people" (s 186(5)(c)), "initiate perform or foster the provision of services to
veterans" (s 186(5)(d)). The limited types of gaming authorized by these statutes
include bingo and games of chance other than bingo or lotto. See e.g, Dalton v.
Pataki, 11 A.D.3d 62, 82, 780 N.Y.S.2d 47 (3rd Dep't 2004); Harris v. Economic
Opportunity Com'n of Nassau County, Inc., 142 Misc.2d 980, 981, 542 N.Y.S.2d 913
(2d Dep't 1989). Neither casino gambling nor high stakes bingo are authorized by
these limited exceptions.

The complaint does not allege that the Unkechaug Nation qualifies as an "exempt
organization" under either of these exceptions, or that it holds any license from
the New York State Racing and Wagering Board that would allow it to conduct any
gaming activity. And that is not the plaintiffs' argument. Rather, they argue
that the Tribe is a sovereign nation (albeit not one recognized by the United
States government), and so can operate gaming facilities on its "ancestral lands"
without interference from either the state or federal government. See Pl.
Consolidated Answering Brief at 4-5.

Plaintiffs are wrong. Because the Unkechaug are not federally-recognized, the
are neither sovereign nor can they claim preemption from state laws forbidding
gambling that is extended to federally-recognized tribes by the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. ss 2701, et seq. And lacking both sovereignty
and the benefit of IGRA preemption,*466 they are subject to New York's strict
prohibition against gaming, just like anyone else.

It is well settled that tribes recognized by the United States Government as
sovereign nations can avoid state law prohibitions on gaming. In California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244
(1987), the United States Supreme Court allowed two federally recognized Indian
tribes located in California to conduct high-stakes bingo on their reservation,
even though such activity violated California law. The tribes' status as
federally recognized was critical to the court's reasoning. The federal government
had granted the Indian tribe sovereignty with the goal of encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development. Id. at 216-17, 107 S.Ct. 1083. The
Supreme Court concluded that State regulation would impermissibly infringe on the
tribe's self-governance. Id. at 221-22, 107 S.Ct. 1083.

In response to Cabazon, Congress enacted IGRA. IGRA permits different types of
gaming, including casino gambling, on Indian lands-defined as lands within the
limits of an Indian reservation or land which is held in trust by the United
States for the benefit of an Indian tribe (25 U.S.C. s 2703(4))-under specified
conditions. The act classifies gaming activities into three different
categories. Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over Class I gaming, which
includes social games and traditional forms of Indian gaming connected to tribal
ceremonies. 25 U.S.C. ss 2703(6), 2719(a)(1). Class II gaming-basically bingo,
together with similar games-can be conducted by tribes subject to regulation by
the National Indian Gaming Commission ("NIGC"). 25 U.S.C. ss 2703(7), 2710(b).
Pursuant to IGRA, high-stakes bingo and slot machines-the type of gaming
contemplated by the "A" agreement between Summerhawk and the Unkechaug-may only be
conducted by a federally recognized Indian tribe on lands that the federal
government defines as Indian lands, unless the state otherwise permits such
activity. New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F.Supp.2d 1, 6
(E.D.N.Y.2003); 25 U.S.C. s 2710(d)(1). All other gaming activity (including
both electronic gaming devices and traditional casino games, such as card tables,
craps, roulette, and slot machines) qualifies as Class III gaming. 25 U.S.C. s
2703(8). Tribes can undertake Class III gaming on ancestral lands or land
acquired by the United States and held in trust for benefit of the tribe only
after entering into a "compact" with the host state. 25 U.S.C. s 2710(d)(3).
These compacts define which types of Class III gaming activities the Tribes can
conduct, and usually provide that a portion of the gaming revenues will go to the
State. Any compact between a state and the Tribe must be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. s 2710(d)(3)(B). See Catskill Development,
L.L.C. v. Park Place Entertainment Corp., 144 F.Supp.2d 215, 218-19

IGRA preempts state anti-gaming laws, but only to the extent of its
application. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Village of Union Springs, 317
F.Supp.2d 128, 148 (N.D.N.Y.2004); see also First American Casino Corp. v.
Eastern Pequot Nation, 175 F.Supp.2d 205, 209 (D.Conn.2000) (citing State ex rel.
Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir.1999)), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1039, 119 S.Ct. 2400, 144 L.Ed.2d 799 (1999); Gaming Corp. of America v.
Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir.1996). In particular, IGRA applies only to
the activities of federally recognized tribes. See First Am. Casino, 175
F.Supp.2d at 208; Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 792 n. 4 (1st
Cir.1996) ("[IGRA] has no application*467 to tribes that do not seek and attain
formal federal recognition.").

The Unkechaug are not a federally recognized tribe. Therefore, IGRA provides
no exception for the Unkechaugs from the general prohibition on gambling in New
York State. See Scutti Enterprises, LLC. v. Park Place Entertainment Corp., 322
F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003).

Plaintiffs contend that, because they do not fall within the ambit of IGRA, the
Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon permits the tribe to conduct whatever gaming
it likes on its ancestral lands. But they are wrong, for two reasons.

First, Cabazon itself applies only to gaming activities conducted by
federally-recognized Indian tribes on land that the federal government recognizes
as reservation land. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 204-05, 107 S.Ct. 1083. In Cabazon,
the federal government had granted the Indian tribe sovereignty, and, on that
basis, the Court concluded that state regulation would impermissibly infringe on
their right of self-governance. Id. at 221-22, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Cabazon by its
terms has no applicability to this case, which involves a tribe that is not
federally recognized as a sovereign nation, and whose ancestral lands have not
been recognized by the federal government. Gaming activities on land that is not
federally recognized as tribal lands remains within the State's historic right to
regulate this controversial type of economic activities. See State ex rel.
Nixon, supra, 164 F.3d at 1108-09 (holding that gaming activity by Indians
conducted off federally recognized tribal land is subject to regulation by the
state); see also Matter of 1,750 Cases of Liquor, 166 Misc.2d 739, 745, 633
N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup.Ct. Oneida County 1995) (holding that because there is no
tradition of sovereign immunity that favors the Indians in distributing alcohol,
and because the activity may have a substantial impact beyond the reservation, the
tribe was subjected to New York State liquor laws) (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463
U.S. 713, 724-25, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983)).

Second, Plaintiffs' contention that the Unkechaug enjoy sovereign immunity
despite the Tribe's lack of federal recognition is meritless. Whether a tribe is
recognized as sovereign is determined by application to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA"). See Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F.Supp.2d at 7-8; 25 C.F.R.
Part 83. The Unkechaugs have never been recognized by the BIA. Recognition by
New York State does not confer sovereignty; a state cannot conduct foreign
policy. Shinnecock, supra, 280 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding that issues of sovereignty
and immunity are matters of federal law).

Absent federal recognition, the Unkechaug do not enjoy sovereign immunity.
The tribe must, therefore, comply with all New York State laws, including the
State's prohibition on gambling. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v.
Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59-60 (2d Cir.1994) (refusing to grant a state-recognized
tribe sovereign immunity absent recognition by the BIA); see also Shinnecock
Indian Nation, 280 F.Supp.2d at 8-9; Western Shoshone Bus. Council, Edwards,
McCoy & Kennedy, P.C. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (10th Cir.1993). Since
the "A" Agreements call for plaintiffs to manage patently illegal gaming
operations on behalf of the Unkechaug, they are void and unenforceable.

The "B" Agreements

The "B" agreements are called "economic development and management" agreements.
The recitals in each such agreement relate to both gaming operations and
"non-gaming enterprises." To the extent that the "B" agreements relate to gaming
operations, they are clearly invalid and *468 unenforceable. To the extent that
they call for the development of non-gaming enterprises, they could, in theory, be
valid and enforceable-but only as long as that non-gaming development is not
incidental to a primary illegal purpose.

[4] "Where an agreement consists in part of an unlawful objective and in part
of lawful objectives, the court may sever the illegal aspects and enforce the
legal ones, so long as the illegal aspects are incidental to the legal aspects and
are not the main objective of the agreement." Donnell v. Stogel, 161 A.D.2d 93,
97-98, 560 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1990) (citations omitted). However, where the
main objective of an agreement is illegal, courts will not sever and enforce
incidental legal clauses. Id.; see also McCall v. Frampton, 81 A.D.2d 607,
698-09, 438 N.Y.S.2d 11 (2d Dep't 1981); Rose v. Elias, 177 A.D.2d 415, 416, 576
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1st Dep't 1991).

[5] That gaming is the main objective behind the "B" agreements-not just some
incidental aspect to perfectly legal activity-is easily seen when one reads the
preamble to the "B" agreements (which are identical except as to party and

Whereas Nation is a Sovereign Nation with Reservation Lands and

Whereas Nation is now the owner of the property located at Unkechaug Indian
Nation Reservation surrounded by the State of New York (Reservation), and

Whereas the Nation is desirous of developing and operating full scale (High
Stakes Bingo and Gaming Facilities on land to be acquired by the Nation at
Schodack, New York/Class II and Class III gaming facilities (Gaming
Facilities)), on land to be acquired by the Nation at Long Island, New York
[Springhawk and Summerhawk "B" Agreements, respectively] and to be declared
Territory of the Nation, such property is hereinafter sometimes referred to as
Property, and

Whereas Nation is desirous of developing the Property to enhance and increase
Nation revenues and undertake Nation economic development so as to increase
Nation self-sufficiency and Nation self-government, and

Whereas the Nation is seeking financing and financial and technical expertise
for such economic development and the operation of developed facilities on the
above-referenced Property, and

Whereas Nation is desirous of vesting in SH and hereby assigns the irrevocable
and exclusive right to develop and operate, for the Nation by and through
various entities to be created by SH and, in accordance with Tribal/State Gaming
Compact to be negotiated and entered into with the State of New York if such
Compact is appropriate and required by law, the Gaming Facilities on the
Property to be acquired by the Nation at Schodack, NY/ Long Island, N.Y.
[Springhawk and Summerhawk "B" Agreements, respectively]; and

Whereas SH is desirous of performing the development and management of such
gaming facility and non gaming enterprises on the Property, with its affiliates
and with third parties to be named by SH ....

In the body of each "B" agreement, the Unkechaug purport to give the
contraparty LLC (Springhawk or Summerhawk) the exclusive and irrevocable right to
develop and manage the relevant gaming facilities (Class II and III Gaming
Facilities on Long Island for Summerhawk; High Stakes Bingo and Gaming Facilities
(including Class II and Class III gaming) at Schodack for Springhawk), together
with other non-gaming facilities and activities *469 relating to the gaming
facilities and "such other economic and development activities as shall be
determined and further agreed upon, from time to time, by SH and Nation as these
projects develop." (Emphasis added). The critical word here is "projects,"
because the word "project" is a defined term in the "B" Agreements. "Section II"
of the agreements is entitled "PROJECT," and it describes what the "project" is
for purposes of the Agreement:

The Nation will operate the Unkechaug Indian Gaming Facility on prime land in
[Schodack, New York/ Long Island, New York]. The Casino gaming area will be
approximately [60,000/250,000] square feet and contain all gaming as such as
those in Las Vegas gaming facilities .... (Springhawk and Summerhawk "B"
Agreements, respectively.)

It thus appears from the text of these agreements that all of the economic
development contemplated therein-including the various non-gaming facilities and
services-are tied to the development of the patently illegal gaming "Project."
Because the main object of these agreements is illegal, the law will not sever and
enforce any tangential "legal" aspects of the "B" agreements. The "B" agreements
are entirely void.

2. The Employment Agreement

[6] The Eighth through Fourteenth Causes of Action also purport to allege
tortious interference with Kingsley's employment contract.

It turns out that, complaint notwithstanding, there is no Kingsley employment
contract. When asked to produce a copy of the agreement, so its validity could
be determined, counsel sent a letter representing that Kingsley had an
"open-ended" oral consulting agreement, which was designed to lead to a permanent
arrangement in the future, but which was terminable at will by either party. It
is not possible to interfere with an agreement for employment or services that is
terminable at will. American Preferred Prescription, Inc. v. Health Management,
Inc., 252 A.D.2d 414, 417, 678 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1998) (citing Guard-Life
Corp. v. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 191-92, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406
N.E.2d 445 (1980)) (holding contracts for an indefinite term are terminable at
will, by either party, and are therefore classified as only prospective
contractual relations, and thus cannot support a claim for tortious interference
with existing contracts).

For the above reasons, the Eighth through Fifteenth Causes of Action, which
seek damages for the defendants' allegedly tortious interference with the gaming
and employment agreements, are dismissed.

B. The First Cause of Action, for Tortious Interference with the Operating
Agreement, Must be Dismissed

[7] The First Cause of Action, brought by Carruthers as the sole named
plaintiff, relates to the AP Equity Defendants' alleged tortious interference with
the operating agreements.

As noted above, the Springhawk agreement was oral rather than written. The
only term specifically pleaded in the complaint is the relative ownership share in
Springhawk of the three principals of the LLC. However, Carruthers is bound by the
allegations of his complaint, and the complaint specifically alleges that
Springhawk was formed to develop and operate high-stakes bingo and other gaming
facilities in Sullivan County, New York on ancestral land of the Unkechaug Indian
Nation (Cplt.P 18), and that its members entered into an operating agreement
shortly after the LLC was formed for that purpose (Cplt.P 21). Since
Springhawk's*470 stated corporate purpose was illegal, any agreement formed to
operate Springhawk is unenforceable. Therefore, the First Cause of Action is
dismissed with prejudice insofar as it relates to the Springhawk agreement.

No such allegation of illicit purpose is asserted as to Summerhawk. In fact,
nothing of any substance is alleged about Summerhawk-including how anyone
allegedly interfered with the Summerhawk operating agreement. The First Cause of
Action is dismissed insofar as it relates to Summerhawk for failure to state any
claim on which relief can be granted.

[8][9] Ordinarily, this claim would be dismissed without prejudice. However,
it must be dismissed with prejudice, because Carruthers cannot recover the damages
he seeks-for two reasons. First, they are predicated on the completion of
illegal activity-the bringing to fruition of the gaming contracts-and are not
recoverable for that reason alone. Harris, supra, 171 A.D.2d at 229, 575 N.Y.S.2d
672 (citing Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948)). Second, these
"lost profits" damages are far too speculative predicated as they are on the
coming to fruition of a project that is (1) presently illegal; and (2) uncertain
of accomplishment; and (3) predictive of a wholly new business enterprise, with
no track record of accomplishment.

Under New York law, lost profits are recoverable as an element of damages only
where they result as the natural and probable consequence of a tortious act.
See, e.g., 342 Holding Corp. v. Carlyle Construction Corp., 31 A.D.2d 605, 295
N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (1st Dep't 1968); Hughes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 98
Misc.2d 667, 414 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup.Ct. Livingston County 1979). This means that
lost profits may be recovered only if plaintiffs prove them with reasonable
certainty and without speculation. See Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 20, 19
N.E.2d 661 (1939); Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150,
154-155, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (4th Dep't 1976); Paduano v. State, 203 A.D. 503, 505,
196 N.Y.S. 804 (4th Dep't 1922); Veverka v. Spinella, 60 Misc.2d 529, 303
N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup.Ct. Green County 1969).

The lost profits sought by Carruthers for tortious interference with the
Summerhawk operating agreement (or the Springhawk agreement, for that matter) are
based on profits they expected to receive as a result of the LLC's gaming
contracts with the Unkechaug. In order for those contracts to be legally
enforceable, and the contemplated gaming projects to come to fruition, a number of
hurdles would have to be surmounted, including but hardly limited to obtaining:
(1) federal recognition, (2) National Indian Gaming Commission approval, and (3) a
state gaming compact. It appears that none of these is even in the works, since
plaintiffs were relying on the Unkechaugs' non-existent sovereignty to get them
around both state and federal regulation. This ruling eliminates those hopes.
Plaintiffs cannot even estimate how long it would take them to accomplish the
results they had hoped to achieve without government interference, and they cannot
predict that they will be able to obtain the approvals they require. Therefore,
they cannot establish that the claimed damages were the result of the alleged
interference with the operating agreements. (see, e.g., Steitz, supra, 280 N.Y. at
20, 19 N.E.2d 661). As damage is an element of tortious interference with
contract, the First Cause of Action must be dismissed with prejudice, even insofar
as it relates to the factually vague allegations of interference with the
Summerhawk*471 operating agreement.FN6

FN6. Every other claim for tortious interference could be dismissed on the
same theory.

C. The Second Through Seventh Causes of Action Must Be Dismissed

[10] Like the First Cause of Action, the Second through Seventh Causes of
Action are brought by Carruthers, not by Springhawk or Summerhawk. They, too,
allege tortious interference. The question is-tortious interference with what?

Causes of Action Two through Seven do not specify what contracts the various
defendants allegedly interfered with. I originally thought that plaintiff was
trying-inartfully-to allege that the Flaum Defendants, the Gallant Defendants and
the Galbut Defendants, acting through the AP Equity Defendants, had somehow
induced Simermeyer and Stanley to breach their duty to Carruthers under the
Springhawk and Summerhawk operating agreements. That made some sense, since
Carruthers was the only party plaintiff in the Second through Seventh Causes of
Action, and the only contracts alleged in the complaint to which he personally was
party were the operating agreements.

However, in plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, Carruthers asserts that the First
Cause of Action is "unrelated to the next 15 causes of action." (Pl. Consolidated
Answering Brief at 12-13.) I accept Carruthers' clarification of his pleading,
and I therefore conclude-contrary to my initial belief-that Claims Two through
Seven have nothing to do with any alleged tortious interference with the operating
agreements. Otherwise, they would be "related" to the First Cause of Action.

What this means is that the Second through Seventh Causes of Action must be
dismissed. To plead tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must first
and foremost plead that one is a party to a valid contract with which someone
interfered. The only contracts that Carruthers can claim tortious interference
with are the two oral operating agreements among him, Simermeyer and Stanley.
The complaint does not allege that Carruthers is a party to the gaming agreements
or to Kingsley's employment contract, and after reviewing the gaming agreements
(both "A" and "B") and counsel's description of Kingsley's oral consulting
agreement, it is apparent that no such allegation could be made. Since
Carruthers eschews any suggestion that the Second through Seventh Causes of Action
relate to the alleged interference with the only agreements to which he is party,
he fails to allege the existence of any agreements with which anyone could have
tortiously interfered, and the Second through Seventh Causes of Action must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.FN7

FN7. If they were not dismissed on that ground, they would be dismissed for
the same reason, and to the same extent, as the First Cause of Action.

D. The Sixteenth Cause of Action, for Declaratory Judgment, Must Be Dismissed As

Finally, in the Sixteenth Cause of Action, plaintiffs seek a declaration that
the gaming agreements are valid and enforceable contracts. Since they manifestly
are not, this claim must be dismissed.

II. The Separate Motion by the Flaum Defendants for Judgment on the Pleadings

A. The Eighteenth Cause of Action (Breach of Contract)

[11] The Eighteenth cause of action is by Springhawk against all the
defendants. *472 It asserts that the Flaum, Galbut and Gallant Defendants,
acting through the AP Equity Defendants, breached the contract between Ancestral
and Springhawk for the transfer of the Apollo Mall Plaza by failing to settle the
outstanding mortgage claim and/or to pay the balance of the mortgage. (Cplt.PP
203, 208-09.) Springhawk also alleges that Ancestral breached its contract with
Springhawk by failing to deliver title to the 3D Industrial Park. (Cplt.P 204.)
Finally, Springhawk alleges that AP Equity breached its implied and/or express
contract with Springhawk to deliver clear and marketable title to the Apollo Mall
Plaza. (Cplt.PP 205, 206.) The complaint alleges that the actions of the AP
Equity defendants occurred within the scope of their employment and agency for the
Flaum, Gallant and Galbut Defendants. (Cplt.P 210.)

The Flaum Defendants move to dismiss the Eighteenth cause of action as against

The essential elements of an action for breach of contract under New York law
are (1) formation of a contract between the parties, (2) plaintiff's performance,
(3) defendant's failure to perform, and (4) resulting damages to plaintiff. Guity
v. Martinez, 03 Civ. 6266(LAP), 2004 WL 1145832, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (citing
Startech, Inc. v. VSA Arts, 126 F.Supp.2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y.2000)). It is also
"well established that a plaintiff in a breach of contract action 'may not assert
a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract against a party with
who it is not in privity.' " Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovenia, 984 F.Supp.
209, 215 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting Perma Pave Contracting Corp. v. Paerdegat Boat &
Racquet Club, Inc., 156 A.D.2d 550, 551, 549 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (2d Dep't 1989)).

The Complaint does not identify or allege the existence of any contracts
between the Flaum Defendants and Springhawk. However, springhawk alleges that AP
Equity and Ancestral acted as agents of the Flaum defendants, and that the alleged
principal-agency relationship establishes the requisite privity for this cause of
action to survive the motion to dismiss. See Huntington Pennysaver, Inc. v. Tire
Supply Corp. of Long Island, 59 Misc.2d 268, 269, 298 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1969) (holding principal liable for the authorized contracts made
by his agents with a third party) (citing Restatement, 2d, Agency, s 146). The
same is true if the principal was undisclosed. See Industrial Mfrs., Inc. v.
Bangor Mills, Inc., 283 A.D. 113, 121, 126 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dept.1953)
("plaintiff [ ]has the right to hold the principal liable when finally disclosed")
(citing Restatement, 2d, Agency, s 186). Because on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings I must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and draw all
inferences in Springhawk's favor (see Desiderio, supra, 191 F.3d at 202), I must
deny the motion to dismiss this claim.

B. The Twenty First Cause of Action (Fraud and Misrepresentation):

[12] In the Twenty First cause of action Springhawk alleges fraud and
misrepresentation by the Flaum Defendants, Gallant, Galbut and 3D Associates for
the actions taken by their agents-AP Equity, Ancestral, Petri, Young and Barbanti.

FN8. The twentieth and twenty-second causes of action are directly against
AP Equity, Ancestral, Petri, Young and Barbanti for fraud and
misrepresentation concerning the ownership and control of the Apollo Plaza,
3D Industrial Park, and other properties that they allegedly caused
plaintiffs to rely upon in purchasing such properties (Cplt.PP 217-18), and
for all acts taken in furtherance of the agency-principle relationship with
the Flaum defendants, Gallant, Galbut and 3D Associates. (Cplt.P 228.)

*473 Springhawk claims that the AP Equity Defendants knowingly made false made
representations of fact to it regarding the ownership and control of the Apollo
Plaza Mall, 3D Industrial Park, and other properties, and the status of liens and
mortgages against these properties. (Cplt.P 217.) Springhawk also alleges that
the defendants intended for it to rely on these representations in deciding to
purchase properties and enter into real estate development contracts. (Cplt.P
218.) Springhawk claims that as a result of these misrepresentations, it
incurred losses primarily for the "delay and possible cancellation in opening the
gaming facilities." (Cplt.P 221.) Springhawk also claims damages which are not
gaming related, such as the loss of a $550,000 purchase deposit for the
properties. (Id.)

Construing the allegations of the complaint most favorably to Springhawk, this
claim alleges that, based on certain misrepresentations, Springhawk put down money
toward the purchase of a piece of property; the purchase went awry; and its
money was used by another party to buy the property for the benefit of a third
party. There is no allegation in the complaint that misrepresentations were made
concerning gaming opportunities-rather, the complaint alleges that
misrepresentations were made concerning the true ownership of the property and the
status of the mortgage. In a complaint where little else makes sense, this makes
sense. Whether it is true or not is another matter entirely-and is, at this
point in the litigation, irrelevant.

To the extent that the Flaum Defendants' motion is predicated on the fact that
Springhawk and the Unkechaug intended to use the properties they purchased for
gaming-a purpose that could not be realized-is of no moment, except possibly as to
the measure of Springhawk's damages. While the millions upon millions of dollars
in damages sought by plaintiff are, for the reasons stated above, not recoverable,
it is conceivable that Springhawk could recover some damages resulting from the
busted land deal. It allegedly put a substantial sum of money-$550,000-toward
the purchase of a property that is now owned by someone else. Its down payment
was allegedly used by another party to purchase the land. Whether the Flaum
Defendants had anything whatever to do with that will be sorted out in discovery.

The Flaum Defendants also move to dismiss this claim for failure to plead fraud
with particularity. I deny this motion as well. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff asserting a fraud claim to do so with
particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Under prevailing standards in this
Circuit, when a complaint charges fraud, "It must (1) detail the statements ...
that the plaintiff contends are fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state
where and when the statements ... were made, and (4) explain why the statements
... are fraudulent." Olsen v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 136 F.3d 273, 275 (2d
Cir.1998) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir.1996)). The
Complaint must also allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of
fraudulent intent. It can do so by (1) alleging facts to show that the
defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or by (2) alleging
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness. S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Tricon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d
629, 634 (2d Cir.1996). "The primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to afford the
defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's *474 claim and the factual ground upon
which it is based." Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir.1990).

Insofar as the misrepresentations are alleged against the AP Equity Defendants,
they are alleged with sufficient particularity. The Flaum Defendants are not
alleged to have made any misrepresentations. However, the complaint alleges that
the AP Equity Defendants made the particularized fraudulent allegations on behalf
of the Flaum Defendants, making them liable therefor. Since the complaint
satisfies Rule 9(b) with regard to the AP Equity Defendants, I decline to dismiss
this claim against the Flaum Defendants.

This is no endorsement of the ultimate viability of Springhawk's claim. I
have elsewhere referred to the complaint as a fishing expedition. The following
statement in plaintiffs' Consolidated Answering Brief-"Completion of discovery may
well result in the voluntary dismissal of the fraud claim as against one or more
defendants" (Pl. Consolidated Answering Brief at 17)-does not inspire great
confidence that Springhawk knows what it is talking about. Plaintiffs began this
action in the State Supreme Court, but they are now in Federal Court and they are
not going anywhere. They and their lawyer leave themselves open to the
imposition of serious sanctions if it turns out that these allegations of agency
are pie in the sky.

However, at least one of the alleged misrepresentations-that the mortgage on
the Apollo Mall would be settled for a lesser amount-is not actionable for a
different reason. The complaint does not allege that this statement was untrue
at the time it was made. In the absence of such an allegation, all that is
alleged is a promise to do something in the future, which will not support a claim
of fraud. Weinstein v. Appelbaum, 193 F.Supp.2d 774, 778-79 (S.D.N.Y.2002)
(citing Champion Titanium Horseshoe, Inc. v. Wyman-Gordon Inv. Castings, Inc., 925
F.Supp. 188, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).

C. Twenty-Fifth Cause of Action (Piercing the Corporate Veil)

[13] The twenty-fifth cause of action asks the court to pierce the corporate
veil of Ancestral and AP Equity and to conclude that Gallant, Flaum, Flaum
Management, Galbut, 3D Associates, Petri, Young and Barbanti are liable for the
sins of those corporations. Flaum and Flaum Management have moved for judgment
on the pleadings to dismiss this cause of action.

New York law does not recognize a separate cause of action to pierce the
corporate veil. See e.g., Fiber Consultants v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp.,
15 A.D.3d 528, 792 N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep't 2005) (citing Matter of Morris v. New
York State Dept. of Taxation and Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623
N.E.2d 1157 (1993)); H & R Project Associates, Inc. v. City of Syracuse, et al.,
289 A.D.2d 967, 968, 737 N.Y.S.2d 712 (4th Dep't 2001); 9 East 38th Street
Associates, L.P. v. George Feher Associates, Inc., 226 A.D.2d 167, 168, 640
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1st Dep't 1996). For that reason alone, the Twenty-Fifth Cause of
Action must be dismissed. Moreover, it must be dismissed as against all the
defendants, not just the Flaum Defendants.

III. The Separate Motion by the Gallant Defendants for Summary Judgment

In addition to naming Gallant as a defendant in several of the tortious
interference claims, Gallant is named individually as a defendant in five other
causes of action and along with the other Gallant Defendants in one other. The
Gallant Defendants have moved for summary judgment*475 to dismiss each of these
claims. Most of the claims against Gallant as an individual are premised on the
plaintiffs' assertion that the AP Equity Defendants were authorized to act on
Gallant's behalf. (Cplt.PP 100, 102-03.) Plaintiff alleges that "[a]ll of the
actions taken by and representations made by [the AP Equity Defendants] occurred
with the express authority, apparent authority or subsequent ratification of
Gallant" and "within the scope of their employment and agency for Gallant."
(Cplt.P 110-11.)

A. The Eighteenth (Breach of Contract) & Twenty-First (Fraud and
misrepresentation) Causes of Action

[14] The Eighteenth and Twenty-First Causes of Action against Gallant are
identical to the same claims as asserted against the Flaum Defendants. For the
same reason that I could not grant the Flaum Defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings dismissing these claims, I cannot grant the Gallant Defendants'
premature motion for summary judgment.

The Gallant Defendants deny that an agency relationship existed between the AP
Equity Defendants and Gallant. See Gallant Defendants' Memorandum of Law in
Support of Summary Judgment at 8. Plaintiffs' counsel invokes Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)
to seek an adjournment of this motion. (Letter of March 16, 2005.) Counsel
represents that, that if additional facts could not be uncovered, plaintiffs will
voluntarily dismiss the claims against the Gallant defendants. Id.

I will deny the motion without prejudice, pending discovery, as contemplated by
Rule 56(f). However, Springhawk and its lawyer are on notice: the rationale for
suing the Gallant Defendants that is described in counsel's Rule 56(f) response
strikes me as thin. In the event that discovery fails to yield any evidence of
the alleged agency relationship, I will be open to a motion from the Gallant
Defendants for sanctions against Springhawk and counsel, in an amount sufficient
to cover the full cost to them of the discovery sought by plaintiff.

B. Twenty-Sixth Cause of Action (Constructive Trust)

In the Twenty-Sixth cause of action, Springhawk sues 3D Associates and Gallant,
seeking imposition of a constructive trust against the Apollo Mall Plaza and 3D
Industrial Park in favor of Springhawk to the extent of $550,000. (Cplt.P 283.)

[15] It is well settled that in order to set forth a valid cause of action to
impose a constructive trust, the following four elements must be alleged: "(1) a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, express or implied, (3) a
transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment." See e.g., In re
Urdang, 304 A.D.2d 586, 586, 758 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 2003); see also Sharp v.
Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72, 351 N.E.2d 721 (1976); Cilibrasi
v. Gagliardotto, 297 A.D.2d 778, 779, 747 N.Y.S.2d 801 (2d Dep't 2002); Gottlieb
v. Gottlieb, 166 A.D.2d 413, 414, 560 N.Y.S.2d 477 (2d Dep't 1990).

[16] Plaintiffs allege that Springhawk, Ancestral, and the Unkechaug Indian
Nation shared a confidential relationship based on agreements amongst the parties
and the nature of their joint ventures. (Cplt.P 276.) But the only agreement
between Springhawk and Ancestral that is relevant to the Twenty Sixth Cause of
Action is the contract pursuant to which Ancestral agreed to transfer the 3D
Industrial Park and Apollo Mall Plaza to the Unkechaug, and to settle all of the
outstanding mortgages and liens against the Apollo Mall Plaza. (Cplt.P 277.)
Plaintiffs *476 further allege that the $550,000 purchase deposit made to
Ancestral-made in reliance on the promise that both properties would be
transferred to the Unkechaug-constituted payment to Gallant and 3D Associates, for
whom Ancestral was allegedly acting as an agent. (Cplt.PP 278-79.)

Aside from the fact that Springhawk was not intended to be the purchaser of the
land that was eventually transferred to 3D Associates and Gallant, the viability
of this claim depends on two "reaches." First, it depends on finding an agency
relationship between the defendants and Ancestral (or the AP Equity Defendants).
I have already ruled that plaintiff can take discovery on this allegation. I
remind plaintiff and counsel of the warning I have already issued.

Second, an arm's length contractual relationship between parties does not give
rise to a fiduciary relationship. See e.g., Cuomo v. Mahopac Nat. Bank, 5 A.D.3d
621, 622, 774 N.Y.S.2d 779, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 02154 (2d Dep't 2004) (citing River
Glen Assoc. v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 295 A.D.2d 274, 743 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1st
Dep't 2002); WIT Holding Corp. v. Klein, 282 A.D.2d 527, 724 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2d
Dep't 2001); Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st
Dep't 1998)). It does not appear, from the allegations of the complaint, that
the contract among Springhawk, Ancestral, and the Unchechaugs created any sort of
fiduciary relationship amongst the parties to that agreement. Even viewing those
allegations in a manner favorable to Springhawk, it is difficult to see where the
fiduciary aspect of the relationship might be. Springhawk does insert the words
"joint venture" into the complaint (Cplt.P 276), which I take to be an effort to
make this real estate deal look less like a commercial contract and more like a
fiduciary relationship. I decline to award summary judgment to the Gallant
Defendants on this claim at this juncture, subject to the same caveat as above.

C. Twenty-Seventh Cause of Action (Unjust Enrichment; Resulting Trust)

[17] In the Twenty-Seventh Cause of Action, Springhawk sues the Gallant
Defendants for either the imposition of a resulting trust against the Apollo Mall
Plaza to the extent of $300,000 or the value of any actual tax lien payments or,
in the alternative, a money award of $300,000 against the Gallant Defendants for
unjust enrichment. (Cplt.PP 293, 294.)

The essence of this cause is plaintiffs' allegation that AP Equity and
Ancestral took $300,000 of the money it received from Springhawk and applied it
towards payment of the tax liens on the Apollo Mall Plaza. (Cplt.P 285.)
Springhawk believed that the money would be applied to tax liens (as it was), but
assumed that it would obtain the third party benefit of such payment when the
property was transferred to the Unkechaugs. (Cplt.P 288.) However, Springhawk
alleges that when the Gallant defendants purchased the Apollo Mall Plaza at the
foreclosure sale, the Gallant Defendants' received unencumbered title to the
property. (Cplt.P 290.) Springhawk alleges that the Gallant Defendants'
equitable interest in the property has been increased by the tax lien payment by
Springhawk, and that the conditions under which Springhawk paid that expense
render the retention of the benefit unjust. (Cplt.PP 290-91.)

A resulting trust arises "where a person makes or causes to be made a
disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does
not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest therein, unless the inference is rebutted or *477 the
beneficial interest is otherwise effectively disposed of." Restatement (Second)
of Trusts s 404 (1957). There is no way that one could conclude that Springhawk
should have a beneficial interest in the Apollo Mall, which is the "property" that
was taken or held by Gallant. The Mall was supposed to be transferred to the
Unkechaug, not to Springhawk. Springhawk's "beneficial interest" in the property
was not an ownership interest, but was limited to its interest in running an
illegal gaming operating on behalf of the Unkechaug.

Alternatively, in order to be entitled to recover damages for unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant obtained a benefit that in
equity and good conscience he should not have obtained or possessed because it
rightfully belongs to another. iWon, Inc. v. Ourhouse, Inc., 192 Misc.2d 1, 5, 744
N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup.Ct. Westchester County 2001) (citing Bugarsky v. Marcantonio,
254 A.D.2d 384, 384, 678 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2d Dep't 1998)). Assuming the allegations
of the complaint to be true, someone-and Springhawk alleges that it was
Gallant-was enriched to the tune of $300,000, which Springhawk agreed to let the
AP Equity Defendants apply toward the mortgage on the Apollo Mall in the
expectation that it would be transferred to the Unkechaug. I decline to grant
the motion for summary judgment dismissing Springhawk's claim for unjust
enrichment, but I do so without prejudice, pending discovery. The same warning


For the reasons stated above, the first Sixteen Causes of Action and the
Twenty-Fifth Cause of Action are dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants.
The Flaum defendants' motion to dismiss on the pleadings the Eighteenth and
Twenty-First Causes of Action is denied. The Gallant defendants' motion for
summary judgment as to the Eighteenth, Twenty-First, Twenty-Sixth, and
Twenty-Seventh Causes of action is denied without prejudice to renewal following

A Case Management Order is attached. Counsel will note that it calls for all
discovery to be concluded within 120 days. I will not extend that deadline for
any reason.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.