| (Cite
as: 166 Wis.2d 464, 480 N.W.2d 234)
Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
In
re the Interest of D.S.P., a juvenile.
I.P.,
Appellant-Petitioner,
R.A.C.P.,
Co-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
STATE
of Wisconsin, Respondent.
No.
89-1362.
Argued Nov. 25, 1991.
Decided
Feb. 18, 1992.
**236 *468
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Michael J. Palid, Marinette
and oral argument by Mr. Palid.
For the co-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Frank J. Crisafi,
Madison and oral argument by Mr. Crisafi.
Guardian Ad Litem brief
was filed by Kim A. Coggins, Marinette, with oral argument by Ms. Coggins.
CECI, Justice.
This case is before the
court on petition for review of a published decision of the court of appeals,
In re Interest
of D.S.P.,
157 Wis.2d 106, 458 N.W.2d 823 (Ct.App.1990). The court of appeals affirmed
an order by the circuit court for Marinette County, Circuit Judge William
J. Duffy, presiding. The order terminated the parental rights of I.P.
and R.A.C.P. as to their child D.S.P., an enrolled member of the Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the tribe), on grounds of abandonment
under secs. 48.415(1)(a)2 and 3, Stats.
[FN1] We granted both parents' *469
petitions for review of the court of appeals' opinion.
FN1.
Sections 48.415(1)(a) 2 and 3, Stats., provide as follows:
48.415
Grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights.
At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury may make a finding that
grounds exist
for the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental
rights shall be one of the following:
(1)
Abandonment. (a) Abandonment may be established by a showing that:
. . . . .
2.
The child has been placed, or continued in a placement, outside the parent's
home by a court order containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2) and
the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period
of 6 months or longer; or
3.
The child has been left by the parent with a relative or other person,
the parent knows or could discover the whereabouts of the child and the
parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period
of one year or longer.
Three issues are presented
on review. The first issue is whether the circuit court erred by instructing
the jury on dual burdens of proof: "beyond a reasonable doubt"
as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f);
[FN2] and "clear and convincing evidence" as required by sec.
48.31(1), Stats.
[FN3] We hold that the dual burden of proof was proper.
FN2.
25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f) provides as follows:
[sec.]
1912. Pending court proceedings
. . . . .
(f)
Parental rights termination orders; evidence; determination of damage
to child
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
FN3.
Section 48.31(1), Stats., provides as follows:
48.31
Fact-finding hearing. (1)
In this section, 'fact-finding hearing' means ... a hearing to determine
if the allegations in ... a petition to terminate parental rights are
proved by clear and convincing evidence.
The second issue is whether
two Indian social workers were "qualified expert witnesses"
as required by 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f), in light of the requirement in
sec. 48.31(4), Stats.,
[FN4] that a licensed physician specializing in *470
psychiatry or a licensed psychologist testify as to emotional
damage in children in need of protection or services (CHIPS) proceedings.
We conclude that **237
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the two
Indian social workers were qualified expert witnesses, and we hold that
sec. 48.31(4), which is applicable to CHIPS proceedings, is not applicable
in termination of parental rights proceedings under sec. 48.415(1), Stats.
FN4.
Section 48.31(4), Stats., provides as follows:
48.31
Fact-finding hearing....
. . . . .
(4)
The court or jury shall make findings of fact and the court shall make
conclusions of law relating to the allegations of a petition filed under
s. 48.13(1) to (11m) [CHIPS petitions]. In cases alleging a child to be
in need of protection or services under s. 48.13(11), the court shall
not find that the child is suffering serious emotional damage unless a
licensed physician specializing in psychiatry or a licensed psychologist
appointed by the court to examine the child has testified at the hearing
that in his or her opinion the condition exists, and adequate opportunity
for the cross-examination of the physician or psychologist has been afforded....
The third issue is whether the testimony of the witnesses supported a
determination, as required by 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f), "that the continued
custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child." We hold that the witnesses'
testimony supported the jury's determination.
We therefore affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
The facts are not in
dispute. R.A.C.P. is the mother of D.S.P., who was born in March, 1984.
D.S.P. was R.A.C.P.'s fifth child born to her out of wedlock. R.A.C.P.'s
parental rights to the prior four children were terminated for reasons
of neglect. During her entire pregnancy with D.S.P., although repeatedly
advised to the contrary, R.A.C.P. continued to consume alcohol and did
not eat properly.
I.P. is the adjudicated
father of D.S.P. Both I.P. and D.S.P. are enrolled members of the tribe.
I.P. and R.A.C.P. had married and were living in Michigan by the time
of the trial in this case.
*471
Beginning before D.S.P.'s birth and throughout the next few years, the
Marinette County Department of Social Services (the department) attempted
to assist R.A.C.P. with her parenting. Though D.S.P. was in his mother's
custody for the first seven months of his life, R.A.C.P. often left him
with babysitters for extended periods of time without explanation.
In October 1984, D.S.P.
was placed in foster care. Eventually, the department
filed a CHIPS petition stating that D.S.P. was in need of protection and
services. Custody of D.S.P. was transferred to the department, and D.S.P.
was formally placed in a foster home. The parents were warned that failure
to visit D.S.P. could result in termination of their parental rights.
Despite the efforts of
the department to assist the parents in establishing a relationship with
D.S.P., the parents visited D.S.P. only rarely. Eventually, neither parent
made any contact with D.S.P. for a period of over a year. Thus, the department
filed a petition for termination of parental rights.
At the termination of
parental rights trial, Martha Snyder, representing the tribe, testified
that the tribe officially recommended supporting the termination of the
parental rights of both I.P. and R.A.C.P. Following the jury trial, the
circuit court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both
parents. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
We first have to determine
the appropriate standard of review. The first issue presented by this
case is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law.
Pulsfus Farms
v. Town of Leeds,
149 Wis.2d 797, 803-04, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989). We review questions of
law without deference to the decisions of the lower courts. Id.
The second issue, whether the two Indian *472
social workers were qualified expert witnesses, "is a matter resting
in the sound discretion of the circuit court, and unless it is shown that
the circuit court abused its discretion, its ruling will
stand." State
v. Robinson,
146 Wis.2d 315, 332, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). The third issue, whether the
evidence supports a requirement of the ICWA, is a question of law. Koenings
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
126 Wis.2d 349, 358, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985). However, because this question
of law is intertwined with factual issues, we give the circuit court's
decision on this issue some weight. Id.
The first issue presented
by this case, the burden of proof applicable to a termination of parental
rights hearing in cases involving the ICWA, is a case of first impression
in this state. In
re Interest of D.S.P.,
157 Wis.2d at 119, 458 N.W.2d 823. Under the Wisconsin children's code,
the burden of proof in a petition to terminate parental rights hearing
is clear and convincing evidence. Section 48.31(1), Stats. However, under
the ICWA, the burden of **238
proof is "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the testimony
of qualified expert witnesses...." 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f). As stated
above, the circuit court instructed the jury on dual burdens of proof.
R.A.C.P. asserts that the dual burden of proof was improper because the
Wisconsin children's code is superseded by the ICWA and because the ICWA
mandates the use of the reasonable doubt standard in an involuntary termination
of parental rights proceeding.
Federal legislation preempts state legislation when it is the intent of
Congress to assert federal primacy in a particular field or when the state
legislation conflicts with the federal legislation. See
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2481-82, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991). We
find neither an express nor an implicit intent *473
within the ICWA to preempt the Wisconsin children's code. Rather, the
ICWA expressly calls for the use of state law rather than the ICWA if
the state law "provides a higher standard of protection" than
that accorded by the ICWA. 25 U.S.C. sec. 1921. In addition, the ICWA
is not pervasive, all-encompassing legislation, but rather sets forth
minimum standards that must be followed. This is indicated by the stated
congressional policy behind the ICWA:
The
Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families
and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes....
25 U.S.C. sec. 1902.
The ICWA does not preempt the Wisconsin children's code, and, therefore,
the Wisconsin statutes can be read so as to harmonize them with the ICWA.
The Wisconsin children's code states that the ICWA supersedes the provisions
of the children's code in any child custody proceedings covered by the
ICWA. Section 48.028, Stats. However, as the ICWA requires the use of
state
law whenever that state law provides a higher standard of protection than
is mandated by the ICWA, we find it appropriate that where the children's
code provides additional safeguards beyond what is mandated by the ICWA,
those additional safeguards should be followed.
R.A.C.P. urges us to
find that the ICWA mandates using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
for proof *474
of abandonment under sec. 48.415(1)(a), Stats. R.A.C.P. argues that the
policy behind the ICWA is thwarted if sec. 48.415(1)(a) is proved by only
clear and convincing evidence. We do not agree. The policies behind both
the ICWA and the Wisconsin children's code are similar: to protect the
best interests of the child and to preserve family stability, among other
things. Section 48.01(1), Stats.; 25 U.S.C. sec. 1902. The ICWA strives
to achieve this goal by requiring evidence proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child before
parental rights may be terminated. 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f). The children's
code strives to achieve this goal by requiring clear and convincing evidence
of abandonment, or other grounds for termination, before parental rights
may be terminated. Sections 48.31(1) and 48.415, Stats.
The two different means
of achieving these goals can be harmonized without requiring that the
burden of proof be the same for both. Absent a clear indication
that the state law should be abrogated, we decline to do so. The additional
state law safeguards should be applied by the burden of proof mandated
by the state law. A dual burden of proof, if mandated by the ICWA and
state law, is therefore appropriate. The Alaska Supreme Court has come
to a similar conclusion. See
Matter of J.R.B.,
715 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 1986).
In the proceedings at
issue here, the circuit court determined that a dual burden of proof was
proper. As mandated by the ICWA, the circuit court required that the **239
jury unanimously agree
[FN5] beyond a reasonable doubt *475
"that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."
25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f). The circuit court also required that the jury
unanimously agree that there had been "active efforts ... made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family and that [those] efforts [had] proved
unsuccessful." 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(d). To satisfy the requirements
of the Wisconsin children's code, the circuit court then required that
the jury be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that R.A.C.P. had
abandoned D.S.P. under sec. 48.415(1)(a)2, Stats.; that each parent had
abandoned D.S.P. under sec. 48.415(1)(a)3, Stats.; and that each parent
was unfit to be the parent of D.S.P. These jury findings fulfill the burden
of proof requirements of both the
ICWA and the Wisconsin children's code.
FN5.
Although the ICWA does not explicitly require a unanimous verdict, its
use is consistent with the highest burden of proof. As the issue is not
presented by this review, we decline to decide whether a unanimous verdict
was necessary.
The second issue is whether two Indian social workers were "qualified
expert witnesses" as required by 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f), in light
of the requirement in sec. 48.31(4), Stats., that a licensed physician
specializing in psychiatry or a licensed psychologist testify as to emotional
damage in CHIPS proceedings. This issue is a matter resting in the sound
discretion of the circuit court. Both parents argue that sec. 48.31(4)'s
requirements apply to this termination of parental rights proceeding because
the expert witnesses had to testify, as required by sec. 1912(f) of the
ICWA, as to the likelihood of emotional damage. Both parents also argue
that the social workers were not qualified to testify as to emotional
damage. We do not agree with the parents' arguments.
*476
Section 48.31(4), Stats., applies only to CHIPS proceedings. Section 48.31(4)
does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings under sec.
48.415(1), such as the case at bar. Although the ICWA
commands the use of state law rather than the ICWA if the state law "provides
a higher standard of protection" than that accorded by the ICWA,
see
25 U.S.C. sec. 1921, we do not interpret the ICWA to require that Wisconsin
courts apply evidentiary requirements from CHIPS statute sections to termination
of parental rights proceedings under sec. 48.415(1).
In response to the parents' argument that the social workers were not
qualified to testify to emotional damage, we note that the ICWA does not
require the testimony of licensed physicians or psychologists. If the
Congress had meant to require the testimony of licensed physicians or
psychologists, it could easily have done so. Instead, sec. 1912(f) of
the ICWA requires the testimony of "qualified expert witnesses"
as to the likelihood of emotional damage. However, the ICWA does not define
what qualifications a person must possess in order to be "qualified"
as an expert witness.
Although the ICWA does
not define qualified expert witness, a House Report prepared in conjunction
with the ICWA states that the phrase " 'qualified expert witness'
is meant to apply to expertise beyond the normal social worker qualifications."
H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7545 (1978). In addition, the Department of Interior, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, has promulgated "Guidelines for State Courts"
which interpret the ICWA. Those guidelines include the following:
*477
D.4. Qualified Expert Witnesses
(a)
Removal of an Indian child from his or her family must be based on competent
testimony from one or more experts qualified to speak specifically to
the issue of whether continued custody by the parents or Indian custodians
is likely to result in serious physical or emotional damage to the child.
(b)
Persons with the following characteristics are most likely to meet the
requirements for a qualified expert witness for purposes of Indian child
custody proceedings:
**240
(i) A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by the tribal
community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family
organization and childrearing practices.
(ii)
A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery of
child and family services to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing
social and cultural standards and childrearing practices within the Indian
child's tribe.
(iii)
A professional person having substantial education and experience in the
area of his or her specialty.
44 Fed.Reg. 67593 (1979). While the above guidelines are not by themselves
binding upon courts, we find that they are helpful and should be considered
when deciding whether a witness is a qualified expert under the ICWA.
Both parents argue that two of the witnesses presented by the state, Frances
Kokko and Martha Snyder, were not qualified expert witnesses. Frances
Kokko's testimony revealed that she possesses the following degrees: an
Associate of Arts in child development, a Bachelor of Science in human
services, and a Master's in social work. She is a full-blooded Chippewa
Indian and has reared three children in the tribal tradition. At the time
of the trial here, Ms. Kokko testified *478
she had approximately 14 years' experience in the social work field and
is certified as a social worker by the state of Michigan.
The other expert witness
objected to, Martha Snyder, testified that she also was certified as a
social worker by the state of Michigan and had been involved in the field
of social work since 1974. Ms. Snyder has a bachelor's degree from Northern
Michigan University. Ms. Snyder is a member of the tribe, was reared in
the tribal tradition, and has reared eight children in the tribal tradition.
She testified that she was involved in implementing one of the first Indian
child placement agencies in the United States--the Michigan Child Welfare
Agency--and was chairman of the board of that agency for three years.
Ms. Snyder testified that she helped develop the tribe's Indian outreach
program which started in her dining room and now has a Tribal Center with
38 units of housing in her area. She went on to testify that she was one
of the drafters of the ICWA at the federal level. Under the above guidelines,
we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that
both Ms. Kokko and Ms. Snyder were qualified expert witnesses within the
meaning of the ICWA.
[FN6]
FN6.
Ms. Kokko has also been found to be a qualified expert witness under the
ICWA by a Michigan court of appeals. See
Matter of Kreft,
148 Mich.App. 682, 690, 384 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1986). For other decisions
discussing the issue of qualified expert witnesses under the ICWA, see
Matter of Welfare
of T.J.J.,
366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); Matter
of M.E.M.,
195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313 (1981); Matter
of N.L., 754
P.2d 863 (Okla.1988); State
ex rel. Juv. Dept v. Cooke,
88 Or.App. 176, 744 P.2d 596 (1987); People
in Interest of J.J.,
454 N.W.2d 317 (S.D.1990); Matter
of K.A.B.E.,
325 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1982); and In
re Welfare of Fisher,
31 Wash.App. 550, 643 P.2d 887 (1982).
*479
The third issue
is whether the testimony of the witnesses supported a determination, as
required by 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f), "that the continued custody of
the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child." We give the circuit court's decision
on this issue some weight. R.A.C.P. argues that the testimony of the experts
did not support the jury's determination and was inappropriately directed
because the experts did not testify to whether continued custody by the
parents would harm D.S.P., but rather the experts testified to whether
D.S.P. would suffer harm if removed from his current foster placement
and returned to his parents. We do not agree and hold that the witnesses'
testimony supported the jury's determination.
In this case, the parents did not have physical custody of D.S.P. at the
time of the trial. The ICWA requires a determination "that the continued
custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 U.S.C. sec. 1912(f).
When the child is not in the custody of the parents for a protracted period
of time, as in **241
this case, it would be irrelevant to receive testimony as to whether or
not the continued custody of the child by the parents will harm the child.
Therefore, testimony as to what effect returning the child to the custody
of the parents will have upon the child is probative of whether the continued
custody of the child by the parents is likely to result in harm to the
child.
Here, Ms. Snyder testified
that the custody of D.S.P. by either of the parents would result in definite
*480
emotional damage and possibly serious physical harm to D.S.P. Ms. Snyder
also testified that it would be a "traumatic experience" for
D.S.P. to be returned to the custody of I.P. and R.A.C.P. We agree with
the circuit court's findings, and we hold that in this case, such testimony
supported the jury's determination.
The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
166 Wis.2d 464, 480 N.W.2d
234
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