(Cite
as: 31 Wash.App. 550, 643 P.2d 887)
Court
of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
In
re the WELFARE OF Tami Marie FISHER, a/k/a Tammy Marie Fisher, b.d. 8-11-78.
Appeal
of Albert FISHER.
No.
9654-1-I.
March 8, 1982.
Rehearing
Denied April 15, 1982.
*551
**887
Phil Mahoney, Seattle, for appellant.
James Young, Mary Parks,
Seattle, for respondent.
Rosanne Pennington, guardian ad litem.
Laura Banks, Seattle,
guardian ad litem.
JAMES, Judge.
Albert Fisher appeals
an order of permanent deprivation. We affirm.
When Tami Marie Fisher
was born prematurely on August 11, 1978, she weighed less than 4 pounds
and showed signs of drug withdrawal. On December 19, 1978, a dependency
order was entered placing her in the custody of the Seattle Indian Center.
Following a hearing on June 11, 1980, the rights of the mother and the
natural father were *552
terminated. The hearing on the petition to permanently deprive Albert
Fisher, the child's legal father, was continued until November 21, 1980.
Fisher did not appear at the termination hearing; however, he was represented
by counsel and there is no **888
contention that he had insufficient notice of the hearing. The trial judge
considered the uncontested allegations in the petition as well as the
testimony of two experts called on behalf of the petitioner, and found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Fisher's parental rights should be terminated.
Fisher first contends
that the trial judge erred in entering the order of permanent deprivation
on the ground that the requirements of RCW 13.34.180 were not satisfied.
The record demonstrates that this contention was not
raised at the permanent deprivation hearing. Although an issue was raised
in a previous hearing concerning the order of deprivation, it was agreed
that Fisher could raise the issue at the termination hearing. The record
shows that Fisher's counsel did not raise the contentions he now urges
on appeal at the permanent deprivation hearing held on November 21, 1980.
Accordingly, Fisher's first assignment of error cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
Further, Fisher's primary
contention is that under RCW 13.34.180(1) the child was not found to be
dependent as to him. We do not agree. An order was entered on December
19, 1978, finding the child to be dependent. Dependency as defined in
RCW 13.34.030(2) relates to the child's status of being abandoned, abused
or neglected by its parent, guardian or other custodian. There is no requirement
that an order of dependency specifically state that the child is found
to be dependent as to a particular parent, guardian or custodian. Such
a determination is implicit in a finding of dependency. In addition, dependency
is only one factor to be considered in determining whether to deprive
a parent of all parental rights. "The primary concern in a permanent
deprivation proceeding is the best interests of the child ..." In
re Dodge, 29 Wash.App. 486, 493, 628 P.2d 1343 (1981). The trial judge
here *553
found beyond a reasonable doubt that "(a)n order terminating the
parent-child relationship between Albert Fisher and the above-named
minor child is in the best interests of the child." Finding of fact
1(B).
Fisher next contends
that the trial judge erred in determining that the witnesses who testified
in support of the petition for deprivation were "qualified experts"
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. We do not agree. The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 provides that:
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
25 U.S.C. s 1912(f).
H.R.Rep.No.95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in (1978) U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 7530, 7545 states that "(t)he phrase 'qualified
expert witnesses' is meant to apply to expertise beyond the normal social
worker qualifications." See generally Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 Hastings Law Journal 1287, 1320 (1980).
Here, the trial judge
specifically found that the two expert witnesses were qualified. One of
the witnesses had been employed as a caseworker supervisor of the foster
care program in the Indian Center for 3 years. The other witness was a
mental health counselor for the Puyallup tribe and had been employed as
a foster
care case worker by the Seattle Indian Center for 21/2 years. The trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that in view of the
witnesses' experience and training in dealing with Indians and Indian
problems that they were qualified expert witnesses for purposes of the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
Fisher next contends
that insufficient evidence was introduced to support a determination beyond
a reasonable doubt that his continued custody of the child would result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child as *554
required by 25 U.S.C. s 1912(f). We do not agree.
**889
We have independently examined the record. In considering the testimony
of the expert witnesses as well as the uncontested allegations of the
petition, we find there was sufficient evidence upon which a rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the custody
of the child by Fisher would result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child.
Affirmed.
RINGOLD and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
31 Wash.App. 550, 643
P.2d 887
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