| (Cite
as: 43 S.W.3d 30)
Court
of Appeals of Texas,
Houston
(14th Dist.).
In
the Interest of W.D.H., III., Appellant.
No.
14-99-00507-CV.
Feb. 15, 2001.
Rehearing
Overruled April 19, 2001.
*32 Belinda
Johnson Chagnard, Houston, for appellants.
David S. Masquelette,
Brian J. Fishcher, Houston, for appellees.
Panel consists of YATES,
WITTIG, and FROST, JJ.
MAJORITY
OPINION
YATES, Justice.
Appellant, William Hightower,
appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with his son,
W.D.H, III. On appeal, Hightower argues the trial
court erred in not applying the standard for the termination of his parental
rights as found in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §
1901, et seq. (1983) ("ICWA"). We agree. Because the trial court
did not apply the correct legal standard for the termination of the parent-child
relationship, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND%H
W.D.H. was born on February 13, 1994. At the time of birth, both W.D.H.
and his mother tested positive for crack cocaine. The Texas Department
of Protective and Regulatory Services ("TDPRS") removed W.D.H.
from the hospital and placed him in a foster home. Hightower's whereabouts
were unknown at the time of W.D.H.'s birth. In April 1994, Hightower contacted
TDPRS, expressing an interest in W.D.H. Accordingly, TDPRS prepared a
family service plan with the long-term goal of reuniting Hightower and
W.D.H. Hightower's employment, however, resulted in his being transferred
frequently, making it difficult for him to provide a stable environment
for W.D.H. Consequently, Hightower advised TDPRS that he wanted W.D.H.
placed with appellant's cousin, Darlene Berry. In May 1994, after conducting
a home study, an investigator with TDPRS recommended that W.D.H. be placed
with Berry. However, for reasons not ascertainable from the record, W.D.H.
was not placed with Berry and remained in foster care.
[FN1]
FN1.
In July 1995, Berry contacted TDPRS and indicated that she was interested
in having W.D.H. placed with her. Another home study was conducted and
overnight visits with Berry were arranged. According to TDPRS caseworker,
in late 1995, Berry indicated that she was no longer interested having
W.D.H. placed with her. At the termination hearing, Berry disputed this
assertion.
To facilitate regular
visits with W.D.H., TDPRS assisted Hightower in getting his work transferred
to Houston. In November 1994, just prior to obtaining a residence in Houston,
Hightower was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to twenty-five
years in prison. While incarcerated, Hightower advised TDPRS that W.D.H.
was one-fourth Indian. At Hightower's request, TDPRS prepared the necessary
paperwork to enroll W.D.H. in the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribe of Oklahoma (the
"Tribe").
[FN2] Hightower also advised TDPRS that he wanted W.D.H. placed with the
Tribe until he was released from prison. The Tribe expressed a desire
to have W.D.H. placed with it. Accordingly, TDPRS changed its family service
plan to reflect the goal of *33
placing of W.D.H. with the Tribe. The Tribe, however, never took custody
of W.D.H. TDPRS was also in contact with two members of the Tribe regarding
the placement of W.D.H., but those members said that they would not be
able to take him. No other
members of the Tribe came forward to request placement of W.D.H. In 1996,
TDPRS was appointed W.D.H.'s sole managing conservator.
FN2.
Hightower is one-half Indian and is also enrolled as a member of the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Indian Tribe.
Based on Hightower's
representation that he would be released in 1997, TDPRS prepared another
family service plan with the long-term goal of reuniting Hightower and
W.D.H. Hightower's parole was denied, however, and he was not released
in 1997. Because TDPRS was not able to determine when Hightower would
be released from prison, it changed its long-term goal of reuniting Hightower
and W.D.H. to termination of parental rights and adoption.
In January 1998, TDPRS
filed a petition seeking the termination of Hightower's parental rights
and sent notice of the termination suit to the Tribe. In July 1998, the
Tribe responded to the notice by stating that although it would not intervene
in the termination proceedings at that time, it reserved the right to
intervene in the future. The termination hearing commenced on November
11, 1998. At this time, the Tribe filed a motion to intervene and entry
of appearance. The trial court granted the Tribe's motion and continued
the hearing until December 1, 1998. The Tribe, however, did not participate
in the hearing and took no further action with regard to the termination
proceedings.
On December 18, 1998,
the trial court entered a decree for the termination of Hightower's parental
rights.
[FN3] The trial court based the termination of the parent-child relationship
on the following findings: (1) Hightower knowingly engaged in criminal
conduct that resulted in his imprisonment and inability to care for W.D.H.
for not less than two years from the date of the filing of the petition,
(2) Hightower engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional
well being of W.D.H., and (3) it was in the best interest of the child
to terminate the parent-child relationship.
FN3.
The decree also included the termination of the parental rights of W.D.H.'s
mother, Diane Johnson. Johnson did not appear at the hearing, but, instead,
signed a Mother's Affidavit of Relinquishment of Parental Rights. Johnson
is not a party to this appeal.
II. APPLICATIon of the
ICWA
Although Hightower
brings seven points of error in this appeal, we find his second point
of error dispositive and, therefore, consider it first. In his second
point of error, Hightower challenges the termination of his parental rights
on the ground that it was error for the trial court not to apply the standard
for the involuntary termination of parental
rights found in the ICWA, rather than the standard found in section 161.001
of the Texas Family Code. See
tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp.2000). We agree. Whether
the trial court correctly applied the ICWA is a question of law. J.W.
v. R.J., 951
P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1998); In
re I.E.M.,
233 Mich.App. 438, 443, 592 N.W.2d 751, 754 (1999). In Texas, questions
of law are subject to de novo review. Precast
Structures, Inc. v. City of Houston,
942 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (citing
State v. Heal,
917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.1996)).
[FN4]
FN4.
TDPRS contends Hightower has waived his complaint that the trial court
applied the incorrect legal standard because he failed to file a request
for additional findings of fact. The application of a legal standard,
however, is a question of law. A trial court's conclusions of law are
always reviewable on appeal. Waggoner
v. Morrow,
932 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). Moreover,
the trial court was made aware of Hightower's complaints concerning compliance
with the ICWA when those complaints were raised during closing argument
and in his motion for directed verdict, thus, preserving error. tex.R.App.
P. 33.1. Additionally, the record establishes that the trial court was
aware that the ICWA applied in this case by its attempt to comply with
the requirements of the ICWA. See
Doty-Jabbaar v. Dallas County Child Protective
Servs., 19
S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (rejecting Child
Protective Services' argument that the mother had not preserved error
with respect to the trial court's failure to comply with the requirements
of the ICWA where the record demonstrated that the trial court attempted
to comply with the requirements of the ICWA).
*34
Congress enacted
the ICWA in reaction to concerns regarding the effects on "Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare
practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,
usually in non-Indian homes." Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 32, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). In accordance
with these concerns, the ICWA " 'seeks to protect the rights of the
Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe
in retaining its children in its society.' " Id.
at 37, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7546).
[FN5]
FN5.
Congressional findings incorporated into the ICWA further reflect these
concerns:
Recognizing
the special relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people,
the Congress finds--
* * *
(3)
that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United
States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4)
that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of
such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions;
and
(5)
that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities
and families.
25
U.S.C. § 1901 (1983).
When the court knows
or has reason to know an Indian child is involved in
a child custody proceeding, then the ICWA applies to the proceeding. 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a); Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 874; see
also In re Adoption of Baade,
462 N.W.2d 485, 490 (S.D.1990) (stating that applicability of ICWA is
contingent only on whether Indian child is subject of child custody proceeding).
The ICWA defines an Indian child as "any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b)
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child
of a member of an Indian tribe; ..." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). W.D.H.
is enrolled as a member of the Cheyenne Arapaho Tribe. Therefore, the
ICWA applies to the termination proceedings in this case. Even the Tribe's
failure to intervene in the termination proceedings does not affect the
applicability of the ICWA. Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 874; see
also In re L.F.,
266 Mont. 461, 464, 880 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); In
the Interest of P.B.,
371 N.W.2d 366, 368 (S.D.1985).
To order the involuntary
termination of the parent-child relationship in Texas, one *35
of the enumerated statutory grounds must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, as well as that termination is in the best interest of the child.
tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1) & (2). Section 1912(f) of the
ICWA sets forth the minimum standard for the involuntary termination of
parental rights:
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence
of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1983).
The trial court in this
case combined the requisites of the Family Code and the ICWA by applying
the evidentiary standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as found
in the ICWA to its findings under the Family Code. Therefore, the trial
court concluded "beyond a reasonable doubt" that: (1) Hightower
had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his imprisonment
and inability to care for W.D.H. for not less than two years from the
date of the filing of the petition under section 161.001(1)(Q); (2) Hightower
had engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well
being of W.D.H. under section 161.001(1)(D);
[FN6] and (3) it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the
parent-child relationship under section 161.001(2). The trial court, however,
failed to make a finding, in accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f),
i.e., "that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child."
[FN7]
FN6.
We note that the trial court made this finding in accordance with
subsection (D). However, subsection (D) states "knowingly placed
or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child."
tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). Therefore, this particular finding
by the trial court should have been in accordance with subsection (E),
which provides for termination if the court finds that the parent "engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct
which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child."
Id.
at § 161.001(1)(E).
FN7.
The custody referred to in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) is "legal"
custody rather than "physical" custody. In
re Adoption of Baade,
462 N.W.2d at 490.
The parties do not dispute
that the ICWA applies to the termination proceedings at issue; rather,
the crux of the dispute is whether the respective termination provisions
of the Family Code and the ICWA may be applied simultaneously. TDPRS contends
the trial court correctly applied the ICWA and the Family Code. We disagree.
First, absent from the trial court's findings and conclusions is a determination,
in accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f), that "the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian
is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."
The language of the ICWA is clear and unambiguous; parental rights may
not be terminated in the absence of such a determination. Therefore, it
was error for the trial court not to make this finding. In
re Elliott,
218 Mich.App. 196, 210, 554 N.W.2d 32, 38 (1996); Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 876.
Second, it was error for
the trial court to make any findings under the Family Code because the
provisions providing for the involuntary termination of parental rights
are in conflict with the ICWA. Federal law preempts state law when: (1)
Congress has expressly preempted state *36
law, (2) Congress has installed a comprehensive regulatory scheme in the
area, removing the entire field from the state realm, or (3) state law
directly conflicts with the force or purpose of federal law. Cardinal
Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, Tex.,
180 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir.1999).
Congress has not expressly stated that it was preempting state law concerning
child custody proceedings by enacting the ICWA. In
re Brandon M.,
54 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 677 (1997). Nor has Congress
intended for the ICWA to occupy completely the area of child custody proceedings.
Id.; In the
Interest of D.S.P.,
166 Wis.2d 464, 473, 480 N.W.2d 234, 238 (1992). Therefore, to find preemption
of the involuntary termination
provisions set forth in the Family Code, we must find that they are in
conflict with the ICWA. There are two types of conflict preemption: (1)
it is impossible to comply with both the federal and state law, and (2)
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of congressional objectives. Railroad
Comm'n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
844 S.W.2d 679, 694 (Tex.1992) (citing Northwest
Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan.,
489 U.S. 493, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989)).
The standard provided
in section 1912(f), that "the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child," is "notably different" from
the standard under the Family Code, which requires the party seeking termination
to establish that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
"best interest of the child." Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 877. Congress was also concerned with the "best interests
of Indian children" in enacting the ICWA:
The
Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families
and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance
to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1983). However, the term "best interests of
Indian children," as found in the ICWA, is different than the general
Anglo American "best interest of the child" standard used in
cases involving non-Indian children. Yavapai-Apache
Tribe v. Mejia,
906 S.W.2d 152, 169 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding
[leave denied] ) (citing Quinn
v. Walters,
320 Or. 233, 259, 881 P.2d 795, 810 (1994) (Unis, J., dissenting)).
[FN8] Therefore, "[u]nder the ICWA, what is best for an Indian child
is to maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture, and family."
Id.
(citing Quinn,
881 P.2d at 810) (citing Holyfield,
490 U.S. at 50 n. 24, 109 S.Ct. 1597); see
also In re Appeal of Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903,
130 Ariz. 202, 204, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (1981) (observing that the ICWA
"is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian
child's best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected").
FN8.
See also
Alissa M. Wilson, The
Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the Indian Child
Welfare Act in In re S.S. & R.S.,
28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 847 n.68 (1997) (citing Michael Dale, State
Court Jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act & the Unstated
Best Interest of the Child Test,
27 GONZ. L.REV. 353 (1991/92) (depicting the dichotomy between the Anglo
"best interest of the child" standard and ICWA "best interest
of the Indian child" standard, with the latter encompassing ties
to one's own culture)).
*37
The requirement
under the Family Code that termination of the parent's rights must be
in the best interest of the child is based on the "Anglo" standard
for determining the best interest of the child. Yavapai-Apache
Tribe, 906
S.W.2d at 168.
[FN9] When state courts make a determination regarding the best interest
of the child, "they obviously consider the factors from their own
perspective, that is, an Anglo-American point of view." Id.;
see also In re Custody of S.E.G.,
521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.1994) (stating "[t]he best interests of
the child standard, by its very nature requires a subjective evaluation
of a multitude of factors, many, if not all of which are imbued with the
values of majority culture"). Therefore, we conclude that it is not
possible to comply with both the two-prong test of the Family Code, which
requires a determination of the best interest of the child under the "Anglo"
standard, and the ICWA, which views the best interest of the Indian child
in the context of maintaining the child's relationship with the Indian
Tribe, culture, and family. See
Yavapai-Apache Tribe,
906 S.W.2d at 170 (stating the ICWA "was specifically directed at
preventing the infiltration of Anglo standards" in custody proceedings
involving Indian children). Because the best interest of the child, as
required by the Family Code, conflicts with the ICWA, the trial court
erred in making
its determinations regarding the best interest of the child under state
law. Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 877.
[FN10]
FN9.
Factors that may be considered when determining the best interest of the
child under Texas law include: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional
and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental
abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available
to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child,
(6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions
of the parent. Holley
v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976).
FN10.
Courts from other jurisdictions have applied their respective state law
standards for termination concurrently with the ICWA, including a determination
under state law that termination is in the best interest of the child.
See, e.g., E.M.
v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs.,
959 P.2d 766, 768-71 (Alaska 1998); In
the Interest of H.A.M.,
25 Kan.App.2d
289, 295-96, 961 P.2d 716, 721 (1998); In
re Denice F.,
658 A.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Me.1995). None of these cases, however, address
the differences between the best interest of the child under the "Anglo"
standard and the best interest of the Indian child in the historical context
and purpose of the ICWA. This court has previously analyzed and recognized
those differences. Yavapai-Apache
Tribe, 906
S.W.2d at 168- 70. Furthermore, the Dallas Court of Appeals has also recognized
the difference between the two standards and found it was error for the
trial court to apply the best interest of the child standard under the
Family Code, rather than determining that continued custody by the Indian
parent would result in emotional or physical danger to the child. Doty-Jabbaar,
19 S.W.3d at 877.
Moreover, Texas law requires
the trial court to make an affirmative finding of at least one of the
enumerated statutory grounds, in addition to a finding that termination
is in the best interest of the child. See
In the Interest of B.S.T.,
977 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (stating
that to support termination, both elements must be established). Therefore,
because the trial court may not make any findings regarding the best interest
of the child under state law standards in cases where the ICWA is applicable,
it is also error for the trial court to make any findings concerning
the enumerated statutory grounds.
[FN11]
FN11.
TDPRS contends that the higher evidentiary burden of the ICWA should be
applied to state law grounds for termination, rather than the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard set forth in the Family Code. Even
if we were to find that Texas law setting forth the grounds for termination
is not preempted by the ICWA, we do not agree with TDPRS's contention.
Other courts have found a dual burden of proof properly applies where
state law provides for termination under a "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard in addition to the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of the ICWA; that is, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard does not apply to state law termination grounds. See,
e.g., In re J.R.B.,
715 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 1986); In
re Bluebird,
105 N.C.App. 42, 47-48, 411 S.E.2d 820, 823-24 (1992); In
re Dependency & Neglect of N.S.,
474 N.W.2d 96, 99-100 (S.D.1991); K.E.
v. State, 912
P.2d 1002, 1004-05 (Utah App.1996). But
see Laurie R. v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't,
107 N.M. 529, 535, 760 P.2d 1295, 1301 (Ct.App.1988) (observing that New
Mexico statute expressly provides for utilizing "beyond a reasonable
doubt" evidentiary standard to state law grounds for termination
in cases where ICWA is applicable and that "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard is utilized in cases where ICWA is not applicable).
It should be noted that the
state law provisions in those cases were found not to be preempted by
the ICWA or preemption was not otherwise at issue.
*38
In sum, it was error for the trial court to terminate Hightower's parental
rights in the absence of a finding that "continued custody of the
child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child" in accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
Moreover, because the Family Code provisions for involuntary termination
of parental rights are in conflict with the ICWA and, thus preempted by
it, it was improper for the trial court to base its findings regarding
termination on the Family Code. Hightower's second point of error is sustained.
III. NOTICE TO THE TRIBE
In his third point of error, Hightower contends the trial court erred
in conducting the termination hearing because the Tribe did not receive
proper notice of the termination suit in accordance with the ICWA. The
ICWA provides, in relevant part, that:
...
where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,
the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian
and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested,
of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.... No foster
care
placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until
at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian
and the tribe or Secretary: Provided,
That the parent or Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request,
be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1983) (emphasis in the original).
As a preliminary matter,
TDPRS contends that Hightower does not have standing to challenge the
adequacy of notice to the Tribe of the termination suit. To the contrary,
the ICWA specifically confers standing on a parent to petition a court
to invalidate a termination proceeding upon showing that notice requirements
have not been satisfied. 25 U.S.C. § 1914. This is true in cases
where the parent challenges the adequacy of notice to the Indian tribe.
See In re Pedro
N., 35 Cal.App.4th
183, 190, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 819, 824 (1995) (involving mother's claim that
social services department gave inadequate notice of termination proceedings
to Indian tribe); In
re M.S.S.,
86 Wash.App. 127, 134-35, 936 P.2d 36, 40, review
denied, 133
Wash.2d 1008, 943 P.2d 663 (1997), cert.
denied sub nom., Sather v. Washington,
523 U.S. 1098, 118 S.Ct. 1564, 140 L.Ed.2d *39
798 (1998) (involving father's challenge to adequacy of notice provided
to Indian tribe regarding termination proceedings). We conclude that Hightower
has standing to challenge the adequacy of the notice provided to the Tribe.
A review of the
record, however, establishes that the Tribe received notice of the termination
suit in accordance with section 1912(a). The record shows that when TDPRS
filed the petition for termination of Hightower's parental rights in January
1998, it sent a copy of the petition with an "Amended Notice to Cheyenne
Arapaho Tribe" by registered mail, return receipt requested, advising
the Tribe of its right to intervene and of the next scheduled hearing
in July 1998, as required by the ICWA. Hightower, however, claims that
neither the copy of the notice to the Tribe filed with the court nor the
copy of the notice admitted into evidence at the termination hearing had
a copy of the termination suit attached as "Exhibit B," as stated
in the notice. In July 1998, the Tribe acknowledged TDPRS's compliance
with the notice requirements of the ICWA in the following response:
We
have determined the above named child(ren) is an enrolled member(s) of
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribe. The Indian Child Welfare Program will not
intervene in the following proceedings, however we would like to reserve
our right to intervene should that become necessary in the future.
We
sincerely want to thank you for keeping in accordance [sic] with the Indian
Child Welfare Act....
By its reply and express
refusal to intervene, it appears the Tribe did, in fact, receive a copy
of the petition to terminate Hightower's parental rights. We conclude
TDPRS complied with the notice requirements of the ICWA in initially
notifying the Tribe of the termination suit.
Hightower further asserts the Tribe was not notified that its motion to
intervene and entry of appearance, filed on November 12, 1998, had been
granted or that the hearing had been continued until December 1, 1998.
The record shows that on September 24, 1998, TDPRS served the Tribe with
a notice of trial setting for November 11, 1998, and on November 17, 1998,
an amended notice of trial setting for December 1, 1998. When the hearing
continued on December 1, the Tribe did not appear. Although the record
establishes that the trial court orally granted the motion, it does not
contain a written order granting the Tribe's motion to intervene. Nor
is there any indication in the record that the Tribe was notified that
its motion to intervene had been granted. The Tribe, however, took no
further action with regard to its intervention in the termination proceedings,
such as requesting additional time to prepare for the hearing, and has
not otherwise complained of the trial court's having conducted the termination
hearing without its involvement.
In the absence of any
complaint by the Tribe, we cannot conclude that any alleged failure to
notify the Tribe that its motion to intervene had been granted, particularly
in light of the Tribe having been served with the amended notice of trial
setting, actually harmed Hightower. Therefore, Hightower's third point
of error is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSIOn
In view of our determination that the Family Code's termination provisions
are preempted by the ICWA, it is not necessary to address Hightower's
other points of error challenging the trial court's findings under the
Family Code. Having sustained Hightower's second point of error, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*40
WITTIG, Justice.
My colleagues competently
and accurately describe the predominance of the Indian Child Welfare Act
over certain standards of the Texas Family Code. However, I would more
narrowly construe the federal preemption in accordance with, and because
of, the in pari
materia doctrine.
When two statutes address the same matter or subject, they should be construed,
to the extent possible, in harmony. Findlay
v. State, 9
S.W.3d 397, 399 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Click
v. Tyra, 867
S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
The courts and practitioners
cannot escape the majority's studied conclusion that the Indian Child
Welfare Act requires-for involuntary termination of parental rights (1)
a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that (2) the continued custody
of the child is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). Similarly, the courts and
practitioners must be alerted to other provisions of the Act requiring,
for example, (3) expert testimony concerning the serious emotional or
physical damage to the child. Id.;
Doty-Jabbaar v. Dallas County Child Protective Serv.,
19 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2000, pet. denied). However, I would
not hold, as does the majority, that it was error for the trial court
to make findings under separate Texas statutory grounds or that (all)
Family Code provisions, are in conflict with the ICWA.
Clearly, it is sufficient
for us to hold that the Indian Child Welfare Act heightened standard of
serious emotional or physical damage, proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
trumps the lesser Family Code standard of "best interests of the
child" proven by clear and convincing evidence. But for this court
to hold that a factfinder could not ever conclude that indefinite imprisonment
(over two years to life without parole or even capital punishment), and
inability to care for a child could never meet the heightened Indian standard
is incorrect. Likewise, to hold, as the trial court here did, that endangerment
of the physical or emotional well-being of the child could never meet
the heightened ICWA standard is likewise incorrect. The "best interests"
Texas standard is simply lower than the "serious emotional or physical
damage" standard. If the heightened Indian standard is met, beyond
a reasonable doubt,
a factfinder could logically and correctly include other
aspects of the Family Code as grounds for termination.
The majority discusses,
at footnote 10, sister states that concurrently apply state law and the
ICWA. This, I believe is the correct approach, so long as the application
of state criteria meet or exceed the heightened ICWA requirements. State
law and federal law should be read in
pari materia.
43 S.W.3d 30
|