| (Cite
as: 309 Mont. 529, 43 P.3d 983, 2002 WL 49825 (Mont.))
Supreme Court of Montana.
In
the Matter of Inquiry into K.M.G. and J.G., Jr., Youths
in Need of Care.
No.
01-592.
Submitted
on Briefs Jan. 3, 2002.
Decided
Jan. 15, 2002.
Appeal from District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, in
and for the County of Hill, John Warner, Judge presiding.
Carl White, Attorney at Law, Havre, MT, for appellant.
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney
General, Helena, MT, David G. Rice, Hill County Attorney, Havre,
MT, for respondent.
Chief Justice KARLA M. GRAY delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
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1. ¶ Pursuant
to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as
precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported
by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to
the State Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group in
the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
2. ¶ In
this case, the Montana Department of Public Health and Human
Services (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both
of the natural parents of minor children K.M.G. and J.G.,
Jr. (the children). The Twelfth Judicial District Court, Hill County,
held a hearing at which witnesses testified, including an expert
witness for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
and documentary evidence was received. Thereafter, the District Court entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and, subsequently,
its Judgment and Order terminating the parental rights of both
parents and awarding permanent legal custody of the children to
the Department with the right to consent to adoption. The
natural mother (Mother) appeals, and we affirm.
3. ¶ The
issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred by
telling the ICWA expert witness what testimony was needed to
support the Department's petition for termination of parental rights.
4. ¶ Unlike
most cases involving the termination of parental rights, Mother does
not challenge the findings of fact or conclusions of law
on which the District Court based its judgment terminating her
parental rights. Mother's sole contention is that the District Court
violated Rule 605, M.R.Evid., which precludes a presiding judge from
testifying at trial as a witness and provides that "[n]o
objection need be made in order to preserve the point."
5. ¶ During
the hearing, the Department called Janel Pliley, a Department social
worker in Hill County, as a witness. At the beginning
of her testimony, Pliley testified regarding her education and experience
involving Native Americans and Native American children. Counsel for the
father made a continuing objection to Pliley offering any expert
testimony for purposes of the ICWA. Toward the end of
her lengthy testimony, Pliley was asked if she had an
opinion as to whether the continued custody of the children
by the Mother was likely to result in serious emotional
or physical damage to the children, testimony on which is
required by the ICWA. Mother's counsel joined in an objection
by counsel for the father to Pliley's ability to give
such an opinion, based on lack of foundation. The District
Court overruled the objection and Mother has abandoned that issue
on appeal. No other objection was made regarding Pliley's testimony.
6. ¶ Instead,
Mother contends, in essence, that certain remarks by the District
Court regarding necessary findings under the ICWA constituted testimony
by the court in violation of Rule 605, M.R.Evid., and
that, under Rule 605, no objection was required to preserve
the issue for appeal. She also apparently asserts that questions
by the court, generally allowed under Rule 614(b), M.R.Evid., showed
bias or prejudice by telling Pliley what her testimony needed
to be in order for the court to grant the
petition for termination of parental rights.
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7. ¶ Mother
is correct that, if the District Court did testify, no
objection was required to preserve the issue for appeal. The
transcript contains the following remarks by the District Court with
regard to Mother's contention:
THE
COURT: Well, I know this may be hypertechnical, because I've
listened to all of this testimony from this witness, but
the Indian Child Welfare Act, and I cannot remember the
exact section, requires that opinion by qualified expert that continuation
in the home will seriously impair the mental or physical
well-being of the children. Anybody said that? Does anybody want
to ask that question?
....
THE
COURT: I have to find beyond a reasonable doubt based
on the opinion of a qualified expert that continuation in
the home of the parent will seriously impair the mental
or--I may not have the exact words, but that's that
section. Has anybody got that act?
Immediately thereafter, the County Attorney quoted the exact wording of
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
He stated he thought he had asked the question impliedly,
and then proceeded to ask Pliley directly if she had
an opinion. At that point, counsel made the objection based
on lack of foundation, which was overruled, and the District
Court inquired, "Do you have such an opinion?"
1. ¶ We
conclude that the District Court's statements about the ICWA and
its requirements do not constitute testimony in violation of Rule
605, M.R.Evid., for which no objection is required. They were
legitimate inquiries about the exacting requirements of the ICWA and
whether required testimony had been given. The court's later direct
inquiry to Pliley as to whether she had such an
opinion is permitted under Rule 614(b), M.R.Evid., which specifically permits
a court to interrogate witnesses.
2. ¶ Mother
relies on the portion of Rule 614(b), M.R.Evid., and State
v. Richardson
(1924), 69 Mont. 400, 403, 222 P. 418, 419, which
state that questioning by the court must be cautiously guarded
and exercised with great care so as not to constitute
express or implied comment, bias or prejudice. She ignores, however,
the fact that Rule 614(c), M.R.Evid.--unlike Rule 605-- requires an
objection to interrogation by the court. No such objection having
been made, Mother did not preserve this issue for appeal
and we decline to address it further.
3. ¶ Affirmed.
PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART and JIM RICE, JJ.,
concur.
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