(Cite as: 982 P.2d 738)

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Supreme Court of Alaska.

Anita JOHN, Appellant,

v.

John BAKER, Appellee.

No. S-8099.

Sept. 8, 1999.

Matthews, C.J., dissented with opinion in which Compton, J., joined.

*742 Andrew Harrington and Mark Regan, Alaska Legal Services Corporation, Fairbanks, for Appellant.

J. John Franich, Assistant Public Advocate, Fairbanks, Brant McGee, Public Advocate, Anchorage, and Deborah Niedermeyer, Fairbanks, for Appellee.

Harold N. Brown and Michael J. Walleri, Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc., Fairbanks, for Amicus Curiae Native Village of Northway.

Heather R. Kendall-Miller and Martha L. King, Native American  Rights Fund, Lloyd Benton Miller, Anchorage, and Vance A. Sanders, Juneau, for Amici Curiae Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government and Alaska Inter-Tribal Council.

Vance A. Sanders, Law Office of Vance A. Sanders, LLC, Juneau, for Amici Curiae Paskenta Band of Nomlaki Indians, Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians, and Death Valley Timbisha Shoshone Tribe.

D. Rebecca Snow, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Amicus Curiae State of Alaska.

Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Shilton and  Ethan G. Shenkman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., John D. Leshy, Solicitor and Sandra J. Ashton, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States.

Before MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, COMPTON, EASTAUGH, FABE, and  BRYNER, Justices.

*743 O P I N I O N

FABE, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Seeking sole custody of his two children, John Baker, a member of Northway Village, filed a custody petition in the Northway Tribal Court.  Anita John, the children's mother and a member of Mentasta Village, consented to Northway's jurisdiction.   After the tribal court issued an order granting shared custody, Mr. Baker filed an identical suit in state superior court. Although Ms. John moved to dismiss based on the tribal court proceeding, the superior court denied the motion and awarded primary physical custody to Mr. Baker.   Ms. John appeals, arguing that as a federally recognized tribe, Northway Village has the inherent sovereignty to adjudicate custody disputes between its members and that the superior court therefore should have dismissed the state case.

This appeal raises a question of first impression.   We must decide whether the sovereign adjudicatory authority of Native tribes exists outside the confines of Indian country.   After reviewing evidence of the intent of the Executive Branch, as well as relevant federal statutes and case law, we conclude that Native tribes do possess the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate child custody disputes between tribal members in their own courts. We therefore reverse and remand to the superior court to determine whether the tribal court's custody determination should be recognized by the superior court under the doctrine of comity.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Anita John and John Baker are Alaska Natives;  Ms. John is a member of Mentasta Village and Mr. Baker is a member of Northway Village.   Although they never married, Ms. John and Mr. Baker had two children together:  John Jr., born in July 1991, and Emmanuel, born in June 1992.   The family lived together in Ms. John's village until the parents ended their relationship in 1993.   For the next two years, Ms. John and Mr. Baker cooperated in sharing custody of John Jr. and Emmanuel.   This cooperation ended in July 1995 when Mr. Baker refused to return the children to Ms. John.

In July 1995 Mr. Baker filed a petition with the Northway Tribal Court requesting sole custody of John Jr. and Emmanuel.   The tribal court sent a notice to the parties on August 10 informing them of their right to be present at the custody hearing, and both parents participated in the hearing held on August 29.   At the conclusion of the hearing, Tribal Court Judge Lorraine Titus ordered the parents to share custody of the children on an alternating monthly schedule.   Judge Titus stated, however, that this arrangement would be temporary and that she would reconsider the custody question in one year, before the oldest child entered school.

The parents followed the tribal court's order from September to December, deviating from the alternating schedule only so that Ms. John could care for the children while Mr. Baker was serving a sentence for DWI. During these months Mr. Baker appealed to the tribal court to change its custody order, but the court denied his request.   Dissatisfied with the tribal court's custody determination, Mr. Baker filed a separate action in state court in December. In the affidavit accompanying the state complaint, required at that time under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), [FN1] Mr. Baker misled the superior court by stating that he was "unaware of any custody proceeding regarding the children, except as provided herein, in Alaska, or any other jurisdiction."

FN1. Former AS 25.30.010 et seq.

Citing the tribal court proceedings, Ms. John filed a motion to dismiss the state court action.   The superior court denied her motion.   Ruling first that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)  [FN2] did not apply to a custody dispute between parents, the court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.   The court then stated that even if the tribal court had concurrent jurisdiction, "the facts of this case [would] require" superior court involvement.   The court pointed to the state's access to a child custody investigator and to the parents' different tribal *744 affiliations as facts justifying its involvement in the case.

FN2. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.

The superior court's initial temporary custody order was identical to the tribal court's.   The parties therefore continued with the alternating monthly custody schedule until April 1996, when the superior court altered its temporary order to give Mr. Baker primary custody.   The superior court's final order, entered after trial, maintained Mr. Baker as primary physical custodian and granted Ms. John visitation every other weekend during the school year and for at least eight weeks during the summer.   Although it recognized that both parents had experienced problems with substance abuse in the past, the superior court found that Mr. Baker was in better control of his problems than Ms. John. In addition, the court stated that Ms. John needed to address other issues, such as her severe depression.   Ms. John appealed to this court, arguing that the superior court should have granted her motion to dismiss.

Shortly after we initially held oral argument in this appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II ). [FN3]  We then requested supplemental briefing, asking the parties to address how the Venetie II decision affects the issues presented.

FN3. 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998).

III. DISCUSSION

Resolving this appeal requires us to examine the nature and scope of Native American self-government in Alaska.   We must decide whether Northway Village had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a custody dispute involving children who are tribal members.   If Northway possessed such jurisdiction, we must then decide whether the superior court should have dismissed Mr. Baker's identical state suit.

In a line of decisions beginning with Native Village of Nenana v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, [FN4] and ending in In re F.P.,  [FN5] we held that Native villages in Alaska do not have the power to adjudicate some types of child custody disputes.   Recognizing the existence of these precedents, Ms. John presents two alternative arguments for finding tribal jurisdiction in this case.   First, she argues that we can rule in her favor without overruling Nenana and F.P. because those decisions do not apply to the facts of this appeal.   Second, she contends that even if Nenana and F.P. do apply, we should reconsider their holdings.   Ms. John claims that, regardless of whether they occupy Indian country, Alaska Native villages can adjudicate child custody disputes between members because of their status as federally recognized tribes.

FN4. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986).

FN5. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992).

Mr. Baker's briefing focuses on perceived flaws in the tribal court's decision in this case.   He therefore claims that even if Northway Village generally has jurisdiction to decide child custody disputes between members, state courts should not recognize this particular decision because the proceedings violated due process and because his children are not members of Northway Village.   We evaluate each of the parties' arguments after discussing the relevant standard of review.

A. Standard of Review

We rely on our independent judgment to decide legal questions such as the scope of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction and the meaning of federal statutes. [FN6]  In exercising our independent judgment, we will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. [FN7]

FN6. See Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries, 925 P.2d 246, 248 (Alaska 1996);  In re T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 975 (Alaska 1989).

FN7. See Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).

B. Our Prior Decisions on Tribal Court Jurisdiction to Decide Custody Disputes Do Not Apply to This Case.

Mr. Baker claims that the holdings in Nenana and F.P. compel the conclusion that *745 Northway is without jurisdiction in this case. Although not conceding that these decisions apply to the facts before us, Ms. John asks us to reconsider the holdings of those decisions.   All the amici, including the United States and the State of Alaska, join Ms. John in urging us to reconsider these decisions and recognize tribal court jurisdiction.   Before we decide whether to re-examine our precedents, we must determine whether they apply to the facts before us.   Accordingly, we begin our analysis with an examination of whether it is necessary that we revisit Nenana and F.P. in order to decide this case.

Although the holdings in Nenana and F.P. touched upon the contours of tribal court jurisdiction, both of those decisions were rooted in a pair of federal laws that may not apply to the facts of the dispute between Ms. John and Mr. Baker:  Public Law 280  [FN8] (P.L. 280) and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). [FN9]  If this case does not fall within the scope of either of those pieces of legislation, then the holdings in our prior decisions are not squarely before us today, and it may be unnecessary to reconsider them.

FN8. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub.L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360).

FN9. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.

1. The holdings of Nenana and F.P.

Nenana and F.P. dealt with the question of tribal court jurisdiction in cases falling under ICWA in Alaska.   In Nenana, the village petitioned a superior court under ICWA to transfer a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding to the village's jurisdiction. [FN10]  Interpreting ICWA, the superior court ruled that transfer was improper because the village had not petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.  [FN11]

FN10. See 722 P.2d at 220.

FN11. See id. at 221.

In evaluating the arguments on appeal in Nenana, we first considered § 1918(a) of ICWA, [FN12] which states that any Indian tribe that became subject to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 may "reassume" jurisdiction over child custody proceedings by petitioning the Secretary of the Interior.  [FN13]  Public Law 280 is a federal statute that grants several states, including Alaska, jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters arising in Indian country. [FN14]  In Nenana, we interpreted § 1918(a)'s reassumption requirement to mean that P.L. 280 had vested exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters in state courts, and that the state exercised exclusive jurisdiction until a particular tribe successfully petitioned the Secretary of the Interior. [FN15]  Because the village of Nenana had not petitioned the Secretary of the Interior for reassumption, we affirmed the superior court's denial of the petition for transfer. [FN16]

FN12. See id.

FN13. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a).

FN14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).   Enacted in 1953, P.L. 280 required five states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over affairs in Indian country, and allowed other states to assume such jurisdiction voluntarily.   In 1958, Alaska was added to the list of mandatory P.L. 280 jurisdictions.   See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, P.L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545.

FN15. See Nenana, 722 P.2d at 221.

FN16. See id.

In F.P., we were asked to reconsider Nenana 's holding in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska (Venetie I ). [FN17]  The question before the Ninth Circuit in Venetie I was whether ICWA required the State of Alaska to recognize tribal court child custody determinations. [FN18]  The state argued that because P.L. 280 had granted state courts exclusive jurisdiction over all civil disputes, the villages could not exercise any child custody jurisdiction without first petitioning the Secretary of the Interior. [FN19]  The Ninth Circuit resolved the dispute by addressing two issues:  first, "whether the native villages are inherently sovereign, at least insofar as domestic relations or child-custody issues are concerned," *746 and second, "whether Congress has stripped the villages of that aspect of sovereign authority which encompasses child-custody determinations."  [FN20]  Although suggesting that it saw no impediment to a finding of sovereignty, the court concluded that sovereign status depended on a factual analysis that should be conducted by the district court. [FN21]  It then held that P.L. 280 had not stripped the villages of sovereignty over child custody issues because it had granted the states only concurrent jurisdiction. [FN22]

FN17. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1991).

FN18. See id. at 550.

FN19. See id. at 556, 558.

FN20. Id. at 556.

FN21. See id. at 559.

FN22. See id. at 562.

In F.P., we disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusions on both the issue of sovereignty and on the meaning of P.L. 280.   Addressing the sovereignty question first, we stated that the Ninth Circuit's "opinion is contrary to Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, [[[[[[[[[[ [FN23]] where we concluded that 'the history of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives indicates that Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereigns.' "  [FN24]  Moving to the second step in the Venetie I analysis, we reiterated our view that P.L. 280 had granted the states exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters, quoting from the portion of Nenana that interpreted ICWA's § 1918(a). [FN25]  We therefore reaffirmed our prior holding that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over child custody proceedings under ICWA until they successfully reassume jurisdiction by filing a petition with the Secretary of the Interior. [FN26]

FN23. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).

FN24. In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Alaska 1992) (internal ellipsis and citation omitted).

FN25. See id. at 1215-16.

FN26. See id. at 1216.   But see id. at 1217-18 (Rabinowitz C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that "it is inconsistent with the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty to conclude that § 1918 of the ICWA and Public Law 280, taken together, divest tribes of even concurrent jurisdiction over child custody matters" (citation omitted)).

In sum, our decisions to limit tribal adjudicatory power in Nenana and  F.P. turned on our interpretation and application of ICWA and P.L. 280.  In order to determine if those decisions are controlling, then, we must examine whether those two federal laws similarly apply to the case presently before us.

2. ICWA does not apply to the dispute between Mr. Baker and Ms. John.

ICWA's provisions, including the reassumption requirement of § 1918(a) that we interpreted in Nenana and F.P., apply only to "child custody proceedings" as defined by the statute. [FN27]  ICWA's § 1903 specifically excludes from this definition an award of custody to one of the parents in a divorce proceeding.   Ms. John relies on this language to argue that ICWA is inapplicable to this dispute because it will result in a custody award to a parent.   Thus, we must decide whether a custody battle between unmarried parents qualifies for the divorce exception to ICWA. [FN28]

FN27. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1918.

FN28. Although the superior court ruled that ICWA did not apply to this custody dispute and neither party has appealed this aspect of the court's decision, Mr. Baker now argues that ICWA does apply.   Even though Mr. Baker arguably has not preserved this issue for appeal, this court can affirm on any grounds.   See Gunderson v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 922 P.2d 229, 236 n. 9 (Alaska 1996).   Moreover, we address the question of ICWA's applicability because it is "critical to a proper and just decision," and the "parties have had an opportunity to brief it." In re K.E., 744 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Alaska 1987) (citation omitted).

[4] Congress's intent in enacting ICWA suggests that the divorce exception should apply to this case.   Congress created ICWA because it was alarmed by the number of Indian children removed by state agencies from their parents and tribes and placed into non-Indian homes. [FN29]  In the policy declaration incorporated into ICWA itself, Congress stated that the statute's dual purpose was "to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of *747 Indian tribes and families."  [FN30]  The legislative history emphasizes this dual purpose, stating that the statute "seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society."  [FN31]

FN29. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901.

FN30. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.

FN31. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.

The custody dispute between Ms. John and Mr. Baker raises neither of the concerns ICWA sought to address.   Whatever the outcome of the custody battle, John Jr. and Emmanuel will continue to split their time between the homes of their Native parents and their Native villages.   Because this case does not pose the possibility that the children will be removed from their parents or their tribes, ICWA's exclusive jurisdiction provision as well as its intricate procedural guidelines are unnecessary to protect the family's or the tribes' interests.

Specific legislative history also suggests that Congress intended the divorce exception to apply to any parental custody dispute.   Commenting on a draft of ICWA, the Department of the Interior wrote to Congress suggesting that it create exceptions to the type of proceedings covered by the Act. Stating that the "protections provided by this act are not needed in proceedings between parents," the Department of the Interior advocated for the divorce exception.  [FN32]  Apparently agreeing with the Department's view, Congress inserted the divorce exception into ICWA. The legislature's decision to create the exception based on the Department's opinion that ICWA's protections were unnecessary in disputes between parents suggests that Congress intended for the exception to apply to all parental custody battles.

FN32. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 31.

Relying on the legislative history, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has concluded that Congress intended for the divorce exception to apply to all "domestic relations proceedings ... so long as custody is awarded to one of the parents."  [FN33]  Additionally, the courts that have considered the question have concluded that ICWA does not apply to disputes between unmarried parents. [FN34]  Based on this case law, the conclusions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the purpose of ICWA as expressed in its text and legislative history, we conclude that ICWA does not apply to this inter-parental custody dispute. [FN35]

FN33. Guidelines for State Courts;  Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,587 (1979).   Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not promulgate these guidelines as regulations, they do represent its interpretation of the statute and as such the guidelines have important but not controlling significance.   See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-25, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977).

FN34. See Walksalong v. Mackey, 250 Neb. 202, 549 N.W.2d 384, 387 (1996);  see also In re Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 721-722 (S.D.1989).

FN35. We note that ICWA's inapplicability to all inter-parental custody disputes was an underlying assumption of our decision in J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206, 1214 (Alaska 1998).

3. The Supreme Court's decision in Venetie II suggests that P.L. 280 does not apply to Native tribes occupying Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands.

The United States Supreme Court's recent Venetie II decision suggests that P.L. 280, which grants states jurisdiction over disputes in Indian country, has limited application in Alaska because most Native land will not qualify for the definition of Indian country. [FN36]  By its very text, P.L. 280 applies only to Indian country. [FN37]  If Northway Village does not occupy Indian country, then our rulings interpreting P.L. 280 are not germane to this appeal.

FN36. See 118 S.Ct. at 954-55.

FN37. The relevant portion of P.L. 280 reads as follows:

(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action ...: State of Indian country affected

Alaska All Indian country within

the State....

28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).

*748 In Venetie II, the Supreme Court interpreted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), [FN38] which resolved Native claims to Alaska land by instituting a novel form of Native land ownership. [FN39]  Under this innovative scheme, Congress revoked all existing Indian reservations in Alaska but one, and extinguished all aboriginal title and claims to Alaska land. [FN40]  In exchange, ANCSA entitled Native-owned, state-chartered regional and village corporations to receive approximately forty-four million acres of land and $962.5 million in monetary compensation. [FN41]

FN38. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

FN39. See id. at § 1601(a).

FN40. See id. at § 1603.

FN41. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't (Venetie II ), 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 951, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998).

The Venetie II Court was faced with the question of whether ANCSA lands qualify as "Indian country" under a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, defining the term.   Under § 1151, three kinds of Native lands qualify as Indian country:  Indian reservations under federal jurisdiction, Indian allotments, and "dependent Indian communities."  [FN42]  ANCSA revoked all federal Indian reservations in Alaska but one. [FN43]  The Supreme Court held in Venetie II that a village occupying ANCSA lands does not qualify for the "dependent community" definition of Indian country. [FN44]  Venetie II 's holding, therefore, appears to undermine the Indian country claims of those Alaska villages, like Northway Village, that occupy ANCSA lands.  [FN45]  If Northway Village does not occupy Indian country as a result of Venetie II, then P.L. 280 has no direct relevance to this appeal.

FN42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151;  Venetie II, 118 S.Ct. at 952.

FN43. See 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b).   The sole post-ANCSA Indian reservation in Alaska is the Metlakatla Reservation on the Annette Islands.   See Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 920 (Alaska 1961), rev'd in part, 369 U.S. 45, 54- 55, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962).

FN44. See Venetie II, 118 S.Ct. at 954-55.

FN45. As Mr. Baker notes, some Indian country may still exist in Alaska under the second definition, Indian allotments.   There has been no contention that Northway Village occupies such an allotment, however, and for the purposes of this appeal we assume that Northway Village is not Indian country.

We conclude, then, that neither ICWA nor P.L. 280 applies to the case before us.   Since Nenana and the decisions that followed it were rooted in the application of these statutes, the rationale underlying those precedents is not specifically called into question today.   We accordingly conclude that it is neither necessary nor appropriate at this time to reach the question of whether Nenana and its progeny were wrongly decided. [FN46]

FN46. The United States argues that our prior interpretation of P.L. 280 remains relevant even if Northway Village does not occupy Indian country because it would be contrary to established law to conclude that a tribal court had greater powers outside, rather than inside, of Indian country.   It is true that, generally, Indian nations possess greater powers in Indian country than they do outside it.   See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (holding that only in Indian country may tribes exercise powers over nonmembers).   And at least one federal reservation does still exist in Alaska.   Thus, the United States correctly notes in its brief that the recognition of Northway's jurisdiction creates a disjunction in Indian law jurisprudence.   But this inconsistency does not create a justification to address issues that are not squarely before us.

We have determined that the central issue in this appeal--whether tribal courts have jurisdiction over non-ICWA child custody cases arising outside of Indian country--is not affected by our holdings in Nenana and F.P. To resolve it, we must instead explore the nature of tribal power under federal law.

C. Tribes without Indian Country Can Adjudicate Internal Child Custody Disputes.

Today we must decide for the first time a question of significant complexity and import:  Do Alaska Native villages have inherent, non-territorial sovereignty allowing them to resolve domestic disputes between their own members?   After examining relevant federal pronouncements regarding sovereign *749 power, we hold that Alaska Native tribes, by virtue of their inherent powers as sovereign nations, do possess that authority.

1. We defer to Congress's finding that Alaska Native tribes are sovereign powers under federal law.

We have previously held that tribal status is a non-justiciable political question. [FN47]  We therefore will defer to the determinations of Congress and the Executive Branch on the question of tribal status. [FN48] If Congress or the Executive Branch recognizes a group of Native Americans as a sovereign tribe, we "must do the same."  [FN49]

FN47. See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 163 (Alaska 1977).

FN48. See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 34-35 (Alaska 1988).

FN49. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S.(3 Wall.) 407, 419, 18 L.Ed. 182 (1865).

Prior to 1993, no such recognition of Alaska villages had occurred.   In  Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, [FN50] we conducted an historical analysis and concluded that the federal government had never recognized Alaska villages as sovereign tribes. [FN51]  We relied on this analysis in F.P. to hold that Native villages lacked sovereignty.  [FN52]

FN50. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).

FN51. See id. at 34.

FN52. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Alaska 1992).

In 1993, however, the Department of the Interior issued a list of federally recognized tribes that included Northway Village and most of the other Native villages in Alaska. [FN53]  In the list's preamble, the Department of Interior explained that it was issuing the list in order to clarify confusion over the tribal status of various Alaska Native entities.   The Department believed that previous lists had been interpreted to mean that Native villages in Alaska, although qualifying for federal funding, were not recognized as sovereign tribes. [FN54]  It sought to rectify this misunderstanding and to reaffirm the sovereign status of the recognized tribes.   In particular, the Department emphasized that the list included those Alaskan entities that the federal government historically had treated as tribes. [FN55]

FN53. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs [hereinafter 1993 list], 58 Fed.Reg. 54,364, 54,368-69 (1993).

FN54. See id. at 54,364.

FN55. See id.

The Department also suggested in the preamble that its decision to publish the list was based on a recent opinion by the Solicitor of the Department of Interior, Thomas Sansonetti. [FN56]  In this opinion, Sansonetti evaluated the sovereign tribal status of Alaska Native villages, conducting the same historical analysis as did the Stevens court but reaching the opposite conclusion. [FN57]  Although recognizing that Alaska Native villages differed in significant ways from the tribes in the Lower 48, the Solicitor concluded that, for the last half century, Congress and the Interior Department "have dealt with the Alaska Natives as though there were tribes in Alaska."  [FN58]

FN56. See id. at 54,365.

FN57. See U.S. Dep't Interior, Solic. Op. M-36,975 at 8-60 (Jan. 11, 1993).

FN58. 1993 list, 58 Fed.Reg. at 54,365 (quoting the Solicitor's opinion).

The language in the preamble to the 1993 list unquestionably establishes that the Department of the Interior views the recognized Alaska villages as sovereign entities.   The preamble affirms the Department's view that federally recognized tribes possess governmental authority and autonomy stemming from their tribal status:

The Bureau of Indian Affairs ... [finds] that the villages and regional tribes listed below have functioned as political entities exercising governmental authority....

....

The purpose of the current publication is ... to eliminate any doubt as to the Department's intention by expressly and unequivocally *750 acknowledging that the Department has determined that the villages and regional tribes listed below are distinctly Native communities and have the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states....  [T]he villages and regional tribes listed below are not simply eligible for services, or recognized as tribes for certain narrow purposes.   Rather, they have the same governmental status as other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes with a government-to-government relationship with the United States .... [[[[[[[[[[ [FN59]]

FN59. 1993 list, 58 Fed.Reg. at 54,365-66 (emphases added).

And for those who may have doubted the power of the Department of the Interior to recognize sovereign political bodies, a 1994 act of Congress appears to lay such doubts to rest.   In the Federally Recognized Tribe List Act of 1994,  [FN60] Congress specifically directed the Department to publish annually "a list of all Indian tribes which the Secretary recognizes to be eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians."  [FN61]  The Department published tribal lists for 1995 through 1998, all of which include Alaska Native villages such as Northway, based on this specifically delegated authority. [FN62]

FN60. 25 U.S.C. § 479a et seq.  (West Supp.1998).

FN61. Id. at § 479a-1.

FN62. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 60 Fed.Reg. 9250, 9255 (1995);  see also Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 61 Fed.Reg. 58,211, 58,215 (1996);  Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 62 Fed.Reg. 55,270, 55,275 (1997);  Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 63 Fed.Reg. 71,941, 71,945 (1998).

The text and legislative history of the Tribe List Act demonstrate that Congress also views the recognized tribes as sovereign bodies.   In the Act's findings section, Congress discusses the "sovereignty" of federally recognized tribes. [FN63]  Similarly, the House report to the Act provides that federal recognition "institutionalizes the tribe's quasi-sovereign status."  [FN64]  Acknowledging that federal recognition "is no minor step," the report states that such recognition "permanently establishes a government-to-government relationship between the United States and the recognized tribe as a 'domestic dependent nation.' "  [FN65]

FN63. See P.L. 103-454, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994).

FN64. H.R.Rep. No. 103-781, at 2-3 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768, 2769.

FN65. Id. at 2.   The legislative history to the Act reveals that Congress recognized the dispute over the existence of Indian country in Alaska and did not intend for the tribal recognition list to resolve the dispute.   See id. at 4-5.   But Congress's ambivalence on the Indian country issue does not undermine its recognition of the tribal status of Alaska Native villages.

Through the 1993 tribal list and the 1994 Tribe List Act, the federal government has recognized the historical tribal status of Alaska Native villages like Northway.   In deference to that determination, we also recognize such villages as sovereign entities.

The fact that Northway Village is a federally recognized tribe answers only part of the question posed by this case.   Alaska Native villages such as Northway are in a unique position:  Unlike most other tribes, Alaska Native villages occupy no reservations and for the most part possess no Indian country.   Mr. Baker and the dissent argue that the existence of tribal land-- Indian country--is the cornerstone of tribal court jurisdiction and that Congress necessarily withdrew such jurisdiction from Alaska Native villages when it enacted ANCSA.

To evaluate this argument, we must decide how much authority tribes retain in the absence of reservation land.   We must, in other words, determine the meaning of "sovereignty" in the context of Alaska's post-ANCSA landscape by asking whether ANCSA, to the extent that it eliminated Alaska's Indian country, also divested Alaska Native villages of their sovereign powers.

*751 2. Tribes retain their sovereign powers to regulate internal domestic affairs unless Congress specifically withdraws their authority to act.

The extent of tribal self-government depends on the intent of Congress. [FN66]  We begin our analysis of congressional intent with the established principle under federal law that "Indian tribes retain those fundamental attributes of sovereignty ... which have not been divested by Congress or by necessary implication of the tribe's dependent status."  [FN67]  The United States Supreme Court explained in United States v. Wheeler  [FN68] that this starting point stems from the fact that tribal governance predates the founding of our nation:  "The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.   Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities....  The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character."  [FN69]

FN66. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980);  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-33, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978).

FN67. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 146, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982);  see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079.

FN68. 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978).

FN69. Id. at 322-33, 98 S.Ct. 1079 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Modern tribal sovereignty is certainly not absolute;  "[i]t exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.   But until Congress acts, ... Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."  [FN70]  In explaining this rule, the Supreme Court has articulated a core set of sovereign powers that remain intact even though Indian nations are dependent under federal law;  in particular, internal functions involving tribal membership and domestic affairs lie within a tribe's retained inherent sovereign powers. [FN71]

FN70. Id. at 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079.

FN71. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981).   Part III.C.4 infra contains a full discussion of the scope of retained sovereignty.

[13] Alaska law, too, has long recognized that sovereign powers exist unless divested.   For example, we stated in Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek  [FN72] that "the principle that Indian tribes are sovereign, self-governing entities" governs "all cases where essential tribal relations or rights of Indians are involved."  [FN73]  We recognized then that "Indian affairs are subject to state law but only to the extent that Congress explicitly so provides."  [FN74]  In accordance with the Supreme Court's approach in Wheeler, reiterated in cases following that decision  [FN75] and established under Alaska law, we presume that tribal sovereign powers remain intact.   Thus, we begin by evaluating federal statutes affecting Alaska Natives in order to determine whether Congress has explicitly revoked the inherent sovereignty of Alaska's Native tribes by eliminating their Indian country.

FN72. 560 P.2d 31, 33 (Alaska 1977).

FN73. Id.

FN74. Id.

FN75. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-67, 101 S.Ct. 1245; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

The dissent, however, asks us to begin from the opposite premise.  Rather than following the teachings of federal and state law that respect tribal sovereignty by presuming that sovereign power exists unless divested, the dissent quotes language from Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, [FN76] in which the United States Supreme Court noted that "Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens."  [FN77]  From this statement the dissent *752 deduces what it terms an "allocative principle."  [FN78]  Based upon Mescalero 's language, the dissent formulates a presumption that would reverse the basic rule and require courts, at least outside of Indian country, to refuse to recognize tribal jurisdiction unless an act of Congress specifically authorizes the exercise of tribal adjudicatory power.   We refuse to accept this invitation to deny the existence of tribal sovereignty and to turn federal law on its head.

FN76. 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973).

FN77. Id. at 148-49, 93 S.Ct. 1267.

FN78. Dissent at 774-776.

The dissent's "allocative principle" thesis ignores the teachings of  Wheeler and the decisions that follow it.   In these post-Mescalero decisions, the Court has not focused on tribal land as determinative of tribal authority.   Instead of interpreting the Mescalero language as an across-the-board prohibition of tribal sovereignty in the absence of Indian country, for example, the Court in Montana v. United States  [FN79] reconciled the general rule that tribal sovereignty exists unless specifically divested with the Mescalero language that state law applies to natives beyond reservation land.   But Montana,